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This thesis examines the scope for developing countries, and in particular those with a
socialist tradition like China, to benefit from advanced technologies developed in the
West and acquire indigenous technological capacities. Empirically it investigates China's
attempts to acquire capabilities in the highly complex field of - Public Digital Switching
Systems (PDSS) - the technology at the heart ofmodern telecommunications systems
and therefore ofgreat social and economic importance.
The study builds upon a critical review of literature in three areas: development studies,
studies of socialist economies and technology studies. It explores how developing
countries might utilise exogenous technological competencies effectively, by means of
'dual technology development' with appropriate strategies for technology transfer and
processes of technological learning to transform exogenous competencies into
indigenous ones.
Two detailed cases studies are presented and analysed in the wider social and economic
context. One involves the wholesale transfer of capabilities to produce aWestern PDSS
technology in China (System 12) through a joint venture project. The other involves the
indigenous development of a Chinese PDSS (HJD-04) conceived by a military R&D
institute, and brought to production through a collaboration with two other bodies in the
Chinese telecommunication sector. These cases highlight the range ofchoices available in
the acquisition of technological capabilities - from large scale and formal technology
transfer (System 12), which provided a wide range ofmeans for technological learning,
to the selective import of component technologies (HJD-04) and their effective
combination with locally available expertise. They offer different opportunities for further
innovation and for local shaping of these technologies.
The cases also throw light on the influence of the economic reforms on the technological
dynamism ofChina's 'national system'. In particular, the introduction ofmarket
pressures provided important incentives for R&D institutes and producers to become
more responsive to their customers and to work together. Economic necessity forced
them to compete in the market and meet customers' requirements for high product
quality. The cases demonstrate the need for continued state intervention to provide
frameworks for market mechanisms to encourage technological co-operation, to balance
local and national interests, and to reduce negative social consequences. In light of the
changing and diverse forms of state intervention in China, the thesis argues that market
dynamics and public policy should be complementary.
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1.1 Focus and Scope of Study
The main theme which concerns me in this study is technology development in
developing countries. This basically involves two elements. The first is the transfer of
advanced technologies from industrialised countries, and the various options and
strategies through which a nation may seek to build up indigenous technological
capabilities. The second concerns restructuring a country's socio-economic system for
technological development. This study focuses on a socialist state, the People's
Republic of China, which is transforming its system from a centrally planned to a
market-oriented one, and pursuing development through a combination of state
intervention and market forces. Specifically, it deals with the development of public
digital switching technology (PDSS) in the context ofChina's economic transition.
The empirical research looks into acquisition of technological capabilities in the area
of public digital switching systems (PDSS), focusing on two contrasting cases: in the
first, foreign technology is transferred, as a complete system, into China through a
joint venture project; the other is a locally developed system which utilises available
foreign components and design tools. The study examines these two different
strategies for utilising advanced foreign technologies as well as their outcomes. It
explores in the detail the processes of development and adaptation of technology
involved in these two systems, the social and economic driving forces behind them,
and their roots in China's economic transition. It examines the changes in the
behaviour of, and relationships between, actors (individuals or organisations) involved
in these processes - e.g. a military R&D institute, a state-owned firm, a joint
production venture, and other relevant governmental organisations - focusing in
particular on the roles played by the state and the newly-introduced market
mechanisms in China.
This introductory chapter briefly outlines the intellectual traditions that have
underpinned the approach of this study. It then addresses the importance of the
telecommunications sector and, finally, describes the context of the study in China's
economic and social system.
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1.2 Intellectual Underpinnings of the Study
This research applies the approach of "social shaping of technology" to the case of
telecommunications technology development in China. It examined the detailed
process of technological development, to understand the interactive linkage between
technological development and the social, economic and political agents and
environment wherein the technological process operates. Unlike many economic
approaches, which treat the complex value systems of human society in a simplified
manner as if they were uniform, this research takes other elements involved in the
technological process into account, e.g. cultural inheritance, political tradition,
historical experiences. In contrast to most policy related research which focuses on
the macro level, this study investigates the effects of the policies relevant to building
up technological capabilities and gaining technological competencies at the level of
the individual R&D team, firms and management institutions.
Because technologies like telecommunications have an enormous impact on social,
economic and political life, its development is ofgreat concern to all these social,
economic and political agents. However, the quest for a comprehensive overview of
the interaction between technical and social, political and economic elements adds
enormous complexity to this research. At the same time, the complexity of the socio¬
economic issues addressed - in relation to both the technological development and to
the China's socio-economic transition - makes this study extraordinarily broad. Issues
touched in this research span at least three disciplinary areas: development studies, the
study of socialist economics (in particular the current transition of socialist states) and
technology studies.
In development studies, a long standing debate has surrounded whether developing
countries should import advanced foreign technologies, which may be largely
inappropriate to the local conditions and which have more or less embedded in them
Western values and rationales; does this lead to dependencies of different sorts and
negative social consequences? The experiences of newly industrialised countries
(NICs), particularly the four Asian NICs, suggests that developing countries do
indeed have opportunities to leapfrog into the new technological era based on
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electronics and information technologies from the West. This has prompted more
recent debates on whether the state should pursue the role of directing investment and
activities in technology development and protecting domestic industries, and what
state interventions both direct and indirect are appropriate? Though these debates are
not new to this field, they nevertheless are still academically controversial and are of
great concern to all developing countries. This research seeks to examine these
debates in the light ofChinese experiences, and their relevance for the policy
challenges facing China today. - -
China had adopted a socialist model of development for thirty years before its recent
economic reforms, though this differed from the widely used Soviet model to some
extent. Moreover, while many former socialist states have abandoned socialism, China
is till hanging on to some elements of the socialist path in its economic transition.
Therefore, issues related to the study of socialist economics and transitions are
thrown up by this research. Apart from briefly confronting the heated debates on the
compatibility or incompatibility of socialism and market mechanisms and the future of
socialism, this research analyses the Chinese socialist tradition in relation to
technological development and the transition to a more market-oriented economy.
And it examines their related institutions and government policies which have had a
major impact on the technological dynamism of the country in the past and now.
In the area of technology studies, there have been important developments in
understanding of the process of technological innovation. However, a vigorous and
systematic analysis for investigation of the social determinants of technological change
across different (economic, social and technological) contexts is still lacking. This is
particularly the case in relation to the developing countries, given the focus ofmost
technology studies on the advanced Western economies. The study explores whether
and how insights from technology studies can be applied in developing countries and
China in particular.
This study treats development as a strategic matter, and one that involves a
competition between individual countries, developed and developing alike. It argues
that, despite particular constraints, there are opportunities for less developed
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countries to catch up to some extent. There is thus a need to identify these
opportunities and establish a series of appropriate strategies for the long and short
term development of a nation. It stresses that the development of appropriate
strategies depends on understanding ofnot only the external environment but also
internal strengths and weaknesses.
The Chinese socialist tradition is also brought under scrutiny, so is its economic
transition along "socialist path". With respect to existing socialist theories and
practices, this study suggests that the better choice for China is to combine socialism
and market and integrate state intervention and market forces to balance the interests
of the whole society and the efficiency of economic development. From the viewpoint
ofdevelopment strategies, whether China is truly socialist is not the issue. More
important is the speed and continuity of China's development, not only in economic
but also social and political terms. There are interesting comparisons with the former
Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries which appear to have abandoned
their socialist tradition over night and lost much of state power.
The standpoint of this research is optimistic about the possibility for developing
countries to catch up in the new era of information technology based on micro¬
electronics. With the current trends ofglobalisation of technological development,
issues of national strategies for technology development have come to the fore, for
developed as well as developing countries. The enormous development costs and
complexity of these technologies mean that only the very largest and most advanced
economies can hope to have the full range of technological competencies.
Globalisation thus poses both limits and opportunities on national strategies. In
particular, the application of different strategies can alter the position of a country
from one which solely favours external high-technology suppliers to one which also
meets the interests of the developing countries seeking to acquire the technology.
The success ofAsian NICs has stimulated interest in the matter ofhigh-technology
development and developing countries. This study supports the argument that, given
their relative lack of advanced technology resources, technology transfer is essential
for developing countries. The main focus of this study thus centres on a series of
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strategic issues related to the selection of appropriate technologies, the effective
learning of foreign advanced technologies, and the accumulation of technological
competencies.
This study applies the social shaping of technology approach to technological
development strategies in developing countries. It sees complex modern technology as
a heterogeneous assemblage of diverse technologies and social elements and therefore
capable ofbeing reconfigured in their implementation and use. Transfer of foreign
advanced technology into developing countries is a process ofunpacking and local
shaping of these technologies. There are therefore always choices, albeit within
constraints, for developing countries to decide which technologies to adopt as finished
solutions and which "black boxes" need to be opened. This opens up a range of
strategic options in utilising foreign advanced technologies, e.g. between transferring
developed technological systems and adapting them to local conditions, or buying in
components and/or design-tools to develop systems locally and configuring them into
complex systems matched to local requirements and conditions. The study then
discusses the choice of these different strategies and in relation to the existing
indigenous technological competencies and/or the long term plans for the
accumulation of technological capability of a country.
The idea ofnational systems for technological innovation (section 2.4.1) has recently
received considerable attention in the field of technology studies. The concept
revolves around an attempt to identify a nation's structural characteristics and policies
and their effects on the rate and success of innovation, and implies a search for the
optional conditions for a particular country. However national systems are in a
continuous process of flux - in the face of socio-economic and technological change -
particularly in relation to developing economies and socialist economies in transition.
Because China is undergoing the transformation of its system from the centrally
planned to market oriented one, its social institutional structure and policies have been
changing extremely rapidly. There is thus little value in seeking to identify a particular
"best-practice" national system for China to emulate. This research will instead give
more attention to analysing the successive strategies and policies in China and their
implementation, together with the steps and outcomes of reforming institutional
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structures, and relate these to some general features seen to underpin effective
innovation. In addition, broader considerations, such as domestic social tensions and
international opportunities and pressures are also taken into account.
This research is concerned with policy implications. It evaluates major Chinese
government policies which have had effects on technological activities relevant to the
case ofpublic switching technologies. These include the import substitution policies
to protect domestic industry by providing subsidies to firms, high tariff rates and
regulations that served to restrict the import of foreign goods, financial support for
indigenous technological projects as well as more open policies designed to attract
foreign investment and technology inflow. In particular this study examines the dual
technology policy, described as "walking on two legs", which encouraged both the
transfer of foreign technology into China and the development of indigenous
technology. It discusses the conflict between these policies in the long or short term,
the sequence and circumstances for their implementation and their consequences,
including the positive and negative side-effects.
As well as highlighting issues for China, this study intends to draw lessons and policy
implications ofgeneral importance for other developing countries, especially those in
transition. However, because of the uniqueness ofChina's size and its historical
inheritance, there may be limits in the extent to which Chinese experiences can be
extrapolated elsewhere. In addition, given that this research is based on the particular
empirical case of telecommunications switching technology, findings may be rather
different from other technologies, (for example, automobiles, chemicals or textiles,)
which differ in their technical, social, economic and political features. In particular,
the strategic importance of telecommunications and the fact that network integrity
must be maintained nationally means that the state is a major player in regulating or
actually running the telecommunications system.
Above all China has one fifth of the world's population, about 80 percent peasants,
100 millions living under the poverty line. Its success or failure will have a substantial
impact on the political economy, as well as the environment, of the entire world.
Although this research is mainly focusing on the public switching technology in
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telecommunication sector, it at same time provides a general picture of the Chinese
economic system, its tradition and current transformation. To developing countries,
China's experiment will be an important experience and a source of lessons to draw
upon for alternative paths of development. To those in the developed world, China
might well be a rising opportunity, as well as a threat. These are not fixed matters, but
rather can be altered by the endeavours of the powerful developed world - as
illustrated in this study, the key policy change on the public switching market was the
response of the Chinese government to international pressures from Western suppliers
to open up this market.
1.3 Social, Economic and Political Concerns in
Telecommunications
Technologies vary in their social, economic and political characteristics and
implications. This research examines telecommunications technology, a technology
which has enormous social, economic and political significance.
Telecommunications are a recognised part of the fabric ofmodern society. The
telecommunications industry constitutes a public good and provides the backbone
supporting a wide range of industries, and has the potential to create many new
service activities. The development of the telecommunications industry is also an
important factor in stimulating innovation and research and development (R&D) in a
range of related sectors. As it can offer such great technical and economic advantages
to industry and society, it has long been a focus of attention of business, government
and public debate.
For example, telecommunications services make it possible for information to be
shared by people world-wide. Because of its crucial and fundamental role in economic
and social development, it has the potential to exacerbate inequalities between
individuals or communities simply through people's differential access to the
networks. Particularly in developing countries, introducing advanced
telecommunications technologies into an existing economic and social context could
possibly constitute new and enhance forms of inequality and uneven development
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between rich and poor, central and peripheral regions, and urban and rural areas.
Equally in today's business world, efficient telecommunications services have become
so essential that it is one of the most important factors for a developing country to
attract foreign investment.
The social and economic significance of telecommunications makes it politically
crucial as well. From its earlier years the telecommunications industry has been of
great concern to governments in almost all countries, since the days of the electric
telegraph. Looking back in history, the state has been drawn to play a variety of roles,
e.g. as a customer of the products, a financial sponsor for R&D projects, a guardian
and a regulator for the industry and a co-ordinator to initiate product innovation, etc.
Telecommunications services involve three operational areas - transmission, switching
and terminals. The first two of these are complex, large scale technologies. Network
provision in particular is subject to marked economies of scale. It has been presumed
that economies of scale and network "externalities" (the growing benefits with larger
numbers linked up to a system) would favour "natural monopoly" of
telecommunication provision (which would need to be) run or tightly regulated by the
state. Given the huge capital costs of telecommunications networks, especially the
"local loop" to individual domestic consumers were presumed to prohibit competitive
provision of fixed link phone services. Duplicate provision would be inefficient and
too expensive. Public management, through nationalised service or state regulation,
could further enable the network to be developed in line with broader social and
economic policy objectives - for example to allow equality of access. However the
traditional model, whereby the state was the guarantor or monopoly provider of
telecommunications services, has recently come under sustained attack, with moves
toward privatisation, opening up the sector for competition and so called de¬
regulation (though this often in fact involves re-regulation of the sector), spreading
from the USA to UK, the rest of the European Union, and the rest of the world.
In a context of rapid technological change and the growth and diversification of
telecommunications service markets, it has been argued that state regulation or state
monopoly provision have proved inefficient because of the lack of competition and
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have served as an obstacle for further technological innovation. However, some
researchers such as Vickers and Yarrow (1996) and Ypsilanti (1988) suggest that
privatisation and competitive provision may be not a better solution in the longer
term, particularly in the provision of telecommunications network facilities.
Similar arguments have surrounded the supply of telecommunications equipment. Its
enormous costs stimulate governments to seek domestic manufacture to improve
balance ofpayments. Strategic considerations have motivated many countries to
ensure national ownership or control ofproduction facilities and innovation
capabilities of the technologies involved. However, recent advances in switching
technologies - the move to electronic switches, and in particular to programmed
control and digitisation underpinning PDSS had been associated with a dramatic
escalation of research and development costs. This posed particular problems for
poorer (e.g. smaller and especially developing ) countries which lacked the necessary
financial and human resources. The scale of investments required is frequently beyond
the capacity of individual domestic companies without assistance from the state or
large foreign companies. PDSS posed a strategic challenge for developing countries.
They offered greatly reduced costs and scope for rapid expansion and upgrading of
telecommunications services. But they also posed a number of dilemmas. The first
concerns whether to develop the technology locally or buy it in. In the latter case
there were further dilemmas. Strategies of state control (or even nationalisation) of
foreign firms which might have been relatively successful in relation to earlier mature
generations ofelectromechanical switching technology might frighten away foreign
companies, technologies and investment. Opening up the market for a single foreign
supplier might make it more attractive for private firms to accept public requirements
(e.g. to keep costs low or allow for domestic production), but might lead to
dependency. On the other hand allowing free entry and market competition could
produce fragmentation of the telecommunications network and inefficiencies
associated with duplication of technologies and incompatibilities between them.
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1.4 Context - China's Transition
China has been seeking economic prosperity for generations, no matter whether its
government was "republican", "nationalist" or "socialist". However, recent history
has not favoured this ancient giant, the "central kingdom". While the West prospered,
China, beset by the colonial powers, was subject to sustained political and economic
turbulence and chaos (including civil strife and foreign invasions) until the 1949
success of the Chinese communist party. Since then, there have been several periods
of rapid economic growth. Under the People's Republic, for the first time after a long
period of impoverishment, the country was able to feed its population, by then one
billion, and the majority of the population came to believe in the leadership of the
country, with the expectation that this government would deliver continued
improvements in economic and social well-being.
However, like other socialist states, over time the initial impetus of the revolution
gradually eroded, and people's confidence and inspiration faded away. Mao's political
campaigns inside and outside the governing Communist Party did not save the
socialist system from decline. Mao's policy explicitly prioritised matters of ideology
over economic pragmatism. Rather, economic development became tangled up with
political movements. Ever-changing policies resulted in fluctuations in economic
development and reached its lowest point in the late stages of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976).
China has been reforming since 1978 when the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party ofChina was held in Beijing to inaugurate
China's policies ofeconomic reform and openness to other countries. In a relatively
short period China has become one of the countries in the world with the fastest
growing economy. Between 1978 and 1993, economic growth averaged nine percent
a year. In 1992 and 1993, GDP increased 12.8 percent and 13.4 percent respectively
(Li Tieying, 1994: pp.3). China's share ofworld trade has doubled and 200 million
people have been released from absolute poverty (Balls, 1993). "The dynamism of the
Chinese economy has been a major factor underlying the rapid growth of the region's
trade and output which has contributed to maintaining stability in the world economy"
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(UNCTD, 1994: pp.7). Some consider that China will become the world's next
economic superpower (Balls, 1993).
Unlike the former Soviet Union and other former socialist states, China is commonly
seeking to combine socialism and market mechanisms. The motto ofChina's
transition as defined by the Communist Party is to establish a "socialist market
mechanism in a planned economy" and to build up "four modernisations" (upgrading
industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology) with "Chinese
characteristics". The term "socialism with 'Chinese characteristics'" reflects the
challenge facing China's transition with no existing model to follow, as well as its
pragmatism and the importance attached to social prosperity. This pragmatism is an
essential element ofChinese culture, embodied also in the Chinese leadership, as
captured by Deng Xiaoping's phrase "whether a black cat or a white cat, the one who
can catch rats is the best". It is precisely this pragmatic attitude that Chinese
reformers and ordinary individuals, are displaying in pursuing the current process of
socio-economic transformation. "Chinese socialism" is the product of such a culture.
In China, not many people are seeking a clear definition ofwhat "socialist market
economy with Chinese characteristics" means. Instead, since the market economy is
new for China, people are learning about it while practising it. After thirty years under
a state socialist system, and especially after the previous ten years of the Cultural
Revolution, in which people have seen all too many of the errors and defects
associated with socialism and a centrally planned system, people have high
expectations for a market economy. Only recently have some of the problems endemic
to market economies become apparent. These including the widening of economic
inequality between individuals and between districts, high inflation, increasing
unemployment and disruptive migration from the countryside to the cities and from
poor districts to the richer coastal areas. People are now beginning to recall the merits
of the previous socialist system.
China's reforms have taken place in three phases. The first phase, from December
1978 to September 1984, mainly concentrated on the agricultural sector. It sought to
introduce a more market-oriented system and to give farmers with greater scope for
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private initiatives. This ended successfully with a "rapid increase in agricultural
productivity, a dramatic reduction in the incidence ofpoverty" (Yenal, 1990: pp.707).
From October 1984 to December 1991, the second phase of reform shifted the central
focus to urban areas and was mainly directed to reorganise the industrial sector.
Government policies sought to stimulate the dynamism of industrial sectors by
introducing market forces to the entire system and giving much more autonomy to
enterprises. In the third phase, since the beginning of 1992, the sphere of economic
reform has broadened in many aspects and the process has been stepped up. The aim
is to build up a new socio-economic mechanism for the country (Li Tieying, 1994:
pp.7).
A major objective of economic reforms is the promotion of dynamism of the
technological innovation system. Progress has been unprecedented as economic
reform has led to the integration of economic development with technological
innovation. However, in contrast with the other social, political and economic
policies, the core of science and technology policies has shown key elements of
continuity in the importance it attached to both developing technology locally and
introducing advanced technology from abroad.
As early as 1949, with the foundation of the People's Republic ofChina, one element
of the technology policy was described colloquially as "walking on two legs" - that is
to say, to combine foreign and national aspects in technology development (Li Wan,
1991). Accordingly, the strategy for the development of science and technology aimed
to establish a number of advanced industrial enterprises and to acquire large amounts
ofmodern technology (Li Wan, 1991). There were many ups and downs in
technology development before the 1979 economic reforms largely due to political
fluctuations as well as to fundamental problems of the socialist centrally planned
system (in particular the poor linkages between R&D institutes and production
organisations, and the lack of incentives for firms to adopt technological innovations).
In December 1980, National Labour Conference on Science and Technology in
Beijing had the explicit objectives of overcoming these problems. In particular it
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sought to integrate the S&T systems with economic development. The strategic
motto was clearly presented that
"Economic construction should rely on scientific-technological progress and
that science and technology has to serve economic construction. It was
pointed out that the main task of scientists and technicians was the
development of the national economy, and that the majority of the scientific-
technological forces should be shifted to the main field ofaction - to serve the
development of the national economy" (Li Wan, 1991: pp38)).
This began the introduction ofmarket mechanisms into the field of science and
technology research and development. These new steps were explicitly aimed at
catching up with the West and developing new technologies and high technology.
One of the important features of these new technological development strategies is the
"open door" policy, addressing "rigorous promotion of technology transfer". Opening
China's economy up to other countries was in order to import funds and highly
qualified personnel, and assimilate advanced science and technology and experience
from abroad (Li Wan, 1991). Under this policy, in the late 1980s, the issue of the
introduction of foreign technology came to be seen as all important. Newton's line -
"If I can see a little farther, then it is because I am standing on the shoulders of a
giant" - was frequently quoted by those who believed that "technology import is more
efficient and uses less research personnel than research itself' (Li Wan, 1991: p.44). It
was believed that China should not only seize opportunities to import foreign
technologies, but also make every effort to assimilate, remould and innovate the
imported technology in a so-called a "healthy cycle". (Li Wan, 1991). This concept
drew upon Japanese experiences: the "healthy cycle" is considered as a series of spiral
developmental activities: import of advanced technology; assimilation; new creation;
extension of exports and increased imports (Li Wan, 1991).
The Chinese government has stated that the opening to other countries and rigorous
promotion of technology transfer represent a fundamental long term state policy and a
strategic measure to accelerate socialist modernisation. However, the what really
matters are the changes actually taking place in China's technological innovation
systems and its benefits to the economic development, (as well as any problems which
may arise and lead to policy shifts).
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Today China is undergoing a socio-institutional transition. The whole system is
characterised by instability, as well as by an acute shortage of almost everything. Like
other developing countries, China has been short of capital and natural resources in
proportion to its population size, the rapid rate ofpopulation growth and the slow
rate of capital accumulation (Mu Gongqian, 1991). In these circumstances, the
behaviour of institutions like individual enterprises or firms, local government
organisations, sectors, and even the State, is largely determined by the immediate
external and internal opportunities and pressures bearing upon them. In these
contexts, their scope for developing and implementing new policies are highly limited.
China is determined to catch up in economic development. Especially, since the
economic reforms, its impressive success is reflected in rapid economic growth. As a
former socialist state, China has chosen a way ofdevelopment rather different from
the former Soviet Union and many other countries in the Eastern Block - a strategy
that combines socialism and the market economy. The Chinese government policies in
technology development pursue dual development: on the one hand, rigorously
importing foreign advanced technologies and, on the other, encouraging assimilation
and innovation of imported technologies. But, in reality, China is facing enormous
constraints and problems in its road of seeking for social prosperity. Old problems
stemming from the socialist system are still there while new problems associated with
the emerging market-oriented mechanism have surfaced.
1.5 Outline of Thesis
There are three parts to this thesis. Part I, the background to the study consists of
three chapters. Chapter 1 outlined the scope and intellectual underpinnings of the
study, flagges the importance of telecommunications technology and describes the
context ofChina's political and economic situation. In Chapter 2, the literature in
three areas - development studies, the study of socialist economics and transition and
technology studies - is reviewed and discussed. These form the basis ofmy theoretical
framework. Basic concepts important to the main themes of this study are defined.
Finally within this theoretical framework, the presumptions and research questions are
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brought forward for examination in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 describes the
research design and methodology of this study, including the process of fieldwork.
Part II presents the empirical findings - focusing on two case studies, in which the
innovation processes in the development of two public switching technologies, one
indigenous and the other foreign, are explored. To set the scope for these, Chapter 4
first depicts the historical background of the Chinese telecommunications
infrastructure, the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications, PDSS technologies and
industry. It is then followed by two major chapters giving detailed accounts of the
case studies. Chapter 5 explores the case of import of a foreign PDSS technology,
specifically the process of technology transfer of System 12. It examines the process
of technological innovation (adaptation and improvement) and changes in the social
and economic arrangement (e.g. related government policies) over this period. The
acquisition of technological capability is investigated with the analysis of the joint
production venture, Shanghai Bell. Chapter 6 examines the case of the indigenous
technology, detailing the process ofbuilding up the sociotechnical constituency for
the Chinese public digital switching system, HJD-04. This involves three players: a
military research institute which initiated the project, a state-owned firm which
produces the HJD-04 system, and a governmental organisation, the Posts and
Telecommunications Industrial Corporation. Along with elucidating how social
factors in the transition shaped technical features of this technology, and how
technical and organisational elements were aligned together, it gives a close-up
examination of the state-owned firm, its accumulation of technological capabilities,
problems encountered and progress made.
Part HI is concerned with analysis and conclusions and has three chapters. Chapter 7
analyses the process ofPDSS technology development and the range of strategies
revealed by these cases by the comparison between indigenous and exogenous
technology acquisition processes encountered in the case studies. Chapter 8 evaluates
contributions of the broader social and economic context to PDSS technology
development in China's economic transition. Finally, Chapter 9 presentsthe summary






This chapter explores the possible contributions to this study ofwritings from three
disciplines: development studies, writings on socialist economics and technology
studies. This provides the basis for the theoretical framework for my research. As the
fields reviewed are each extensive, it has been necessary to be selective in this account
of the literature and main debates. The sources used, and the framework presented
here, reflect the particular concerns and values which have underpinned my research.
In this complex area it is possible that different people could arrive at rather different
interpretations, even of the same historical phenomena, insofar as they draw upon
their own knowledge and belief systems which, in turn, are built upon their past
experiences and early knowledge frame. Thus, it is not possible to create a single
authoritative account. This is why it is interesting and useful in social sciences for
various researchers to address the same subject.
Section 2.2, "Modernisation, Dependency and Intermediate Technology", is the
review ofdevelopment studies, and in particular of the issues relating to technological
development and its relationship with economic development in developing countries.
From the vast range of theoretical writings on socialism, section 2.3, "The
Implications of Socialist Practices", focuses upon debates about the role ofmarkets
and state within socialist economies. Section 2.4, "Technology Studies", examines the
range of relevant approaches within technology studies and their relevance to this
study.
Section 2.5 summarises the rationales as an outcome of literature review and draws
threads between the theoretical framework of this study and research questions to
discuss throughout the concrete cases in the rest of these chapters.
2.2 Development Studies
The systematic study of the problems of development in developing countries (DCs)
has emerged mainly in the period sinceWorld War II. Amongst many theoretical
approaches in literature on development studies, economic development in DCs has
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been a central focus, and similarly economic theories are the main stream of the field.
A dominant tradition, associated with modernisation theory, suggested that
developing countries should simply repeat the industrialisation process of the
advanced economies. However, the largely frustrating experiences of developing
countries in the 1960s and 1970s (especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa), and comparatively successful more recent experiences of the newly
industrialised countries (NICs), have challenged these classical economic perspectives
and opened new territories for development studies. Today, it has been by and large
acknowledged that development is not purely an economic phenomenon, rather a
multidimensional process involving the reorganisation and reorientation of entire
social as well as economic systems. In particular, technological development has come
to play an increasingly important role in the economic and social life ofdeveloped and
developing countries.
Section 2.2.1 discusses lessons this study can draw from post-war literature on
development studies, distinguishing three main intellectual traditions: modernisation
theory, dependency theory and the approach of intermediate technology. Section
2.2.2 highlights the importance of the recent practical successes of the newly
industrialised countries and discusses the issues that this new phenomenon throws up
for development studies and the strategies of developing countries.
2.2.1 Modernisation, Dependency and Intermediate Technology
There are many theoretical approaches within the post-war literature on development
studies. A variety of schema have been proposed to categorise these diverse
approaches. These include, for example, the mainstream modernisation theorists,
structuralist approaches and dependency theories. Various writers reviewing this field
have sought to synthesise and categorise this diverse literature (Clark, 1985; Colman
& Nixson, 1994; Chenery and Srinivasan, 1988; Dutt & Jameson, 1992; Hirschman,
1981; Taylor, 1992; Todaro, 1994; Smith, 1995). However, scholars from different
academic, social and political backgrounds have treated theoretical concepts
differently, or given different emphasis to particular elements, and have thus arrived at
different classifications of the main theoretical trends and the relationships between
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them (Smith, in Pillai & Shannon 1995, in particular section 1). For example, in many
accounts the 'structuralists' are attached to dependency school, however, in some
other schema, structural-change theories are associated with those, such as Lewis,
Chenery and some post-Keynesians (Todaro, 1994), who are broadly associated with
the stage-model that derives from modernisationist accounts. These differences are
not "just academic" but reflect sharp political differences within the field of
development studies. Thus there have been controversies about the contribution of
various traditions. For example, modernisation theory has been strongly criticised on
the grounds of its implicit ideological support for neo-colonialism or imperialism
(Barratt Brown, 1974; Leys, 1975, 1977; Smith, in Pillai & Shannon 1995; Warren,
1980; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). However, others have seen modernisationists as
making an important contribution to the theoretical development of development
studies, linking them to those of developmentalists who were ambitiously seeking a
unified model of development (Smith, in Pillai & Shannon 1995).
Despite these differences ofview, modernisation theories and dependency theories are
more or less consistently recognised by most scholars as representing two contrasting
views in development studies. Whilst the former was articulated largely by scholars
from the industrialised countries, the latter emerged from DCs countries (notably
based on experiences in Latin America). It would probably be too simplistic to say
that these two theories have been the mainstreams in development studies. However,
they do often represent points in a spectrum, which provide a useful point of entry
into the area of technology studies, its ideological, theoretical, and empirical diversity,
and the range ofcontroversies that have arisen. Another reason that it is worth
reviewing them is that the core of these two perspectives still retain their influence
over development studies today (although not many still acknowledge this
contribution). Moreover, some of the issues raised in these two perspectives are still
relevant to today's practice in DCs.
The most outspoken and influential theory in the Modernisation tradition can be
traced to Rostow's stages ofeconomic growth (Todaro 1994). Rostow, as an
economic historian, classifies all societies into five stages: the traditional society, the
pre take-off stage, the take-off stage, the drive to maturity stage, and the age ofhigh
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mass consumption. According to Rostovian or modernisationists, all countries pass
through the same set of historical stages in the same sequence, and if there are slight
variations in terms of timing, duration and other factors, these do not detract from the
main process. Less developed countries are backward in terms of their cultures,
political systems, social institutions and economic resources. As a result,
modernisationists believed that, as an extension of the already developed part of the
world, what less developed countries must do is "to compress an essentially linear
process into the shortest possible time-scale" (Clark, 1985: pi65). "The way to
become "less backward" is to borrow, buy or copy those corresponding features of
the rich countries felt to be instrumental in bringing about economic growth" (Clark,
1985: pi67).
Modernisation theories came under attack from many scholars not only for their
economic implications but also on empirical, ideological and methodological grounds.
The most eminent critique came from a range ofwriters from Latin America who
developed theories of "structural underdevelopment", which have also been described
as "dependency theories" (Santos, 1973). From this perspective, the conditions in the
less developed countries were examined as part of a broader international picture.
"Underdevelopment is seen as being caused by the dominant influence exercised by
developed capitalist countries as a result of certain political and economic institutions
which lock poor LDCs into a dependent relationship" (Colman and Nixson, 1994:
p29).
Perhaps the heaviest criticism was derived from empirical studies in the third world
which showed that the Western model ofdevelopment had brought negative
consequences including unemployment, dependency and disequilibrium. Latin
American and African countries are seen as typical victims of this development
approach. And the Western model of development was condemned as
"maldevelopment" or "distorted development" (Goulet, 1983). It was believed that,
even where high economic growth had been achieved, mass misery still continued.
There, a small portion of people gained wealth through economic growth. However
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the majority was by-passed, and these benefits did not trickle down to the poor
masses.
Dependency theories have a very pessimistic view of the prospects for technology
transfer, let alone the acquisition of technological capabilities by developing countries.
With regard to technology transfer, it is believed that the ownership or control over
advanced technologies is not transferred, and there is merely a geographical
movement of technology from one set ofgeographical boundaries to another, but still
within the control of the metropolitan economy. Thus developing countries do not
have effective access to the whole range of existing technologies, and the price
structure is always based on the seller's market. Moreover, Western technology is
regarded as a two-edged sword, simultaneously creating and destroying different
kinds ofvalues-destroying old values and uprooting people in alienating fashion, and
threatening indigenous values, local economies or local institutions in developing
countries (Goulet, 1983). Indigenous technological competencies are even less
possible to achieve, as developing countries are considered to be poor and lacking
technological resources, not only equipment but also know-how and manpower.
Therefore, the more a developing country relies on advanced Western technologies,
the more it will reinforce its dependency on industrialised countries.
Some of the most radical critiques have led to extremely pessimistic views, based on
notions of "a series of interlocking vicious circles ofpoverty and stagnation",
"backwash effects", "low level equilibrium traps", "backward sloping supply curves of
effort" and the like, which assert the impossibility of economic development in less
developed countries (Clark, 1985). Some even concluded that "stopping economic
growth would be the solution" (Riedijk, 1982: p2). However, these dependency
theories have been subject to increasingly severe criticism (Lall, 1975; Lays, 1977;
Palma, 1978; Warren, 1980).
For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to review all the writings within these
two perspectives. Instead, I will draw out those aspects which are most relevant to
the theoretical framework ofmy research. As we have seen, the core theory of
modernisationist perspective, the linear-stage model of development, has hardly any
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credibility in development studies today. However, its implicit presumptions have
become deeply rooted in much contemporary thinking about development. Let us
leave aside for the moment two long-standing criticisms ofmodernisation theories -
first, that politically and ideologically they reflect colonialist and imperialist views,
and, second, that their schematic form does not provide a useful framework for
critical analysis nor for policy prescription. However, we can still acknowledge the
usefulness of a range of detailed empirical studies conducted within this framework.
For example, modernisation theories generalised the features of experiences of
economic and technology development in the West, in particular, the powerful
integration of technology and market economy. This point is closely related to the
interests of this research, and I will explore it in detail below.
The "dependency" or "structural underdevelopment" theories opened new
perspectives for developing countries to understand their situation within the world¬
wide economy and the sphere of international politics. This structural perspective is
obviously useful for comprehensive analysis of the technological, social and
economical development in developing countries. However, from the early 1970s
onwards, dependency theories came under increasing criticism on both theoretical and
practical grounds. The latter, in particular, was in response to the success ofNICs in
which sustained and rapid economic growth has taken place with the state playing a
strategic role. Dependency theories could not provide adequate explanation of this. (I
will return to this in the following section).
Despite this, it is undoubtedly the case that dependency theory has provided many
important insights into the characteristics of developing countries and the interaction
between them and developed capitalist economies. For example, one of the important
contributions ofdependency theory is to show that the problems ofdevelopment are
not only a question of economic growth, but that the broader social dimensions must
be addressed. It highlights a range of social issues in developing countries, including
social security systems, unemployment, income distribution, poverty. Technological
change, and especially the negative consequences of technology transfer from
industrialised countries, are given particular attention. Moreover, these negative
consequences identified by dependency theories as arising from economic growth in
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developing countries on Western lines are still arising today: continuing
unemployment with excessive immigration from rural to urban areas is causing serious
social instability; the gap between rich and poor is widening; and pollution of natural
environment and excessive exploitation of irrenewable resources are worsening. On
top of these difficulties are added also the effects of the discriminatory trade barriers
imposed by industrialised countries. "Textiles are the most obvious, though not the
only, example" (The South Commission, 1990: p29).The DCs have been playing a
role in providing low-price food and raw materials to industrialised economies, in
order to buy highly value-added industrial goods as well as technologies.
The critique advanced by dependency theory has been one factor stimulating the
emergence of an important concept about technological development in developing
countries. This is 'intermediate technology' (or appropriate technology), which points
to an alternative development approach that seeks to encourage self-sustained growth
through the design and development of technologies that build upon locally available
skills and resources, and appropriate to the local, social and cultural circumstances. A
leading role in espousing this concept has been played by Schumacher's publication,
"Small is Beautiful" (Schumacher, 1973). Various bodies, such as the Intermediate
Technology Development Group, which was established in London in the late 1960s,
have sought to put these ideas into practical application.
Like dependency writers, Schumacher and his supporters attributed many disastrous
manifestations in the world to modern technologies. They concluded that:
1) many Western technologies are inappropriate to local conditions in developing
countries;
2) there is a huge imbalance in technology trade between richer and poorer
countries;
3) technology transfer has reinforced dependencies ofall kinds; and
4) the values of less developed countries' are being manipulated and people are
being mobilised to support goals reimposed from the external - metropolitan
economies of industrialised countries (Schumacher, 1973).
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To counter these tendencies, they therefore called for alternative development
approaches. Intermediate technology is supposed to be appropriate for local
conditions in less developed countries and regions, and to meet certain criteria, e.g.
being easy to access, easy to learn, and being suitable for small scale regional or
district production with local resource supplies (Schumacher, 1973).
The intermediate technology approach appears to provide a very promising model of
technological development in developing countries, by encouraging indigenous
technological capabilities. However it has obvious weaknesses. First of all, the ideas
about which technologies might be appropriate have been confined to a very limited
category of artefacts and technologies - which effectively rules out a wide range of
existing technologies, particularly advanced technologies. Second, the practical
achievements of appropriate technology have been very limited. This draws attention
to weaknesses in its theoretical framework - and in particular its treatment of
technology. Schumacher and his supporters only recognised the fact that technology
embodies social factors of the country which developed the technology. But they did
not pay sufficient attention to the possibility that exogenous technologies could be
sufficiently flexible to be useful in a wider range of circumstances or could be adapted
to the particular local context of developing countries. Further, they have largely
confined their search for technologies appropriate to developing countries to a series
of relatively inefficient traditional technologies, to the exclusion ofmodern
technologies which are often extremely resource efficient (Beckerman, 1995).
One of the reasons for these theoretical and practical shortcomings can be linked to
shortcomings in Schumacher's conceptualisation of technology. Schumacher saw
socio-economic values as becoming embodied in technological artefacts - that were
conceived as stabilised "black boxes". Their implementation and use would therefore
impose certain socio-economic arrangements and outcomes. In this respect,
Schumacher's perspective on technology can be seen to have incorporated some
features of the "technological determinist" approaches (Williams and Edge, 1992)
which were extremely prevalent when he was writing. From this perspective,
therefore, technology transfer tends to be virtually treated as the synonym of
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technology transport from one place to another. I will return to this point in section
2.4.
2.2.2 The Challenge of the Newly Industrialised Countries - NICs
A key feature of the global economy in the last decades has been the marked process
ofeconomic and technological development in a number of peripheral economies - the
so-called newly industrialised countries, notably Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
and Taiwan. These experiences present a sharp challenge to existing theories and
models ofdevelopment studies. The high growth rates experienced by East Asian
NICs obviously contradict the pessimistic conclusion assumed by advocates of
dependency. On the other hand, it is fairly clear that the model of development under
way in the NICs is far removed from the modernisation theorists' concepts, discussed
above, to create DCs in the image of the social order now present in the developed
countries (or the concept that DCs had to replicate their particular development paths
and methods, e.g. laissez-faire system and industrialisation). The NICs' success has
attracted the attention of scholars from a variety of tendencies - whether
modernisationists, dependency advocates, neo-Marxians, structuralists or other neo¬
classical economists (Dutt, Kim and Singh 1994). It has stimulate detailed
investigation of the NICs' practices across a broad range ofdimensions (e.g.
institutional structure, government policies).
The interpretations drawn from the NICs' experiences are often highly controversial.
The theoretical approaches of individual scholars tend to lead them to reach different
conclusions. For instance, neo-classical economists see their laissez-faire model in the
successes ofTaiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore (Wolf 1990); others
attribute this to the role ofgovernment intervention (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990,
Singh 1992). However, some conclusions are now becoming commonly
acknowledged (though intellectual debates are continuing and inducing further
research on the details of The NICs' experiences).
First, it is commonly recognised that governments in Taiwan, South Korea and
Singapore have played substantial role in provision ofmacroeconomic policies and
infrastructure, such as directing capital investment and technological development,
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issuing restrictions on imports for industrial promotion, etc. The market is guided by
the long term national plans for investment and industrial development formulated by
government officials; the content and pace of industrialisation is not left entirely to the
aggregate decisions of individual businessmen (White & Wade 1988). The extent of
government intervention at the industry level varies according to perceived necessity.
Some industries have accordingly been highly subsidised and directed by the
government; others have experienced policy intervention only intermittently; the rest
have been more or less left to take care of themselves within a broad framework of
regulation (Wade 1985, Pack and Westphal 1986, Bardhan 1988). One of the main
areas of debate among different schools of thought within development studies
concerns whether these interventions played a positive role in economic development
in these countries. When we compare the development experiences of these NICs
with those in economies subject to strict state control across the board, and those at
the other extreme that have relied upon laissez-faire approaches, what emerges as an
important feature of the countries is not their resort to state intervention or market
forces, but the way they manage to blend market force and government intervention in
an appropriate manner.
Second, East Asian NICs attach considerable importance, in economic development,
to the accumulation of technological capabilities. In contrast to the predictions of
dependency theories, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan have obtained
technological competencies in such areas as consumer electronics, semi-conductors
along with a range ofmanufacturing technologies in traditional industrial sectors.
Moreover, in this process, The NICs' experiences show the feasibility and indeed
necessity for dual technological development, transferring advanced technologies
from developed countries on the one hand and facilitating the adaptation of foreign
technologies into local conditions on the other. Considerable interest has been shown
in the influence that selective technology acquisition strategies might have effects
upon the prospects for technological dynamism and industrialisation ofDCs.
Attention has become concentrated recently on investigations into the actual and
likely impact of the "radical" new technologies associated with the use of the
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microprocessor in many branches of economic production and distribution (Luedde-
Neurath, 1988).
Third, the success ofNICs invites detailed research on the contribution to technology
dynamism ofnational institutional structure and strategies (and how these have
changed over time). In these countries, industrial policies of import substitution and
export orientation are not contradictory; both have been applied in the process of
industrialisation. It is commonly recognised that South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
began their industrialisation drives with high levels of protectionism, and gradually
became more export-oriented (White and Wade, 1988). This raises a range of
research and policy questions, concerning the extent to which national strategies are
applied across different sectors and at different stages in the process; when and how
to apply these strategies; how these strategies are implemented and technology
dynamics are achieved.
Finally, an important observation from the studies of the NICs' development
experiences concerns the uniqueness ofdevelopment process in individual countries,
reflecting their specific historical characteristics in terms ofcultural, economic and
political development. The international environment in which a development process
takes place is relevant too. In spite of the encouraging aspects derived from the
success ofNICs, many have suggested that the transferability of their experiences is
extremely limited.
In summary, NICs' experiences greatly challenged the intellectual traditions of
development studies. This also shift the central focuses of development studies from
more generalised issues on to more specific ones, such as the role of state and
government policies on industrialisation, foreign trades, science and technology
development strategies, etc.; accumulation of technological capabilities; and
technological dynamism. More importantly, this new shift provided much prospects of
technology and economic development to developing countries, especially those in
Asian Pacific region. For China, it is extremely tempting to try to follow the suit in
achieving technological development and economic growth, and the reform of the
socialist central planning system has become the pressing undertaking. Next section
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will turn to recent writings on socialist economics relevant mainly to China's socialist
practices.
2.3 The Implications of Socialist Practices
This section aims to clarify my standpoint about the problems facing socialist societies
particular in relation to economic and technological development through a review of
recent writings on socialist theory. The collapse of the political and economic systems
in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, and the challenge of resurgent
new liberal policies to Western forms of social democracy has thrown traditional
concepts of socialism into a deep crisis. Many writers on the left have been forced to
reassess their approaches. Some of the fiercest controversies have arisen between
writers in the Marxist tradition, involving sharp polemics about the nature and
definition of socialism. However, I have only limited interest in these theoretical, and
often sectarian, debates. Instead, this review focuses on the practical issues which
socialist states like China are facing and particularly those arising with their transition.
My main concern here is pragmatic - to build up a framework which will provide a
means for socialist developing countries and to achieve economic and technological
development in the context of transition, rather than digging to find out authentic
socialist theory. In particular, based on the analysis of socialist practices in the past, it
emphasises the need for diversity of applying state interventions apart from the central
planning and direct state control, and the importance ofusing these instruments
strategically for technological and economic development. Section 2.3.1 discusses
selectively the issues put forward by the current crisis of socialism in both theory and
practice, concerning the transition of former socialist states from centrally planned to
market oriented economies, and through this process brings out the rationale on
which my position is based. Section 2.3.2, from the view point of technological
development, goes further to examine the problems or merits of "socialist traditions" -
and in particular of the state control and central planning.
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2.3.1 The Central Planning System
Contrary to the expectations of 19th century Marxists, 20th century socialist
revolutions had taken place in largely pre-industrial or industrialising countries. It is
generally acknowledged that the early socialist regimes in Russia and China alike
made great achievements in industrialisation.
Taking China as an example, the socialist government achieved, in the first five years
after revolution, 18 percent increase per year on average in industrial production and
a 4.5 percent average growth in agricultural production. People's living standards
rose substantially, with average wages of the non-agricultural labour rising 42 percent
and of peasants 27.9 percent in this period (Zhou 1982). The regime had the strength
and stability to fend off external pressures and destabilisation. Similarly, the Soviet
Union proved more efficient than many of its capitalist counterparts in achieving rapid
industrialisation in an industrially backward country through high rates of saving and
concentrated investment as well as in building national economic independence and
national security (Stauber, 1987).
However, the initial dynamism which followed the transformation of these semi-feudal
and chaotic societies was not sustained. The central state planning system, which
seemed so effective in developing large-scale basic industries and providing essential
social needs of food, clean water and housing, seemed less well suited for producing
non-essential consumer products that populations sought as their living standards
rose. Leftwich (1992) comments that socialist states have been facing systematic
constraints associated with the centralised planning system. They need to achieve
international competitiveness, develop alternative planning and management systems
capable of dealing with complex resources flows which characterise more developed
economies, and meet popular demands associated with non-essential consumption -
for consumer durables, improved housing, better quality and variety of food, etc.
White (1988) has examined these problems in the case ofChina. Within this system of
planned state industry, relations between state economic organs and industrial
enterprises, and among enterprises themselves, are not based on commodity exchange
regulated by the "law ofvalue" through the markets, but are subject to unified co-
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ordination and control at various levels of the state planning network. The pattern of
industrial output is predominantly determined by state officials not market demand;
production functions are set by the plan according to relatively unchanging,
standardised technical coefficients; most prices are regulated administratively and are
only marginally subject to pressures of supply and demand; money plays a passive,
accounting role, monitored closely by a centralised banking system with cash playing
only a marginal role; industrial manpower is administratively allocated by state labour
bureaux; inter-sectoral product flows are determined by a balancing process based on
physical input-output ratios; supplies of raw material to industrial enterprises and
purchase of their products are both handled administratively by specialised state
agencies. Under such a system, although firms are formally independent accounting
units responsible for calculating their own profits and losses, in reality they are
administratively subordinate, responsible for carrying out the planned targets issued
by superior state organs. White concludes that, "Just as capitalist enterprises in
competitive conditions are theoretically 'price-takers', so socialist enterprises in such
centralised conditions are theoretically 'plan-takers'" (White 1988: pl55).
These criticisms of the problems of socialist planned economies have now been well
rehearsed with a substantial recent contribution by writers from the former socialist
states (e.g. Brus & Laski 1989, Kornia 1986, Zhou 1982 and more other Chinese
economists).
Studies of socialist countries show that the information on which central planning is
based is always inadequate and that the state machine is too large and rigid to react to
a situation that is continually changing at various levels, including consumers'
demand, requirements of firms and institutions in the supply chain, and a changing
external context (e.g. ofglobal technologies and world trade) (Brus & Laski 1989).
As described by Brus and Laski (1989), the "inconsistent plans cannot be fulfilled in
their totality by definition", let alone the "unforeseeable reactions of the economic
actors to unexpected events which must be included" (ibid.: p42). The informational
weaknesses of the system interact with weakness of incentives: the lack of
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competitive incentives and the fragility of those linked to consumers' choice (Brus &
Laski 1989: p44).
The lack of incentives for change within an essentially static system is the other fatal
problem. The socialist incentive system relies on people's inspiration, government
mandate and officially organised competitions (Zaleski and Wienert, 1980), which are
in reality often unreliable. Because people had life-long tenure of employment within
organisations, their sense ofmotivation, based upon general inspiration for socialist
construction, gradually become eroded. The incentives for hard work and better
performance gradually declined and could only be sustained at a low level. Moreover,
labour allocation was conducted by the state, and human mobility was limited.
Government agents at various levels of the state planning network became
bureaucratic organisations and were not able to play active role in monitoring and
promoting technological development.
2.3.2 The Systems of Rigidity
The lack of technological dynamism has come to be seen as an increasingly critical
problem of state socialism. It stems from the lack of integration between the research
system (specialised R&D institutes) and industrial organisations, and the weak links
between technology designers and producers and technology users. R&D institutions
were by and large separated from industries, and manufacturing firms were separated
from product users. In the main, government agencies were not able to play an active
role. Information exchange between players was inadequate, apart from the rather
crude requirements of central planning. Therefore, the bigger the system, the more
rigid the system was for technological changes.
R&D institutions themselves have little interest in understanding what industries need,
since their finances are provided by the state, and R&D projects are not selected
according to the demand of industries (Balazs, Faulkner and Schimank, 1995a).
Similarly, industries have no need to co-operate with R&D institutions, because most
technologies are freely provided by the state. Firms find their output targets set on a
continuing "ratchet principle" that impels them to seek increased output without
concern for cost, quality or customer satisfaction. So, although they are the "carriers
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of innovation" they have little space to improve their performance. In turn, customers
only had limited scope to impose their requirements because of the supply-driven
system. They found that they had little option except to accept what was produced.
All these factors resulted in low productivity, and a waste of technological resources.
Worse, firms - the supposed carriers of technological change - and other relevant
institutions lack motivation to improve this situation. Although the socialist system is
supposed in theory to promote technological development by controlling science and
technology to ensure free education ofpeople and technology exchange by any
enterprises (Bhalla 1992), in practice it failed to deliver the expected results.
Apparently, central planning without market forces is not able to provide necessary
and adequate incentives for technological development.
2.3.3 State Interventions versus Markets
An important current in socialist, and in particular Marxist, thinking has seen markets
as incompatible with socialism. This perspective has been reflected in government
policies, at different stages in the history of state socialist countries, to suppress the
operation ofmarket forces, for example by insulating the national economy from the
global economy.
Authors like Ticktin, Bettelheim, Sweezy, McNally and Elson, and many from a
Trotskyite or Maoist persuasion, all argue that markets and socialism are
incompatible. Bettelheim and Sweezy insist that there is a viable socialist economic
model without involving the market (Bettelheim, 1970). However, McNally admits
that the market can not be eliminated overnight and would have to play some role for
a considerable period of time in the transition to socialism (McNally, 1993).
In contrast, Leland Stauber (1987) notes that,
"After all, there have always been market elements in such examples of
central planning as that of the Soviet Union even in its most centralised
periods, and there have always been considerable elements ofgovernment
intervention even in the most laissez-faire era ofnineteenth century
capitalism" (Stauber 1987: p338).
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Stauber also looks at the features ofWestern capitalism, and explores the implications
and problems of a broader form of socialism drawn upon the practical experiences of
socialism within Western capitalist economies. Based on the analysis ofmodern
capitalist economies in the United States and Western Europe, he sees the problem of
the "simple dichotomy" in which "on one side of the fence lies the combination of
private ownership ofbusiness corporations with an emphasis on the market and
decentralisation to the level of firm", and "on the other side of fence lies the
combination of the principle of public ownership with a large amount ofgovernment
economic planning and hence a large amount ofgovernment control required to
implement such planning" (Stauber 1987: p321).
Stauber further points out that contemporary Western Europe displays existing
practices that do not fit the ideologies either of capitalism or traditional socialism, but
which exhibit many considerable elements ofmarket socialism (Stauber 1987: p341-
342). In his view, the term "market socialism" can be used to denote any of a wide
range of institutions and policies that emphasise simultaneously the market within the
decision-making process and public or social ownership within the property system
along with tax policies designed to eliminate and prevent large private fortunes
(p339). A range of types ofmarket socialism can be conceived, extending from only
modest departures from the most centralised of central planning systems, at one end,
all the way to a situation in which corporate business firms are publicly owned but
where their control is structured so that their management operate with a degree of
freedom and autonomy no different whatever from that typical ofprivately owned
corporations in contemporary capitalist systems (p338).
Such concepts ofmarket socialism bear obvious similarities to Western social
democracies, particularly the more egalitarian participating system such as in
Scandinavia. These observations undermine the traditional dichotomy that has been
drawn between socialism and capitalism.
Ticktin (1992) points out that modern capitalism is no longer the classical capitalist
system based on the free-market. Therefore, for a former socialist state like USSR to
introduce the free market system is an example of "reactory Utopia", which will not
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work in the present system of the world. Ticktin refers to the changes in Western
economic system as "capitalist decline" or "the breakdown of capitalism". He points
out that in modern capitalist countries, governments are playing a substantial role in
the economy, intervening via interest rates, subsidies, taxation, etc., and controlling
prices and production by large firms. In reality, "the law ofvalue, or the market, is
greatly limited in operation" (Ticktin, 1992).
The economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies
has led to an acute debate about the feasibility of socialism, and in particular about
centralised state planning. Apart from orthodox Marxism, there is a consensus that
ideas of socialism must be reformulated (Qadir and Gills, 1992).
A quite few scholars from a socialist perspective have turned to the solution of the
market, although there are significant and important differences in their basic beliefs.
Authors like Alec Nove, GeoffHodgson, Wlodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski,
attempt to reconcile socialism with the market (Mcnally, 1993). The influential text by
Alec Nove in his "The Economics ofFeasible Socialism", (1983) illustrates a model
that combines these two. Investment and the infrastructure, in general, would be
planned by the state. Health and education would continue to be non market parts of
the economy. So-called natural monopolies, such as utilities industries, would remain
with the state. For the rest there would be an operating market. For instance, services
and consumer goods would be in a market situation. Accordingly, they would set their
own prices and conclude their own contracts, which would be based on profit and
loss. Meanwhile, the centre (the state) would have a number ofvital functions, such as
major investment, monitoring decentralised investment directly or through the banking
system, playing a major role in administering "naturally" centrally-planned productive
activities, while setting the ground-rules for the autonomous and free sectors, with
reserve powers of intervention when necessary, and operating the functions connected
with foreign trade (Nove, 1994).
Brus and Laski (1989), on the basis of their past experiences in Poland, are more
aware of the problems that may arise in the process of realising market socialism,
although they "do not refrain from taking sides" (pi52). Unlike those who adhere to
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the Marxist definition of socialism, Brus and Laski admit "there is little doubt" in their
minds "that the distinctions between capitalist and socialism, as hitherto perceived,
become under MS [market socialism] thoroughly blurred" (pi51). They point out that
"while advanced capitalism fails to display the expected propensity to transform itself
into socialism, the more 'real socialism' matures the more it is compelled to borrow
from the capitalist armoury" (Brus and Laski 1989: pi51). This brings us to look at
the options facing the state socialist countries in transition.
2.3.3 Transition
As a specific model ofnational socio-economic and political system, the Soviet
model, has been demolished. Beyond this, we can find different reactions, given the
diverse theoretical approaches and presumptions of the various school of thought, and
differences between the former socialist states. Clapham (1992) refers to the demise
of "statist orthodoxy" whether in its socialist or capitalist / Keynesian variants, and the
concomitant ascendance of "a newly dominant orthodoxy [which] emphasises the
need for market incentives, and sees incorporation into the capitalist world economy
as the essential motor for growth". He believes that this restructuring affects not only
socialist states, but also "actually existing capitalism" (Clapham 1992: p9).
Some view the successes or crises of socialism as a product of the economy and
politics of the world. As Shahis Qadir and Barry Gills (1992) indicate, the crisis of
penury in the Third World is an integral element of a much broader and deeper
economic crisis in the global political economy and a process of restructuring that
affects all states, developed and less developed, "capitalist" as well as "socialist" (p9).
Colburn and Rahmato (1992) argue that no [developing] country succeeded entirely
in breaking out of the capitalist dominated world economic order and constructing an
"independent economy". For all, there is no escaping the dependence on generating
export earnings, i.e. participating in world trade in order to earn foreign exchange
(plO).
In practice, there has been a sharp turn from central planning towards capitalism in
most of former socialist states in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This has to date
resulted in a decline in living standards for the majority ofpeople and a sharp rise in
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unemployment. The R&D system has also been hit by the deep economic crisis
(Balazs, Faulkner and Schimank, 1995b). Though there are differences, to date most
of these states have experienced neither an economic boom nor politically democratic
forms. Other less developed socialist states, like China and Vietnam with economic
systems that differ from the Soviet model, have shifted to a more pragmatic stance
and committed themselves to economic reforms, while ideologically still hanging onto
the socialism. In these countries, while encouraging private establishment, major
production means remain under public ownership; "marketisation" is conducted
gradually within a regulatory framework provided by the state and key industrial and
agricultural products stay largely under state control (Jeffries, 1993).
In my view, the overwhelming controversies that surround almost every aspect of
"socialism" could only suggest that "socialism" needs reform in both theory and
practice. In this case, seeking for perfect and/or complete socialist theories is
obviously not very helpful for pragmatic uses in the transition of socialist states.
Perhaps, the most useful things are the understanding of the problems of socialist
system, as noted above, which has been gained from the frustrating experiences of
socialist states in the past. Notwithstanding this, throughout the history of
development of capitalist society in the world, there has been widespread support for
socialist ideas which look to the state to combat mass poverty, to protect the interests
of the public, and achieve a more egalitarian rather than polarised society.
After the second World War, a large number of developing countries turned to
socialism. In the developed capitalist world, collectivist policies such as state
intervention to create a substantial public sector, policies and regulations to reduce
unemployment and to redistribute private wealth, as well as the development of a
social welfare system, have been extensively used in manyWestern European
countries. For example, the Swedish model of "welfare capitalism" (so called for
largely nostalgic reasons by both socialists and capitalists), before its crisis of 1991,
was actually admired by people in China and regarded as more socialist than that of
socialist countries. In newly industrialised countries like Japan, Singapore and South
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Korea, the state has played a prominent role in their successful process of
industrialisation, as discussed in the previous section.
These may bring us to the conclusion that the current crisis of socialism in both the
socialist and industrialised capitalist world does not necessarily suggest the demise of
socialism. On the contrary, the transition of socialist states and reformation of socialist
theories can be seen as a step in the evolution of our understanding of socialism or in
particular advanced socialism. At the same time, the modern capitalist system is no
longer the original one, and capitalism which retains "an extensive repertoire of
socialist rhetoric" can be regarded as "advanced capitalism" (Clapham, 1992). State
control and central planning neither deserve to be discarded, rather they should be
thoroughly assessed. Ifwe break the "dichotomy" (see Stauber above), there is no
need for socialist states not to use any effective means such as market mechanism in
social and economic development. For the same reason, state control does not need to
be confined to merely central planning, and central provision of public goods.
Practices in Western capitalist countries have shown that governments have many
instruments of influence over firms, regardless ofwhether they are publicly or
privately owned. These instruments include both regulatory controls and positive
financial inducements, e.g. subsidising, indicative planning with its co-ordination of
investment decisions, promoting consultation and etc. (Stauber, 1987).
There is a particular importance for socialist developing countries to use the state and
central planning as an instrument to effectively use limited resources, secure social
stability and uphold embryonic industries and less experienced firms in participating
the world trade, as no (developing) country can succeed entirely in breaking out of
the capitalist dominated world economic order and constructing an "independent
economy" (Colburn and Rahmato above). At the same time, history has shown that
the market oriented economy can give rise to serious social problems, as discussed
above, e.g. mass unemployment, large-scale bankruptcies, polarisation of the wealth
ofpeople, social instabilities, etc.
Governments have played an important role in the success of the NICs' experiences.
Many argued that the modern notion ofdevelopment rests on a concept of the state as
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the main generator of socio-economic progress (Hodder, 1992). In particular, for
technology development, competition generated by market forces could induce
individual enterprise towards technology protection. In such a case, government
intervention is able to facilitate co-operation at the entire national level. So, although,
the socialist system has shown a number ofweaknesses and problems, particularly in
the institutional structure for technology development of a country, the positive
features of the industrial planning system should not be downplayed. As Riskin (1981)
pointed out, in some accounts the negative stereotype of this system is a mirror image
of that idealisation of the market to which some reformers are prone.
In respect of the argument of "incompatibility" between market and socialism, it may
be plausible to believe the "impossibility theorem" postulated by Arrow (Stauber,
1987), that there is no closed and consistent socio-economic normative theory which
would assert, without contradiction, a socialist value system and at the same time
provide for the efficiency of the economy. History has recorded that there are no
"pure" and perfectly "consistent" societies. Every real system is built upon the
practical compromises ofmutually contradictory principles and requirements. That is
why both socialist and capitalist need to be "advanced". And it becomes necessary for
socialist states to be aware of these contradictions while adopting socialist strategies
and efficient means for economic development in the transition.
As already said in the beginning of this section, the above review of the recent
writings of socialist theories is rather selective in relation to China's social and
economic transition, and in particular the issues linking to technological development,
on which the next section will focus.
2.4 Technology Studies
In this section, the first sub-section (2.4.1) deals with institutional environment and
incentives for technology dynamics of a nation, wherein technological learning,
adaptation, innovation are taking place. Section 2.4.2 examines two important
concepts in particular: technology transfer and technological capabilities. Examination
ofhow these terms have been reconceptualised leads on to a discussion of recent
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strategies for "indigenous technological capability". Section 2.4.3 is concerned with
"the social shaping of technology" (SST), its possible contribution to the treatment of
technology in development studies and its relevance to the concerns of this study. In
particular SST's concepts of local shaping of technology, through the adaptation and
even transformation ofexogenous technological offerings, offers new ways of
understanding the process of technology transfer and the appropriateness of foreign
technologies to local environments and thus opens up possible strategies for the
acquisition and promotion of indigenous technological capabilities.
2.4.1 Institutions and Incentives for Technological Development
Recent technology studies have seen extensive discussion of the contribution of
social-institutional structure and government policies to technological dynamism.
Scholars such as, Nelson (1992), Fransman (1991), Lundvall (1992) and Bell and
Pavitt (1992), have been focusing on the national system for technological innovation
in developed and developing countries. They seek to identify the essential
characteristics of "best practice" of a country's national system - comprising
institutions and policies and the key features which are associated with successful
technological development.
Bell and Pavitt (1992) sought to distinguish the characteristics of the countries which
have been successful in generating and managing technical change from those which
have not. They address the features ofparticular firms which have different sources of
and opportunities for technical change and technological accumulation; local incentive
mechanisms, inter-sectoral linkages; and policies and institutions that support the
development of indigenous capabilities and seek to link this to the relative
performance of the country and its technological accumulation. Key features are
identified as being associated with successful technological accumulation: a substantial
inward flow of foreign technology, closely coupled with the rapid development of
indigenous capabilities in firms; heavy investment in education, training and skills;
incentives for innovation and imitation; favourable product market conditions; and
institutions and policies to encourage learning.
40
Bell and Pavitt (1992) have systematically compared institutions and policies in
developed, developing countries and centrally planned systems. They argue that the
accumulation of technological capabilities must become a policy objective of a
country in its own right, rather than to be treated as a by-product. They believe in the
indispensable importance of the state role in encouraging technological accumulation
(learning) within firms, given the risks of "market failure" in this respect.
Similarly, Lundvall (1993) criticises the presumption ofmany economists of the
rational behaviour of economic agents and the existence ofpure markets. His work
also explores the relevance of national systems of innovation, highlighting the ways in
which real world economic systems may be organised differently and wherein the
behaviour ofagents, rooted in different systems, may be governed by different rules
and norms.
A series of studies have been undertaken ofdifferent countries. Many features are
commonly recognised as important across different national systems. These include
user-producer relationships and intra- and/or inter-sectoral collaboration.
This shift of concern from addressing the generic features of successful national
innovation system towards investigating particular aspect and processes which may be
associated with technological dynamism is also accompanied by a concern to examine
how these may vary with different forms of technological innovation and across
different technological fields. Thus Freeman and Perez (1988) and Lundvall (1993)
distinguish stationary technology, incremental innovation, radical innovation and
technological revolution. For example Perez (1985) suggests that the current period
which is dominated by information and communication technologies and micro¬
electronics, heralds the onset of a new techno-economic paradigm, requiring a
radically different set of social and institutional arrangements. This includes, for
example a high level of industrial collaboration and government intervention. Perez
further suggests that the new paradigm will offer DCs important opportunities to
catch up with the West.
Apart from this work, which adopts a long-term historical perspective, most of these
studies are concerned to identify particular "best practice" with a national system.
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This is essentially conceived as static. This invites two criticisms. First, factors
deemed to be successful in inducing innovation in one country may turn out to be less
significant in a different national context. Second, national systems are not static. A
national system in the real world is changing and, moreover, must change responding
to the evolving world system and technology paradigms. Transition is the most
dramatic case. The pace and scope of social and institutional change poses particular
difficulties in achieving innovation in national systems. For example, it requires not
just appropriate policies but perhaps also their rapid adjustment. With this regard, it is
important to address not only the form of the institutional system and the content of
policy, but also the process, timing and circumstances.
2.4.2 Technology Transfer and Indigenous Technological Capabilities
To clarify the meanings of "technology transfer" and "technological capabilities"
relevant to this study, it is necessary to examine and discuss these concepts which
have been defined and used by many writers.
The Earlier studies concerned with technology transfer from richer to poorer
countries focused largely on the enormous problems which most developing countries
suffered. These problems related mainly to the cost, suitability (or "appropriateness")
and effectiveness of the technology transferred (Fransman, 1984, also section 2.2).
Since the late 1970s, with the recognition of the success of certain NICs in acquiring
and developing advanced technological capabilities, the assumption about the
extremely weak position of less developed countries in technology transfer began to
be challenged. Since then, there has been a fundamental shift in focus in the study of
developing country technology (Fransman, 1984 and Colman and Nixson, 1994).
Intellectually, this shift paralleled a turn in technology studies to address the detailed
processes involved in technological change in developing countries (Fransman, 1984)
and in general (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1985). Increasingly researchers became
interested in what happened to technology as it was imported and assimilated by DCs.
Accordingly, greater attention began to be given to the processes involved in
unpacking, mastering and adapting imported technologies.
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It was increasingly realised that technology was not fully transparent and involved
important tacit elements, and that its transfer accordingly involved a significant degree
ofuncertainty. The process ofunpacking, mastering and assimilating imported
technologies thus required firms to solve numerous problems, the answers to which
were not always provided by the supplier of the technology. The assimilation and
reproduction of technology therefore itself involved a process of technological
innovation, however minor (Fransman, 1984). As we see below, the process of
technology transfer relates to the technological capabilities of the recipient.
Smith (1990) has distinguished four types of transactions that may be involved in
technology transfer:
1) the acquisition of the right to employ a technology which is protected by a
patent;
2) the acquisition of physical capital assets embodying a new technology or set of
technologies;
3) the provision of technological services, whether at arm's length or through the
equity involvement of a foreign company and
4) the transfer of knowledge to citizens of the host country about the technology
and its use (Smith, 1990).
There have been other schema for categorising such transfer with more or less similar
features and terminology. Some refer to (1) as "licence purchases", and (2) as
"commodity imports", which is regarded as a mode of technology transfer when they
embody technologies not available in the recipient country. (4) has been described as
the "transfer through non-commercial channels" (Bornstein 1985). Bornstein (1985)
breaks down (3) into two types: "turnkey plants" and "industrial co-operation
agreements".
It seems to me that the choice of technology transfer modes depends on the
requirements of recipient firms or nations; their strategic development plans (section
2.4.3); and their existing capabilities for mastering, assimilating and innovating
imported technologies.
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The effectiveness of technology transfer - including the selection ofboth technology
and supplier, and the maximisation of the recipient's bargaining position - requires
indigenous technological capabilities. For example, in the first place, strategic
planning demands technological knowledge and understanding ofcurrent
technological developments. A long-standing debate has been focused on the relative
merits ofacquiring large-scale sophisticated versus small-scale, intermediate
technologies, and in the recent past increasing attention has been given to the need of
acquiring advanced technologies. Experience shows that they each have a role to play
in different contexts. What is essential is that developing countries need properly
qualified manpower to assess competing technologies on their own merits and to
select those that are found to be most suitable under the circumstance (Huq, 1991).
Moreover, the recipient's knowledge about the technology concerned will be an
important factor influencing its bargaining strength, e.g. the information it has about
alternative sources of supply, the resources it is prepared to expend on getting such
information, and, paradoxically enough, how much it knows about the knowledge it is
buying (Balasubramanyan, 1973).
The longer term significance of technology transfer is the possibility of replicating
knowledge and applying it more broadly, beyond the boundaries of the firm originally
involved, for recipients to assimilate, adapt and improve upon the original technology
transferred from abroad. Rosenberg (1985) points out that the geographic transfer of
very productive forms of physical capital may be of little use, unless the appropriate
human resources are simultaneously available in situ to provide for the operation,
maintenance, repair, and upgrading of the facilities, as well as to interface with and
learn from foreign engineers and specialists (Rosenberg 1985, Preface, viii).
Therefore, issues of the technological capabilities of the recipient come to the fore in
relation to the technology transfer. For developing countries, effectively transferring
technology requires indigenous technological capabilities. In turn, it offers the
possibility ofbuilding up indigenous technological capabilities by strategically and
effectively acquiring exogenous technological capabilities through technology
transfer.
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There have been many definitions of indigenous technological capabilities, and
definitions are often closely related to the perspectives and purposes of the person
using this concept. Many popular definitions identify different components of
technological capabilities in relation to the process of technology transfer and put
them in a hierarchical order. For example Dahlman and Cortez (1984) identified five
types ordered as follows:
1) capturing technology which includes searching for available technologies,
selecting ones appropriate to specific local needs and conditions, and
negotiating favourable terms.
2) translating product and process knowledge into products and productive
facilities.
3) operating those plants, processes and equipment.
4) improving plants, products, processes, inputs and equipment.
5) creating new technological knowledge, in order to satisfy specific needs and
local conditions (Dahlman and Cortez, 1984 in A. H. Molina 1987).
Lall (1992), perhaps from an economic point ofview, stresses "investment
capabilities", "production capabilities" and "linkage capabilities", describes these
technological capabilities as a sequence involving mastery of technology proceeding
from simpler to more difficult activities. (Though he indicates that different firms and
different technologies may adopt different sequences).
In my view, technological capabilities can most effectively be examined at two levels:
at the basic level, it is the capability of production, operation, maintenance, resource
allocation, management, marketing, etc. at the advanced level, it is the capability of
innovating technologies and creating new technological knowledge. In relation to
technology transfer, the former, more likely, relates to the short term objectives of
technology transfer for the purpose ofmeeting domestic demands and can be achieved
by selecting the package of technology to be transferred according to existing
technological capabilities. Thus, the weaker existing technological capabilities the
recipient possesses, the more extensive must be the package transferred. This may
have the results that the capacity to operate, produce and maintain imported
technology and any upgrading rely heavily on the technology supplier, and it therefore
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induces financial and technological dependencies. Developing countries transferring
technology on this basis can at best hope to become a follower of their technology
supplier. Compared to the basic level, capabilities at the higher level may be more
crucial for the longer term development ofDCs in order to catch up through
technology transfer.
Regarding the accumulation of technological capabilities, there are different accounts.
Many stress that technological capabilities are firm oriented. It is argued theoretically
that "technology is conceived as firm-specific information concerning the
characteristics and performance properties ofproduction processes and product
designs, and to the extent that it is tacit and cumulative in nature" (Rosenberg and
Frischtak, 1985: p.viii in "Preface"). It is shown empirically that "most technological
learning is localised in firms", and "even in the industrially advanced countries,
measured R&D activities are only the tip of the iceberg" (Bell and Pavitt, 1992:
pp.25). Thus, firms are regarded as ofcentral importance in the accumulation of
technological capabilities, and, at the same time, technological learning, the
mechanism transforming the activity of technology transfer to the accumulation of
indigenous technological capabilities. For example, Bell (1984) elaborates six different
kinds of learning mechanisms contributing to accumulation of technological
capabilities in enterprises:
1) learning by operating,
2) learningfrom changing,
3) system performancefeedback - learning from the experience of production
depends, at any level above that of the individual task, on institutionalised
mechanism for generating, recording, reviewing and interpreting that
experience;
4) learning through training,
5) learning by hiring - if the skills and knowledge are not available in their
environment, these may be acquired through the simple mechanism ofhiring
the people who embody those resources;
6) learning by searching (Bell, 1984).
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Notwithstanding technological learning at the firm level, some writers address the
importance of technological capabilities at the nation level, which require not only a
clear vision of strategically utilising exogenous advanced technological capabilities,
but also an supportive environment for technological learning and innovation.
Researchers such as Lall (1992) distinguish technological capabilities at two levels:
firm and national levels. He points out that the nation's technological capabilities are
not simply the sum of individual firm-level capabilities. There may be a synergy
between individual firms, and more important is a common element of response of
firms to the policy, market and institutional framework (Lall, 1992). Bell and Pavitt
(1992) define the country's technological capabilities as being incorporated with the
resources needed to generate and manage technical change, which include not only
skills, knowledge and experience, but also institutional structures and linkages (in
firms, between firms and outside firms) (Bell and Pavitt, 1992). The OECD (1987)
refers primarily to a country's technological capabilities as the supplies of human
capital, savings and the existing capital stock, as well as the technical and
organisational skills required for the use. It notes the interactions between incentives
and capabilities, and institutional framework: "Both incentives and capabilities operate
within an institutional framework; institutions set rules of the game, as well as directly
intervening in the play; they act to alter capabilities and change incentives; and they
can modify behaviour by changing attitudes and expectations" (OECD, 1987, pp.18).
The above discussion leads to the clarification ofmy understanding of these concepts
and their relationship, which is applied in this research. To sum up, there are three
major points. First, as this research concerns the processes of selecting, unpacking,
adapting and utilising foreign technologies and through them ultimately acquiring
technological capabilities rather than the form of the commercial relationship between
suppliers and recipients, the main focus is placed on the interplay between technology
transfer and indigenous technological capabilities. It gives credence to the view that
the process of technology transfer, of selecting, unpacking, adapting and innovating
imported technologies, demands indigenous technological capabilities, while, in turn,
the accumulation of indigenous technological capabilities requires strategic and
effective technology transfer.
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Second, closely related is technological learning, the means which transforms the
exogenous technological competencies into indigenous technological capabilities.
However, technological learning may be passive, inefficient and incomplete, because
of the lack of incentives, resources and supportive mechanism to encourage
technological learning to take place. Therefore, the national systems of innovation,
which encompasses the institutional framework and incentives relating to both state
interventions and market forces (sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) is relevant. Moreover, the
national innovation system is essential to the strategic acquisition of exogenous
technological capabilities through technology transfer for both the short-term demand
and the long-term development of a nation; it shapes the scope for technological
learning to build up indigenous technological capabilities, in particular the longer term
innovative and creative technological capabilities; and it is responsible for indigenous
technological capabilities at the national level - regarding materials, financial and
human resources and the capacity to generate and manage technological innovations.
Finally, while exploring different strategies for effectively utilising foreign
technologies, this study distinguishes the technological capability for production,
operation, maintenance, resource allocation, management, marketing, etc. from
innovative and creative technological capabilities, and regards them as being at two
different levels, the basic level and the advanced level. It assumes that the
technological capabilities at the basic level relate primarily to short term development
strategies of developing countries; and the advanced-level technological capabilities in
innovating imported technologies and creating new technological knowledge enable
developing countries to catch up in the longer term. Also, it distinguishes a nation's
technological capabilities from firm-level technological capabilities. In the main, it
agrees that most technological learning is localised in firms. However, it supports that
the nation's capabilities are not just the sum of the many individual firm-level
technological capabilities. It argues that, in developing countries, many local firms are
so weak in terms of their existing technological capabilities that assistance ofother
technologically related firms and institutions, such as R&D and financial institutions,
become crucial.
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2.4.3 The Social Shaping of Technology in Developing Countries
In respect of technologyper se, this research is based on view of technology as
socially shaped. Thus, the characteristics of technology can be changed according to
the input of a broad social and economic factors.
In this perspective, technology transfer, in theory, can never be a pure process of
geographic movement, rather technology will necessarily be transformed to adapt the
different social and economic context. Accordingly, it may be possible for developing
countries to adopt advanced technologies from abroad and make them suitable for the
local environment. No doubt, to achieve this purpose, indigenous technological
capabilities in the recipient country are required.
According to the theory of social shaping of technology (SST), technology does not
develop according to an inner technical logic or any other single rationality, such as an
economic imperative. Instead, every stage in the generation and implementation of
new technologies involves a set of choices between different technical options.
Alongside narrowly "technical" considerations, a range of"social" factors affect
which options are selected - thus influencing the content of technologies and their
social implications (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985).
SST highlights the "choices" inherent in both the design of individual artefacts and
systems, and in the direction or trajectory of innovative programmes; and it stresses
the social influences and negotiability of technology. This contrasts with traditional
"linear" models of innovation which divides innovation into separate phases, with a
one-way flow of information, ideas and solutions from basic science, through R&D,
to the diffusion of stable artefacts through the market to consumers. In this way SST
criticised "technological determinist" views, that sought to exclude technological
development from social analysis and explanation, and which saw technologies as
requiring particular social outcomes or "impacts" (Williams & Edge 1992).
SST research investigates the ways in which social institutional, economic and cultural
factors have shaped:
• the direction as well as the rate of innovation
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• the form of technology: the content of technological artefacts and practices
• the outcomes of technological change for different groups in society.
It intends to "identify opportunities to influence technological change and its social
consequences"; to "broaden the policy agenda"; to offer "the prospect ofmoving
beyond defensive and reactive responses to technology, towards a more pro-active
role" (Williams and Edge 1992).
In respect of technology development in developing countries, the SST perspective
has some similarities with classical intermediate technology theory, insofar as it points
to the way that technologies embody social and economic elements from the context
in which they originated. However these two theories point to different conclusions
about the scope for developing countries to transfer advanced technologies from
industrialised countries and apply them to their own ends. Classical intermediate
technology theories see advanced technology transfer as inextricably linked to
dependency and therefore confine what they see as appropriate technology to a very
limited category.
SST research emphasises the instability and negotiability of technologies. So, although
values may get built into artefacts, they are not automatically reproduced when they
are used; instead the possibility remains for their transformation to meet specific local
circumstances. Indeed SST empirical research shows how flexibility in use is a
deliberate feature ofmany advanced technologies such as microelectronics:
technologies which were purposely designed to meet the needs of a wide range of
customers, often around public or industry standards, as part of a strategy to build and
exploit mass markets. The implication is that such technologies as the telephone and
computer can be used not only in industrialised countries but also in developing
countries. Underpinning these contrasting interpretations are very different views of
technology, and their social bases.
Whereas classical intermediate/appropriate technology theories tend to see
technologies as internally monolithic, and embodying particular priorities and
presumptions (about social goals, about the skills and resources available in the
society) which will be reproduced when those technologies are used, SST sees
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complex modern technologies as heterogeneous assemblages (ofdiverse technologies
and social elements) and therefore capable in principle ofbeing reconfigured in their
implementation and use. Indeed an important feature ofmodern, complex
technologies, such as information technologies, is their configurational nature, as
combinations of standard components and customised elements, configured to meet
particular exigencies ofuse (Fleck 1988). In the dynamics ofdevelopment of
information technology, many elements have become available as standardised,
"black-boxed" commodities, including, for example, hardware (e.g. microprocessors,
personal computers) and software (e.g. operating systems, and generic utilities such as
databases, network management functions etc.) designed around their potential utility
in a wide range of technical and social settings (Brady, Tierney and Williams 1990).
Although empirical SST research mainly addresses technological development in
industrialised countries and some early studies can be criticised for their undue focus
on the early development ofnew technologies, its theory provides new perspectives
for developing countries to utilise and benefit from foreign technologies. On the basis
of SST theories, we can see that in principle developing countries, though lacking
technological resources and therefore depending somehow on foreign technologies,
should still be able to apply and develop technologies locally, utilising existing foreign
advanced technologies as instruments in this process. Practically, East Asian NICs
have confirmed this possibility with their successful experiences.
In a broad sense, the local shaping of technology in a developing country can be seen
as the adaptation and further elaboration of technology development on the basis of
technologies transferred from abroad. From the viewpoint of SST theory, we can
clearly see the possibilities for developing countries to acquire technological capability
by transferring foreign technologies and through it to locally shape these technologies.
As discussed above in section 2.2, there are many disadvantages and problems for
developing countries to transfer foreign advanced technologies, e.g. the
incompleteness of their knowledge of the transferred technology; theWestern social
and technical rationality and presumptions which may be embedded in transferred
technologies which may not be appropriate for the developing countries; and trade
barriers favouring industrialised countries. This research argues that the flexibility in
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use and potential negotiability of technologies, emphasised by SST research, invite
developing countries to look into technology strategies and government policies
relevant to the local appropriation and further development of technology. For
example, where technology transfer only resulted in incomplete knowledge transfer,
developing countries need to consider only acquiring the knowledge which is
acquirable and needed at the moment. Other kinds of technological knowledge - for
example needed to build "black-boxed" technological artefacts - may remain within
the "black box". So to speak with regard to embedded Western rationality, developing
countries have to reduce their negative effects through either selectively purchasing or
locally shaping them to meet the local needs.
In these respects, of course, it becomes important to understand the scope for the
flexibility and negotiability of a particular technology in its design, production and
use.
From the viewpoint of developing country, the scope for local shaping of foreign
technology is concerned with the characteristics of the technology transferred and the
nature of transaction agreed between suppliers and recipients. It might be useful to
identify some characteristics of technology employed typically in today's advanced
technology transfer from industrialised countries to developing countries.
There are at least two main ideal types of technology transfer, the purchase simply of
physical assets and the complete transfer of technological competencies including also
foreign know-how, management skills etc. This points to a range of kinds ofmore or
less extensive transfer. Obviously, the latter is more complex: it extends into more
explicit "social" issues. In terms of the know-how, the major difference between these
two is that for the latter the know-how is more comprehensive than the former and
contains not only know-how ofusing the technology but also production, possibly re-
engineering, operation, installation and maintenance, etc. Both of them include
technology transfer in the form ofphysical assets.
Following on from this, SST also allows us to analyse the differences between
different type of technologies in the form ofphysical artefacts. Fleck proposes a
distinction between discrete technologies, component technologies, system
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technologies and configurational technologies. According to him, discrete
technologies refer to those independent in function, not interfacing with other
elements, discrete in implications and that the ultimate user or consumer can use
directly. Component technologies are designed to be used in conjunction with other
technological elements. They may be available as cheap standardised commodities.
Public and industry inter-operability standards are critical in proving standard
interfaces and reducing the cost and effort of combining components. System
technologies are large scale, more complex technologies constituted around final
demand. They involve complexes of elements which mutually condition and constrain
one another, so that the whole complex works together. Configurational technologies,
the concept introduced by Fleck, refer to situations similar to system technologies,
insofar as they are complex systems oriented to final demand. However, their internal
architecture is very different offering greater flexibility of development: there is no
clear system level dynamic, and the system is open for further configuration (Fleck,
1988, 1988a). Configurational technologies are assembled from an array of
component technologies - including both standard and customised elements - to match
the application requirements.
For the purpose of this research concerning developing countries, I shall borrow
some, not all, ofFleck's concepts.
Insofar as discrete technologies are stand-alone technologies designed to carry out
particular functions, it may be possible to apply them widely, including in developing
countries. Examples include word-processors, and computer - controlled machine
tools - which relate to activities that are widely encountered (Fleck et al 1990).
System technologies typically encompass a greater range ofactivities than discrete
ones and are thus may be more tightly linked to particular applications settings.
System technologies developed for use in developed countries may need to be
adapted to fit them to the rather different requirements and circumstances of
developing countries. However system technologies tend to be rather rigid in their
construction and may be difficult or costly to adapt. An example is provided by the
System 12, public digital switching system covered in this study.
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Configurational technologies match the application complexity of systems
technologies, but are designed to allow great flexibility in development and
application. Development costs are reduced by drawing upon existing components
technologies - which can be selected to match the particular applications
requirements. This makes it more flexible for developing countries to reconfigure such
solutions to their local needs and exigencies.
Information and communications technologies in particular are increasingly taking the
form ofconfigurational technologies. Modular design and the use ofopen standards
facilitates the substitution of internal components. The selection of components and
design for flexibility in application can make it easier to adapt them to meet the
specific needs of a wide range ofusers. In such a case, foreign technologies can be
locally configured in the developing country to meet as much as possible local criteria,
such as being suitable for local production and local markets, using local resource,
etc. Configurational technology extends the scope for recipient-side innovation.
To some extent every technology needs to be re-configured when being transferred
from one society to another. In fact, their degree of configurability varies greatly
depending on the nature of the technology design and the nature of component
technologies. Obviously, the more configurable the technology, the more the
technology can be locally shaped.
One important advantage of the more open architecture ofconfigurational technology
solutions is the scope for applying standardised component technologies which may
be available on the market as cheap commodities (thereby offering lower prices for
consumers and bigger markets and bigger profits for suppliers).
By contrast, system technologies are generally more difficult to master than
configurational technologies. Their more or less unique proprietary architecture and
elements mean that they embody a wide range of technological knowledge which
must be acquired if a developing country is to learn how to design, make and apply
the system themselves. On the other hand, the possibility ofbuilding configurational
solutions from component technologies gives a firm or a nation more choices about
which areas of competence they need to acquire themselves, and which areas can be
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"bought in" as black-boxed technological solutions. For developing countries, there
are always "black-boxes" while transferring foreign advanced technology, since
mastering technology or adapting technology is a gradual process. In addition, some
black-boxes are more difficult or costly to open than others and the extent that they
can be opened is concerned with local technological capabilities, market price and
decision of suppliers. In this respect, developing countries have to concentrate on the
most appropriate choice about which technology black-boxes to open and when.
So far, this section has covered discussions about importance of the broad social and
economic context for technological development; and the close interplay relationship
between technology transfer, indigenous technological capabilities and technological
learning. These discussions point to the necessity of strategies in combining
exogenous technological competencies acquirable and indigenous technological
capabilities to meet local needs and exigencies in developing countries, and further
lead to the adaptation of social shaping of technology approach to this research.
2.5 Summary - Rationales and Research Questions
This section summarises the key points drawn from the above long literature review
and discussions of issues in three areas, and all these are related to the major concerns
of this study. In the main, this establishes the theoretical framework for the study, and
sets up research questions to be central focuses in the rest of the thesis.
Development or Dependency
The three intellectual traditions ofdevelopment studies in post-war literature -
modernisation theory, dependency theory and the intermediate technology approach -
each have their strengths and weaknesses. Together they bring a wide range of
perspectives for this research in relation to the scope for development in less
developed countries. Modernisation theory is very much confined to the model of
Western industrialisation, however, it produced a range ofdetailed empirical studies.
These empirical studies were valuable particularly in integrating technology and the
market economy, although it is largely based on the experiences ofeconomic and
technology development in the West. The dependency school of thought draws
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attention to the obstacles to economic and technological development in DCs.
Together with associated structural approaches to understanding development, it
addressed not only the economic dimension, but also other social and environmental
issues and explored how the roots ofunderdevelopment lay far beyond the domain of
less developed countries and arose from their position in the world political economy.
However, its general view is so pessimistic as to provide little hope for developing
countries wishing to industrialise and to acquire advanced technologies. It does not
suggest effective strategies for DCs and it fails to explain the relative success of some
NICs. The intermediate technology approach gives an close-up view of the problems
and especially the negative social consequences of technology transfer from
industrialised to developing countries, and emphasises the scope for developing
indigenous technologies. However, it confines itself to a very limited choice of
technologies, which particularly excludes advanced technologies.
The need for modern technological development is now widely recognised as crucial
to economic development in developing countries. There are still doubts as to whether
it is feasible for developing countries to catch up and overcome the existing gap
between developed and less developed countries, and debates about how DCs might
achieve this and thus escape economic and technological dependency. The economic
success ofAsian NICs has raised the hopes of developing countries. Studies of their
experiences draw attention to some of the strategies which may achieve technological
dynamism. However, there have been controversies about the assessment of their
technological capabilities and the validity of their experiences for other countries.
This study holds a relatively optimistic view of the scope for developing countries to
acquire technological capabilities while being armed with knowledge about possible
pitfalls from earlier development studies. As dependency theories have clearly pointed
out, no developing country can escape from the political economy of the world. Thus,
for developing countries, development, including technological development, would
be better seen as a race between countries, and, to a great extent, a race with the
powerful developed world. It is evident that the advantages of developed countries
and/or disadvantages of less developed countries are neither absolute nor fixed. For
example developing countries had advantages in terms of labour costs. Advanced
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economies may have stronger technological competencies, which may enable them to
retain markets for sophisticated high-technology products, but this situation is
changing rapidly. The NICs have rapidly acquired high levels of technological
competencies with a highly trained workforce. Equally economies like South Korea
are now, in turn, beginning to face the problems ofdeveloped countries in the face of
competition from newer industrialising countries.
China is ambitiously seeking to catch up with the developed world in both economic
growth and technology. The success ofJapan and the Asian NICs is a great
encouragement to it, and their models ofdevelopment have been of considerable
interest to China. In particular, their model of strong government intervention in the
process ofnational industrialisation and foreign trade are seen to match the Chinese
socialist tradition, together with a more or less similar culture. There is considerable
uncertainty inside and outside China about whether China can follow suit and achieve
its ambitious targets, especially in technological development.
Through the case of telecommunications switching technology, this study seeks to
explore the prospects and opportunities for technological development in China. In
particular it seeks to investigate whether China is achieving its targeted objectives in
public digital switching technology, which is regarded as an area of high technology.
Following from the above review, a key question is whether less developed countries
like China are able to build up technology competencies in high technology by
importing technology from developed countries without suffering substantial
dependencies.
Technology Transfer and Indigenous Technological Capabilities
From the review of research into technology in developing countries, this study
concludes that technology transfer from advanced resources is necessary (section
2.4.2). Effective utilisation of foreign technological competencies can help build up
indigenous technological capabilities. The selection of imported technology needs to
be matched to the strategic development plan of individual recipient countries and be
most appropriate for their circumstance. However, technology transfer does not
automatically lead to the accumulation of indigenous technological capabilities. Rather
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there is the need for a broader social and economic environment encouraging the
activity of technological learning.
Indigenous technological capabilities are essential for developing countries to
extricate themselves from the less developed state. The technological capabilities at
firm level lay the foundation for the technological capabilities at the national level,
although there are differences between the two. Technological capabilities can be
categorised into two groups: the basic technological capabilities including production,
operation, management, resources allocation, marketing, etc.; and the technological
capabilities of innovation and creation which seems to be more crucial for DCs in
catching up and pursuing technological advantages in longer term.
This study highlights the close and inseparable relationship between technology
transfer and indigenous technological capabilities (as discussed in section 2.4.2). The
transfer of advanced technology from abroad is necessary for accumulating
indigenous technological capabilities; indigenous technological capabilities are
essential for the strategic and effective transfer ofexogenous technological
capabilities; and through learning mechanisms the activity of technology transfer -
selecting, unpacking, adapting and innovating imported technologies - contributes to
the accumulation of indigenous technological capabilities.
In the case ofpublic digital switching technology in China, the aim of technology
transfer involves renewing the national telecommunications infrastructure which
requires a sufficient domestic production capacity for the new switching technology.
More important, for the longer term, is the accumulation of indigenous technological
capabilities to innovate imported technologies and create new technological
knowledge for China to catch up in this area. This therefore detects at least two
different purposes ofutilising foreign technologies - to meet urgent domestic needs
and to accumulate particular indigenous technological capabilities with longer term
significance. All this requires a strategic plan for technology production and R&D
development, linked to the general development strategy of the whole country.
Local Shaping of Technology
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Adopting the approach of social shaping of technology, as addressed in section 2.4.3,
opens up a wide range ofpossible strategies for the acquisition and promotion of
indigenous technological capabilities. Unlike classical intermediate technology
theories, the approach of social shaping of technology sees complex modern
technology as increasingly configurational in nature. They are heterogeneous
assemblages of diverse technologies and social elements and therefore capable of
being reconfigured in their implementation and use. This is in contrast to the
conventional concepts ofacquiring complex technologies as finished "systems"
solutions (Fleck 1988, 1988a). Applying the social shaping of technology perspective
to developing countries, this research suggests that technology transfer can involve a
process of local shaping as well as the unpacking of foreign technologies. There are,
to a greater or lesser degree, choices for developing countries to alter these processes.
This is not to deny the disadvantages and risks faced by developing countries in their
attempts to transfer foreign advanced technologies, e.g. incompleteness of knowledge
transfer; the imposition ofWestern values and rationality embedded in transferred
technologies; and trade barriers which favour of industrialised countries. However, it
suggests that these negative affects can be reduced through selective purchasing,
unpacking and local shaping imported technologies according to local technological
capabilities and requirements and the availability in the international market.
Through empirical cases studies, this research seeks to explore the different strategies
available to developing countries, in order to examine the advantages and weaknesses
of these strategies in relation to the accumulation of technological capabilities, and to
analyse how such strategies may correspond with existing local technological
capabilities and the local environment.
National systems of Innovation
Some studies have further shown that the process ofbuilding up indigenous
technological capabilities will not be effective and complete without a supportive
institutional environment and appropriate government policies (section 2.4.1). Here,
the increasing interest within technology studies in national innovation systems draws
attention to links between technological dynamism and institutional environment and
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government policies. However, there is no single or fixed model of the best system for
technological innovation. Different institutional and policy contexts of a nation,
different international environments, different historical traditions of the nation, each
may call for different strategies for long and short term development. This study
examines the Chinese innovation systems - focusing on the problems in achieving
technological dynamism in China's socialist economy and the ways in which the
Chinese innovation systems are changing during China's transition.
Studies of socialist economics (section 2.3 in particular 2.3.1), have analysed the
marked weaknesses of socialist states rooted particularly in the central planning
system and state monopoly control. From the view point of technological
development, we see that the rigidity of the socialist state machine and the lack of
incentives are also major obstacles to technological dynamics. As China's current
transition is from a centrally planned to a market-oriented system, this study seeks to
examine whether and how China's current transition has altered the elements of this
national system for technological dynamics over time.
State Intervention versus Market Forces
The development studies literature relating to the success of several Asian NICs
suggests that state intervention has played significant role in providing
macroeconomic policies and infrastructure, formulating long-term national plans for
investment and industrial development, directing the pace of industrialisation, etc.
(section 2.2.2). The technology studies literature on national technological dynamism
stresses the importance of information flows and collaboration between industries and
other institutions relevant to technological activities, such as educational, R&D and
financial institutions, and customers. It concludes that market forces and state
intervention are both important and complementary in generating incentives for
technological development (section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). The literature on socialist
economics comes to similar conclusions (section 2.3.3). Though many writers from
the ideological right and left have sought to counterpose state intervention and the
free market, this dichotomy has been increasingly called into question. Again there is a
growing consensus that public intervention and market forces may be complementary
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in achieving sustained technological dynamism. Empirical studies show that "pure"
state intervention and "pure" market mechanisms are each likely to fail.
This study is concerned with the public digital switching technologies, which are
radically different from the electromechanical switching technologies they superseded.
Being at the heart ofmodern telecommunication networks, their enormous economic
and social importance give them considerable strategic and political significance. State
intervention and state provision have been a common feature in telecommunications in
all countries - which can be related to the enormous long term investments involved
and the strategic importance of telecommunications. Even where the state is not a
provider, it uses regulations to ensure the integrity and acceptable operation of the
telecommunications network. The state's role in developing countries is particularly
important in acquiring the necessary resources and to bargain more effectively with
foreign suppliers and their governments. In this regard, China is no exception.
In the study of socialist economics and transition, the issue of diverse forms of state
interventions has been raised. Policies used for the economic development in NICs
include e.g. import substitution, export orientation, openness ofdomestic market to
outside, high import tariff to protect the infant industries of the nation. Their effects
whether positive or negative are still controversial. With this in mind, this research
seeks to analyse the way that the Chinese government has implemented its
interventions in the case ofpublic switching technology development in the contrast
ofapproaches being pursued elsewhere.
Another very important function of state intervention to be addressed here is the
reduction ofnegative social consequences ofeconomic development. This issue has
been raised in development studies, as well as in the study of socialist economies. In
development studies, some dependency theorists have been very pessimistic about the
consequences ofeconomic growth (section 2.2.1). The same concern has arisen in the
study of socialist economies resulting in controversies about the feasibility of
socialism and the incompatibility or compatibility ofmarkets and socialism. This
research recognises the contradictions between economic efficiency and other human
interests, as Arrow's "impossibility theorem" (section 2.3) has pointed out. However,
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it is necessary for governments (perhaps especially socialist governments) to play a
role in striking a balance between economic efficiency and public interests.
This research proposes that socialist governments, which in principle attach a greater
priority to the majority of the people's interests, may be more concerned than others
about negative social consequences produced by technology and economic
development. It is equally important in pursuing rapid economic growth in developing
countries, because social instability has been one of the major destructive factors.
There is the need to control the pace of economic development which may impinge
upon public interests, e.g. unemployment, environment problems, etc.
Research Questions
As noted in chapter 1, the two broad aims of this study are to explore:
• What are the implications drawn from this Chinese case for developing countries
in general to acquire advanced technological capabilities, both through technology
transfer and through indigenous technological development, and what strategies
are available for this?
• What can we learn from the Chinese PDSS development process in relation to the
context of the transition in China?
Within the above rationales and the constraints of the empirical case in the
telecommunications switching technology in China, this review ofexisting literature
suggests the following research questions to be addressed in this study. They aimed
five main concerns:
1) Development or dependency
• How has China strategically utilised advanced foreign technological competencies
in the area ofpublic digital switching system to fulfil domestic demands for
modernising its telecommunications infrastructure in short term and innovating the
technology in the longer term?
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• How has China dealt with the problems associated with technology transfer, e.g.
dependencies or negative social consequences from which many less developed
countries have suffered?
2) Technology transfer and indigenous technological capabilities
• Have China's attempts at technology transfer been effective in terms ofacquiring
technological capabilities? Have they succeeded in using existing capabilities and,
through technological learning, further accumulating them?
• What factors were crucial in establishing the technological learning needed to
transform exogenous technological competencies into indigenous ones?
3) Local shaping of technology
• What are the differences between the two strategies of technology transfer and
indigenous technological development, in respect of selectively utilising foreign
technologies and the scope of local shaping of these two systems? How has the
combination of these two strategies served the country's requirements in the
reconstruction of the telecommunications infrastructure and the acquisition of
PDSS technological competencies?
4) National systems of innovation
• How has China's transition - both the opening up ofmarket forces and the
changing institutional context - impacted on the development ofPDSS
technology?
5) State intervention versus market forces
• What implications can be drawn from the Chinese PDSS cases about the
respective roles of state intervention versus market forces?
• What are the changes of the forms of state intervention of the Chinese government
over time during the transition and their links to different outcomes?
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Chapter 3:
Research Design and Methodology
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter explains how the research was designed and carried out. Section 3.2
presents the overall research design. It clarifies my reasons for selecting public digital
switching systems as the technological object ofthis study and for adopting detailed
case-studies as the main research method. Section 3.3 explains my preparatory work
before entering the field, encompassing the identification ofpossible cases and
preparation of the schedule of questions for interview. Section 3.4 describes the
development of the fieldwork and reports how the case selection was finalised after I
entered the field. Section 3.5 describes the process of data collection including
obtaining access to investigation, interviewing, collecting written materials and official
documents. This section focuses on the development of the case-studies through
interviews with key respondents, and discusses problems encountered in the
investigations, approaches and techniques adopted. In particular, it stresses that, given
uncertainties arising in the course of the investigation, research design, data collection
and data analysis are not clearly segregated stages in sequence, and they each have to
be modified from time to time to ensure the quality and value of the research. In
section 3.6, three phases in data analysis are described including: the analysis of the
process of development in the individual cases; the identification of key features of the
case-studies; and the selective analysis of research issues. The final section, 3.7,
reflects on some of the strengths and limits of this research, as well as possible
personal biases that may be embedded in it.
3.2 Research Design
As stated in chapter 2, my particular interests are related to technological
development in developing countries and China in particular. My central focus is on
the strategic acquisition of foreign advanced technological competencies to meet
developing country's domestic needs and to build up indigenous technological
capabilities. All this more or less shaped the choice of the technological focus of the
study, the theoretical framework and the methodology adopted.
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3.2.1 Selection of Technological Object of Study
As the study aimed to understand the strategic issues involved in the acquisition of
foreign advanced technologies as mentioned above, the technological object of the
case studies had to be a high technology field. My engineering background in
telecommunications technology encouraged me to select public digital switching
systems (PDSSs) as the specific advanced technology for this study. The main
justification of this choice however comes from the nature ofPDSS technologyper
se, which matches the features required in this research. As explained in section 1.2,
telecommunications technology is at the centre of the rapidly developing field of
electronics and computing technologies. Moreover, the public switching system is
right at the heart of public telecommunications service. It has great social, economic
and political significance for both industrialised and developing countries alike.
Accordingly, within China, the telecommunications sector had been under the state
monopoly control from the very outset, and had attracted considerable attention from
the government since the economic reforms. Outside China, all large
telecommunication equipment companies had lined up (especially before 1 January
1993),1 with backing from their governments, to pursue the Chinese market.
3.2.2 Methodology
Questions still remain about the scope of the study - with important choices about
research methodology, between for example large scale "quantitative" research, and
more detailed "qualitative" approaches (MacKenzie, 1992). Most existing work that
addresses technology development in China has focused on the "macro" level, relying
on national statistics or policy statements. Such studies are not very informative about
the key questions I wanted to explore, concerning how technological capabilities are
acquired. Large scale surveys are also less appropriate than more detailed
"processual" studies for investigating technology transfer from abroad since this is a
new and changing phenomenon in China, which has only really occurred since the
economic reforms of 1978 and had only taken place on a limited scale (when I started
1 On 31 December 1992, Chinese government announced the new policy which relaxed the strict control over
the import ofdigital switching systems.
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this study). Since the aims of this study were to explore the processes of technological
innovation and their related social, economic and political context, detailed case-
studies seemed to be more appropriate. It was necessary for the level of detail in the
case studies to correspond to the level at which technological activities were
generated and the innovation processes were carried out. At the same time, the scope
of the studies must be sufficiently wide to be able to engage the main features of the
broader environment in which the innovation processes were taking place and which
patterned these processes.
In addition, there was the need to adopt a comparative approach for at least two
reasons. First, case studiesper se may have weaknesses. It is generally not justified to
extrapolate from individual cases; consequent problems in generalising may raise
uncertainties about the broader relevance ofparticular findings. It also provides little
opportunities for unpicking the influence of the broader social context. Second, given
the rationales of this study discussed in the previous chapter, the chosen cases should
allow me to analyse the relationship between technology transfer and indigenous
technological capabilities; to assess some of the different strategies available for
developing countries to acquire foreign technological competencies in order to
maximise benefit of local application; to evaluate differences of the national systems
of innovation in relation to China's transition, particularly from central planning and
state control to the combination ofmarket mechanism and state interventions.
Within the limits of finance, time and access to players involved, I therefore decided
to choose at least two PDSS systems - one foreign system brought into China by
technology transfer, and one system developed indigenously. The aims are to compare
different strategies for acquiring foreign advanced technological competencies in
order to build up indigenous technological capabilities and meet domestic demands. A
state-owned firm which was associated with the chosen locally developed PDSS and a
joint venture which was associated with the foreign PDSS would be an ideal pair of
cases. Investigating the state-owned firm would also reveal changes in the process of
technological innovation taking place as a result of the economic and social transition.
At the same time, the study of the joint venture, itself a new phenomenon of the social
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and economic transition, would provide a window on quite different behavioural
patterns from the state-owned firm.
To understand not only the process of technological innovation but also its social
context, I felt that the detailed case-studies should encompass a series of in-depth yet
wider-ranging investigations, which would cover as far a possible all actors
(individuals or institutions) involved in the technological activities, including
manufacturing firms, R&D institutions and governmental organisations in charge of
making or implementing policies relevant to the cases. A wide range of interviews was
therefore needed ranging from workers and engineers on the shop floor to high-
ranking officials in the central government. Ideally, the interviews should be with the
individuals who have played key roles in the process of technological development or
transfer. In chosen firms the interviews should address a range ofactors including
those directly involved in production or development, as well as management at from
the middle to the highest levels.
This primary research was underpinned by extensive collection of information about
government policies, regulations, legislation and other forms of state intervention.
This is particularly important to comprehend the main features of the broader
environment in which technology development is taking place. Collecting internally
circulated documents and published materials and interviewing officials in government
organisations in parallel allowed a better understanding of the formulation and
changes over time ofgovernment policies and other type of interventions than using
only one of these methods.
Given the complexity of the issues addressed in this study, I have adopted a double
approach. On the one hand, I seek the detailed account of technological development
processes made possible by actor-centred approaches, such as actor-network theory
(Latour, 1988), sociotechnical systems (Hughes, 1983) and in particular, socio-
technical constituencies (Molina 1990). On the other hand, the research design
addresses the influence ofbroader structural and historical factors (Hughes, 1883 and
others like Edquist, 1985).
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The former helps to identify possible constituencies which are potentially influential to
technological development. In particular, it highlights the interaction between
"technical" and "social" elements - the way "the technical" is both shaped by and
shapes "the social". According to Molina (1990, 1995), technological development
processes involve the emergence and development of technical and social elements -
machines, instruments, institutions, interest groups - that interact and shape each other
in the course of the creation, production, and diffusion of specific technologies. These
two groups of elements evolve and change their mix in ways which result in the
technology growth or decline.
The latter seeks to understand the context within which technological processes take
place, and particularly to analyse institutional structures ofthe national system for
technological dynamism and the role government policies, and how they affect the
behaviour and success of local actors. However this study is also centrally concerned
to understand the character and significance ofChina's economic transition. The
contextual part of the study therefore explores the modification and transformation of
institutional structures over time in response to changing government policies and
other changes in the domestic and international environment.
3.3 Preparatory Work
Having in mind the technological object - telecommunications PDSS technology - for
case studies, I searched for all relevant data available in the collections ofUK libraries
and elsewhere. More useful information about the present development in public
digital switching technology and telecommunications in general came directly from
China through former colleagues ofmine. This information helped me to map PDSS
technologies in China and identify an initial selection ofpossible cases.
By then, although there were many foreign PDSS technologies being used in China,
only three joint production ventures had been set up to manufacture public digital
switching systems (PDSS):
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• Shanghai Bell: this is a joint venture between the Posts and
Telecommunications Industrial Corporation which was on behalfofMPT, the
Alcatel Bell Telephone and Belgian Government, producing System-12;
• The Beijing International Switching System Corporation: this involves
Siemens AG and the Ministry ofMachine Building and Electronics Industry
(now Ministry ofElectronics Industry), manufacturing the EWSD system;
• A Sino-Japanese joint venture producing system Neax-61.
My first choice was System-12 and the Shanghai Bell joint venture as the case of
foreign PDSS. This was because Shanghai Bell was the earliest established joint
venture and its first contract for a technology transfer programme had been officially
completed. The second choice had to be the EWSD and the Beijing International
Switching System Corporation joint venture, since the Sino-Japanese joint venture
project was progressing very slowly.
To improve my understanding of these chosen systems from the technological point of
view, I read as much relevant written material as was available. For example, about
the chosen system "System 12", I devoted myself to understand its main technical
features, particularly where (and how) it differed from other major public digital
switching systems used in the world. At the same time, I looked briefly into its
history, e.g. how, where and by whom it was developed, and the history of transfer to
developing countries.
Information about locally developed large scale PDSS technologies was very limited.
I could only establish that there had been two systems, the DS-series and another
system about which available information was so confusing that I could not identify
even its name. I was able to find some published articles in Chinese and English about
the DS-series and associated R&D through different channels, but no information
about its manufacture.
I sent letters to the two chosen joint ventures in China, requesting permission to
investigate. My requests were accepted by both. Some other letters were directed to
various departments in MPT, seeking general support, e.g. provision ofmore
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information and permission for investigation, etc. However, I did not get a reply to
any of these letters.
In the meantime, I prepared the schedule of questions for interviews, to make sure
through interview I would get as much of the information I needed for this study as
possible. Questions were listed under four parts in relation to different stages of
innovation cycle, and each part had two separate versions, geared towards the
particular circumstances of the foreign system and Chinese system respectively.
The first part of"interview schedule" addresses "initiation". In the case of the foreign
PDSS system, this meant the initiation of technology transfer, e.g. search, selection of
a particular technology and negotiation ofthe terms of the joint venture. For the
Chinese system, it was the formulation of the PDSS technology R&D project. The
second part was "technology development", which also has two versions: the major
process of technology transfer of foreign system and the development process of the
Chinese PDSS. The third was "technology improvement" and the fourth was
"technology diffusion", which also sought information about the adaptation of foreign
technology and further indigenous technological improvement after the technology
entered the market. These questions were designed to get information at both the
micro and macro levels. Some questions are straight forward, to obtain the basic
information necessary for analysis. Other questions were more open-ended and
inductive, encouraging interviewees to think openly and give information which they
consider important or relevant and make comments in their own right. Every single
specific interview needed a carefully chosen question list drawn from this overall
interview schedule. For instance, when only a short interview time was given, the
question list needed to be particularly concise, and the questions selected, easy to
answer. The selection ofquestions also depended on the position ofeach interviewee
(e.g. company manager or government official, high or low rank, etc.), the type of
organisation they belong to (e.g. production company, user or R&D institute), and the
division they work for (e.g. marketing or production).
When I entered the field many things still remained to be finalised. I had to decide
whether to choose one joint venture from the two which had given outline agreement
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to be interviewed, or simply to use both. The more difficult task was to select a
Chinese PDSS system, and to get access to the state-owned company which
manufactures the product. Also difficult was the interviewing ofhigh ranking officials
in the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications and other relevant departments in
the central government. I needed not only to find the right person from whom I could
get the information that I required, but also to get permission to interview them. The
problem was that these people were typical officials (or bureaucrats) working for the
organisations at the high level, which had a tradition of collective decision-making and
secrecy.
3.4 Development of Fieldwork
I travelled to China in October 1992 to begin fieldwork. My first move was to get
more detailed information, especially about Chinese PDSS systems. I had several
formal and informal discussions with two of the country's leading switching specialists
and other senior telecommunications engineers. These discussions confirmed that two
locally developed large scale public digital switching systems had been technically
approved by the authorities, DS-series and HJD-04, though further technical
improvements were still required for a full licence to enter the entire market.
The DS-series project began almost immediately after the introduction of the first
foreign public digital switching system into China in early 1980s. This was an MPT
funded project and designed in the MPT's R&D institutes. The DS development
project had been carefully planned, representing the attempts by the Chinese
government to develop such a technology on their own, and gathering the best and
available technological resources within the sector. Accordingly, the process ofR&D
followed more or less the existing (traditional) pattern ofR&D in China. I could
foresee that this would be a good case to reveal the problems of institutional
structures typical of the old centrally planned system in China and incentives in
relation to technology development.
By contrast, HJD-04 was an officially unplanned product, and its development
process did not fit in any traditional pattern. The project had been initiated by a
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military research institute. The technical, financial and organisational elements
required to complete the project were only built up later. Among many institutions
involved in this process, there were three main players:
• The key figure who initiated this project, ProfessorWu, and his Research Centre
for Information Technology at a military research institute, Zhengzhou Institute of
Information Engineering of the People's Liberation Army;
• A state-owned manufacturing firm under the MPT, the Luoyang Telephone
Equipment Factory (LTEF) ofMPT;
• Ade facto procurement unit ofMPT, the Posts and Telecommunications
Industrial Corporation (PTIC).
It proved a great effort for HJD-04 PDSS technology to gain official approval. In
other words, this system is a product of the new social and economic phenomenon,
reflecting the country's current social and economic transformation. Moreover, from
the technological point ofview, HJD-04 adopts a very different technical strategy to
the early developed switching systems, and one which I considered to be very
interesting in relation to the acquisition of technological capabilities by developing
countries.
Given the constraints of time and scale ofdoctoral research, I could not take up both
cases and eventually chose the HJD-04, which seemed to suit this study better. Yet
this case presented a great challenge, there was hardly any data available about either
the system or the project because this project had not been officially approved until
very recently. Certainly, there had been no publications apart from one short article
about this project in a newspaper following the official approval.
In relation to foreign PDSS, Shanghai Bell was my first target of investigation. Later
on, because of time constraints, I dropped the second option - EWSD associated with
the Beijing International Switching System Corporation Ltd, a joint venture with
German Siemens AG. Before began my interview in Shanghai Bell, I had another
search (apart from the one I did in UK) ofwritten materials about Shanghai Bell and
the PDSS, System 12, as well as a couple of informal discussions with researchers and
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officials in the Science and Technology Committee of Shanghai municipal
government, in order to get an overview of the case.
3.5 Data Collection
Although the scope of the study had been established, the research design still needed
to be modified or changed in the course ofdata collection. A study like this, that relies
on detailed case-studies as the main method of research, may well encounter
unforeseeable outcomes in the course of the investigation. New areas of interest are
identified as well as uncertainties and difficulties in the research. The way in which
these issues are handled in the course of fieldwork is critical to the quality of the
entire investigation. Because research design, data collection and data analysis are
often inseparable in practice, many decisions could not be made until particular data
had been collected and preliminary analysis done.
During my investigation into System-12, on the basis ofnew information arising from
the interviews, I identified some additional people to interview outwith Shanghai Bell
itself, for example:
• one of the System-12 users, Shanghai Telecommunications Administration;
• the former Chinese general manager of Shanghai Bell who took part in
negotiating the technology transfer process;
• the System-12 Project Leading Group Office for Shanghai Municipal
Government which jointly involved Shanghai Bell and Shanghai Municipal
Government for the purpose of System-12 "technology localisation" (the
actual meaning is: local production of components) (see Appendix).
In Shanghai Bell, I carried out twenty-eight interviews (see Appendix), ranging over
workers, engineers, managers ofmost departments and both Belgian and Chinese
general managers.
In the case ofHJD-04,1 had from the outset encountered resistance to my gaining
access to the manufacturing firm, LTEF. LTEF, like other state-owned companies
which were traditionally "plan-takers", had no reason to expose itself to any unofficial
investigations. My approach was through the help of a personal contact in the
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Municipal Science and Technology Committee of the local government which had
some (but not powerful) influence over LTEF (which was more directly under the
leadership ofPTIC, the MPT's procurement arm) to make my investigation semi¬
official. Unfortunately, at the time ofmy first visit to LTEF, in the company of the
head of the Municipal Science & Technology Committee, the director ofLTEF was
away and out of contact, and the deputy hesitated to risk making a wrong decision.
While appearing very friendly and reassuring, he asked us to give him a day or two to
get approval from his boss, but actually passed the "ball" to PTIC in Beijing where the
local government has no influence at all. I had to start again, this time in Beijing. After
travelling thousands ofmiles by train back and forth twice between Luoyang, a city at
the centre ofChina, and Beijing, I eventually got permission.
I carried out eighteen interviews (see Appendix) in the Luoyang Telephone
Equipment Factory (LTEF) ofMPT in a similar range to these in Shanghai Bell and
two interviews in the Posts and Telecommunications Industrial Corporation ofMPT. I
also spent a very informative half day with ProfessorWu and his research team in
Zhengzhou Institute of Information Engineering of the People's Liberation Army. The
three key actors in this same technology project presented sometimes quite different
accounts about its development.
To understand the broader context for PDSS and telecommunications technology
development and the background of the state policy formulation and implementation,
I carried out fifteen interviews with researchers and officials in a number ofR&D
institutes and central governmental organisations, including:
• the Economic and Technology Development Research Centre ofMPT;
• the Science and Technology Information Centre ofMPT;
• the State Science and Technology Commission;
• the State Planning Commission;
• the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications;
• the Ministry ofMachinery and Electronics Industries (now the Ministry of
Electronics Industries) (see Appendix).
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I did not have a list ofpeople to interview beforehand. My approach was to trace the
person in charge of the technology project and progress from the bottom up towards
the MPT, and then to follow up lines indicated by previous interviews to find the next
contacts. My access thus started with my personal connections and extended through
them to the whole network of players. Once the chains of interviewees reached
official bodies, it went on naturally to all who seemed to have been important in
different roles and in different government departments.
A key principle in carrying out the interviews was honesty and openness. I gave great
emphasis to interviewees that my aim was to disclose the course of technological
development, explore any problems encountered and search for remedies where
appropriate.
Most of interviews were tape-recorded. Initially, many people did not like their
interview to be tape-recorded. However, after I stressed that the recording process
would be controlled by themselves, they accepted and, while the interview proceeded,
they did not seek to control the recording at all. While tape-recording interviews, I
also took notes of the conversation. This proved very useful, not only in subsequent
analysis, but also when, on two early occasion, I had two unexpected technical
problems of the tape-recording. During the interview period, I tried to listen to the
tapes in order to check the data collected as soon after the interview as possible. It
proved very useful for me to double or triple check the reliability of the data, correct
the errors and omissions and prepare for subsequent interviews.
My field work was carried out during the period ofOctober 1992 to the end ofMay
1993 (I had several months offwork in this period because of illness). Interviewing
was interspersed with collecting written material and official documents, to utilise my
time effectively and to check that interview findings corresponded with background
information. I had also collected substantial written data about the general economic
and social transition in China. All directly related materials had been briefly read
before I returned to Britain. Thus I was more or less sure that I had in my mind a
clear picture about the PDSS technology development in China and adequate
materials in hand for the final writing up ofmy thesis, before leaving the field.
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3.6 Data Analysis
The first stage in analysing the data involved transcribing. Although I had already
listened to all the recorded interviews at least once, sometimes interesting lines in the
interview conversation stimulated my ideas about certain research issues. These
interview transcripts also provided an essential source for citation and analysis of the
study. To retain their original value, I transcribed these recorded interviews by hand in
their recorded language (Chinese and English).
The analysis ofthis empirical material involved three phases: the analysis ofthe
process ofdevelopment in the individual cases; the identification of key issues of the
case-studies; and the analysis of the issues identified.
The first stage involved production of a detailed description of the process of
development ofboth the case-studies, HJD-04 and System 12. This was an
empirically focused account in which the theoretical underpinnings and research
concerns remained largely implicit. These accounts analyse how a technological
process was initiated and further developed; what were the external stimuli which
encouraged or hindered the process; what were the problems facing the process; who
played crucial roles (positive or negative) during the process; and what were the
current outcomes by the time ofmy investigation. Each process was described in
terms of the different players in the innovation cycles, which thus ensured to cover the
entire processes of technological development. For the case of System 12, it was from
the phase of initiating technology transfer to that of adapting the foreign technology
to local conditions on marketing. Whereas for the case ofHJD-04 it phased from the
initiation of the indigenous development to the technological improvement after the
technology entered the market. This was done to facilitate comparison between
equivalent phases of the two cases. Use of this terminology does not imply acceptance
of the presumption in many conventional accounts that the innovation cycle is an
essentially linear process. However, analysing these phases helps to see changing
behaviours of each player, technological learning taking place and the main driving
forces behind individual phases.
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This initial phase ofanalysis revealed rich material about actors and/or actor networks
and driving forces behind technological development. However the level of
descriptive details attained was, arguably, too great to allow systematic analysis. The
next step was therefore to identify key features of interest and importance to the study
and select them for further analysis.
In this second phase, specific features of the analytical focus of this study were
finalised. Since the field of a study like this is so broad, it potentially touches on far
too many issues which may be relevant and important in one way or another. Some of
the issues that the case-studies might illuminate have already been extensively
discussed in the literature (for example, general problems ofmanagement in Chinese
industry); it was not a priority for me to duplicate in this research. An important
intermediate stage ofanalysis involved selectively identifying some ofmost interesting
outcomes of the first phase ofanalysis, according to the aims and structure ofthe
study. This process was conducted with care, but was inevitably idiosyncratic -
reflecting my concerns and developing understanding of the processes under study.
The final phase is the selective analysis of the research issues. The outcomes of earlier
analysis from two individual cases were first compared and/or integrated. The
comparison and integration have two-fold objectives: i) to compare and/or integrate
between two individual cases overall; and ii) to compare and/or integrate particular
elements in their structural and historical context. They were applied selectively
according to different issues. For example, to understand the advantages and
disadvantages of the two different strategies for utilising foreign technologies, the
comparison was between the two cases, the System-12 and HJD-04. To evaluate the
behavioural changes of agents in relation to the changes in the macro context in
China, the comparisons and integration were between elements in different broader
environment, e.g. the socialist tradition and the transition.
3.7 Reflections on the Research Process
This research, like any other, has certain strengths as well as limits.
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Being a native Chinese person, I was able to communicate directly with people. In
particular I was better equipped to "read between lines", compared to foreign
researchers who, despite having good research skills, could end up with a sanitised
"official account", or overlook important features or be misled because of then-
reliance on interpreters. My previous experiences ofworking in China - as a factory
machinist, an engineer, a university teacher and a researcher on governmental projects
- helped me to approach different kinds of people and get them into discussion. These
experiences, ranged as they did from before the Cultural Revolution to the economic
reform and onwards, also made me an inside observer of the system which had been
changing. On the other hand, my period of studying and living in Britain enabled me
to see China with a distance and so see things I might otherwise have taken for
granted. (The current rate of change in China is so great that in a few years the
emerging economic and cultural context might no longer be familiar to me.)
It is not easy to undertake social research in China, as many researchers have pointed
out. One particular shortcoming is in statistics which are not always to be relied upon
in China. Different organisations, e.g. a Chinese ministry, a multinational company,
the World Bank, looking at the same industry or sector may well use different figures
in their analysis. This is due partly to the diversity and lack of standardisation of the
statistic system. For example, "the telephone penetration rate" (in Chinese 'Dian Hua
Pu Ji Lti'), can be based on two different calculations, one that counts in only main
lines as a standardised method and the other counts in all available lines. The former
can be higher than the latter. Which figure is chosen often depends on the occasion for
which the figure is used and the interests of the organisation which is using it. The
sources of the statistical data used for this study are indicated. It is fortunate that
these data are used in this study for the assistance to see the situation or trends rather
than forming the basis of any conclusions.
Given the pervasive atmosphere of secrecy, obtaining policy documents of any sort in
China was very difficult. Many of the policies ofministries and local or central
governments I quoted in this research were described and explained by officials in
person and/or were cited by managers in firms that were affected by the policies,
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rather than being publicly documented. Sometimes, I was shown the official
documents but asked not to read them in detail to conform with the rules of secrecy.
In respect of the method of case-studies used, there is an inevitable problem of
personal biases. The first point I must mention here is that China is a huge country,
and its diversity in almost every aspect is much greater than people outside perceive.
Even people inside Chinese society can be ignorant because ofmany constraints, such
as geographical, dialectal, cultural, etc. barriers. Not surprisingly, within China,
different people can find witnesses to testify to particular interests and prejudices,
which bring to their own account of China, not to mention those outside China. When
individual Chinese are abroad, they sometimes serve or are often considered as
authoritative judges on the past, present, and future ofChina. Yet, as a matter of fact,
Chinese from different parts of the country may well be not able to understand each
other when speaking because of different local dialects.
As I have also given my comments about Chinese tradition in this research, I am fully
aware that my understanding of the society may be also constrained by my past
experiences, which could also be unconsciously embedded in the entire research
process from interviewing to data analysis. Since I was born and brought up in the
cities on the east coast, the culture I am more familiar with is urban towns such as
Shanghai, Beijing, etc. My knowledge about rural areas and other parts ofChina is
limited to short stays during the Cultural Revolution or less than month-long visits
when I was involved in governmental research projects or tourist tours.
As usual, after every research project, I have joys yet regrets. After this field work, I
am happy with the outcome that almost all my interviews went well and were
informative; I brought back a whole story and rich materials. However, because of the
nature ofPDSS technology - a complex technology with social, economic and
political significance and ofChina's economic transition - from socialist central
planning to a more market oriented mechanism, the scope of this study became very
broad. Literature review seemed to be endless, and interesting issues related were
numerous. This led to enormous difficulties of completing a study as such. In
retrospect, given the constraints ofPhD research, it is always wise to be extremely
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selective in setting up research themes, even though it means to suppress immense
research enthusiasm and ambitions over a wide area (which can be very common to
those who are interested in "technology studies" - an interdisciplinary study) which
might have been genuine driving forces for PhD study.
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Following the brief introduction ofChina's social and economic transition in chapter
1, this chapter gives a more close-up view ofhistorical background of the Chinese
telecommunications sector, the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications (MPT), the
public telecommunications infrastructure, switching technologies and industry.
Specifically, it explicates the development of switching technologies in China and the
conditions facing switching system producers in the past and during the transition
period. In this way the chapter seeks to explain the institutional context in the
telecommunications sector, in this transition period. It is also to provide a background
for understanding the case studies that will be presented in chapters 5 and 6.
Section 4.2 describes general features of China's telecommunications sector and
infrastructure. Section 4.3 focuses on the switching industry and technologies in the
past and the transition. The final section 4.4 is a short summary.
4.2 Telecommunications in China
In the past, China's telecommunications system was one of the poorest in the world.
Before the beginning of economic reforms in 1978, China's telecommunications
system had been under the control of the central government and served mainly the
needs of a centrally planned economy, and the Party and government organisations.
At the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the country had only
about 300,000 local telephone lines (East Consulting Ltd, 1995). For the next 30
years, little changed. From 1949 to 1978, the central government was the sole
investor in telecommunications networks and services; the total investment of the
country in fixed assets in the telecommunications sector was only 5 .2 million Chinese
yuan (Zheng, 1992). In 1978, China had merely 3,972,000 telephone lines compared
to a population ofover 900 million, with about 4 phones per 1,000 people (ITU,
1986). Telecommunications technologies in Chinese public network services lagged
far behind the world level, and most telephone switching systems were manually
operated.
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It was the economic reform of the end of the 1970s that made apparent the serious
constraints of the telecommunications infrastructure to economic expansion in China.
As the country's door opened to the world, business communications within China, as
well as with the world, increased rapidly. People's rising living standards also
demanded telecommunications services. Telecommunications became immediately
one of the most serious infrastructure bottle-necks for the economy. The low density
of telephone lines and the consequent high rate ofusage made the network badly
congested. The call completion rate was so low that a popular saying stated that, "for
delivering a message, it would be faster to cycle than make a local call; it would be
faster to go in person by train than to get through on a long distance call".
The need to speed up the re-construction of the telecommunications infrastructure, by
expanding the telecommunications network and modernising its technologies and
services, was acknowledged. Increasing attention was given to the area. Large sums
ofmoney were allocated to the telecommunications sector from home and abroad.
During the 6th (1981-1985) and 7th (1986-1990) five-year plan, with government
approval, a combined total of yuan (RMB) 26 billions ($3 billions) was invested in
telecommunications (East Consulting Ltd, 1995). Since then annual investment has
soared. In 1993 alone it totalled yuan (RMB) 40 billions ($4.9 billions) (East
Consultant Ltd, 1995). As a result, since 1985, the growth of telecommunications has
outpaced GNP growth. According to MPT's figures, during the first halfof the
1980s, telecommunications traffic in China grew by 17.5% a year, increasing to
24.4% annually during the second halfof the decade (East Consultant Ltd, 1995).
Since then these annual growth rates had jumped, rising from 40% in 1991, to 58.9%
in 1993 (East Consultant Ltd, 1995).
In spite of this, the demand for telecommunications services continued to accelerate,
as the economy continued to boom. In late 1992 (when my investigation in China
began), it was a common sight to see people making a phone call while crossing the
street in cities of the coastal area, even though the price of a mobile phone had
reached 30,000 Chinese yuan (equivalent to £3,000). "Information", "economic gain"
and "high-tech telecommunication equipment" begun to be tightly interrelated in
people's minds. As a result, the waiting lists of subscribers for telephone services
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jumped from 163,000 in 1980, to 1,670,000 at the end of 1992, even though the
number of telephone lines installed had increased by 15 million lines during 1979-
1992.1 Installation fees for new subscribers rocketed steeply: in 1993, the highest fee
charged in Beijing was as much as 5,000 Chinese yuan (equivalent to £500) per line,
and the waiting time was one year, or longer ifno extra fees were paid (formally or
informally).2
With a telephone penetration rate as low as 1.63 per 100 in 1992, China had a long
way to go to reach European levels.3 Still demand was expected to accelerate very
rapidly. A Chinese scholar described this growth as involving several waves (Chen,
1993). The first originated with business users, especially organisations involved in
foreign trade in the south-east coastal area. Later on, it moved inland and to the north.
The most recent wave [1993] involved domestic households. There was a
"bandwagon effect" associated with a complicated cultural process. When households
with telecommunications equipment expanded from the emerging entrepreneur groups
to include a number of "open-minded" non-business residential families, people
suddenly sensed a social trend. Traditionally, Chinese culture stigmatised economic
upstarts as arrogant money-worshippers, immoral-opportunists, less-educated or
social-climbers. Except during the Cultural Revolution, however wealth has never
been rejected by Chinese society. More importantly, Chinese people do not like to be
left behind any social trends. This is especially true in the case of telecommunications.
When one's friends have got telephones at home, and one is alone outside the
communication network, one feels excluded from the social circle. In these
circumstances, some people were willing to pay 5,000 yuan, about ten months'
salary,4 to have a telephone set at home.
Economic and social demands had placed great pressure on the Chinese government.
Tight budgets could not meet the needs ofmodernising the whole country's
1 These figures are according to the internal circulated materials issued by MPT.
2 This figure is according to my interview with Chief Consultant of the Economic and Technological
Development Research Centre ofMPT and confirmed by several other officials in MPT.
3 There were 60.95 telephone sets per 100 inhabitants in total OECD countries in 1985. (Ypsilanti, 1988)
4 This can only be a rough estimate, since it is difficult to know people's real income nowadays.
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telecommunications infrastructure. Financial pressures led the central government to
adopt a set ofdecentralisation policies intended to raise the necessary funds. First,
local Posts and Telecommunications Administrations,5 were made responsible for the
local infrastructure and allowed to raise funds from various local sources - for
instance, from local government, business organisations, and individuals. Second,
government control over telecommunications charges (which had remained
unchanged for several decades) was liberalised, with the result that Ministry ofPosts
and Telecommunications (MPT) adjusted charges in 1980s, and local Posts and
Telecommunications Administrations were given scope to make certain additional
charges to meet their own circumstances. Given these policies, many local Posts and
Telecommunications Administrations set out to muster funds, including foreign soft
loans. Many of these soft loans involved a stipulation (by the foreign government) to
purchase foreign switching systems; this took purchasing decisions out of the control
ofMPT.
Central government issued new guiding principles to solve the fundamental problem
of the lack ofmodern telecommunications technologies. This involved three steps:
first, buying advanced technology products from overseas; second, transferring
technologies by setting up joint production ventures; and third, developing Chinese
technologies. This was in line with China's general strategy of dual technological
development, which extended to PDSS technology.
4.3 Switching Industry and Technology in Transition
The Chinese telecommunications sector was one of the most monopolistic industries.
Since the founding of the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications (see Figure 1.) in
November 1949, it was a centrally controlled independent sector. It had its own
financial, material and human resource systems. No local governments and no other
5 Each province, autonomous region, and municipality has its own Posts and Telecommunications
Administrations to administer the MPTs policies locally.
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Source:MPT (TheEconomist Intelligence Unit, 9.1995) 87
organisations were allowed to take part in managing its business. It was regarded as
quasi-militarised. Furthermore, during the cultural revolution, in 1969, the
"telecommunications" sector was separated from the "posts" sector and its control
resided in the People's Liberation Army. From 1973 when the MPT was re¬
established till to the 1979 economic reform, the MPT retained a very strong
monopoly position in the country. During this period, it reinforced its own productive
capacity, establishing 28 manufacturing firms in total. Economic reform has led many
ministries gradually to decentralise control over their companies. However, the MPT,
instead, reshuffled its organisations and rearranged these 28 manufacturing firms
under the leadership of the Posts and Telecommunications Industrial Corporation
(PTIC) which was founded in 1980 (Gu Ming, ed. 1992: pp. 16-21). Although MPT
appeared to loosen its control over these firms, it still retained considerable influence
through the PTIC. For these firms, this was only a change from one headquarters to
another.
Therefore, for a quite while even after the onset ofeconomic reforms, all switch
producers under the MPT retained their traditional status: they were still state-owned;
their material suppliers, annual production volume and technology development
projects were all decided by MPT; and end products were provided to users through
the same system. In the early 1980s, they were still producing cross-bar switches.
On the other hand, soon after the inauguration ofeconomic reforms, China begun to
explore opportunities to transfer more advanced switching technologies from abroad
and seek partners to set up joint production ventures. However, instead of setting up
manufacturing bases, most foreign companies preferred to sell their finished products
directly into the Chinese market. From 1980 onwards, when the first PDSS, F-150, a
Japanese system, was installed in the southern province ofFujian about ten different
systems from eight countries had gradually entered the Chines market, including
System-12, EWSD, Neax-61, F-150, E-lOb, System-X, AXE 10, and etc. China's
PDSS market came to be dominated by foreign systems.
Some multinational telecommunications equipment companies recognised the
importance ofChinese markets in the long term. They responded quickly to China's
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call for technology transfer and were also willing to bring in capital to set up join
production ventures. By 1991, three joint production ventures had been set up
(section 3.3).
After these three joint production ventures were set up, a request was issued to
restrict the variety of foreign systems operating in the public network. It was based on
the argument raised sometimes ago that the variety of different types of foreign
PDSSs had already brought about the complex interfaces in network, difficulties in
maintenance, spare-parts supply, and mastery of software techniques (State Science
and Technology Commission, 1986). However, the debate on whether or not it was
necessary to tighten controls over the range of foreign system types ended in
controversy over costs and political risks. Some studies were conducted in order to
find a better solution, but de facto the opening up the market weakened MPT's
monopoly control. The Chinese government came under enormous pressure from the
demands of the domestic market and state financial shortages, as well as from foreign
governments. Finally, under increasing pressure from the government of the United
States ofAmerica, the Chinese government had to make a concession - not only to
keep the market open but also to open it still wider. Since 1 January 1993, in response
to conditions imposed for China to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the tariff for direct imports ofPDSSs has been reduced, and the other two
PDSS technology transfer projects, from AT&T and Northern Telecom, have been
approved by the government.6
Following the government policy of decentralisation, customers (i.e. the local Posts
and Telecommunications Administrations) preferred foreign advanced systems, even
at much higher prices, to low-price Chinese cross-bar technology. Indeed, the 1980s
was a decade of "foreign technology fever" in telecommunications. Orders for cross¬
bar products decreased sharply, and many cross-bar switch producers were running at
a loss. There were two alternatives for the Chinese switch industry to go: either
develop new technology indigenously, or bring in foreign technology and capital by
setting up joint ventures.
6
According to my interviews with several officials in the MPT and the MMEI, 4.1993 in Beijing.
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In the event, foreign technology was so much in demand that government policy gave
privileges to joint ventures: these included low tariffs, autonomy in personnel
recruitment, and less control over management than in a state-owned company. In
some instances, locally produced foreign systems were treated as Chinese systems,
e.g. MPT provided subsidies for local Posts and Telecommunications Administrations
to buy locally produced System 12, when Shanghai Bell was running at a loss.
While joint ventures were booming, local state-owned companies were suffering. The
transition from a centrally planned system to a market system had been uneven across
enterprises. Joint ventures and new private companies were not subject to the
traditional constraints on state-owned companies, whereas state-owned firms had
inherited heavy social and economic burdens which were difficult to change.
In the socialist tradition, state-owned firms made up the industrial foundation of
socialist China. They functioned not only as a manufacturing body but also as a staff
community undertaking extensive social services for its members. State-owned firms
had unduly large work forces and people's job were permanent. Once one entered the
factory, one became a member of the community; even one's dependants were
included in the welfare schemes. Under this system, the resources ofmaterials and
manpower (including all staff from managers to labourers) were allocated by the state;
financing was controlled by the state; the volume of production was decided by the
state, and even its products were assigned under ration to users, all in accordance
with the state's plans. Incentives were provided by the inspiration and commitment of
the people, encouraged by mass education in socialist and communist thought.
Workers were supposed to be masters of the firm and, in turn, the firm took care of
their well-being.
By the mid-1980s, there had already been a profound change: state protection
gradually decreased as state-owned companies were pushed into the market place.
Existing institutional arrangements - once well suited for the central planning system -
did not fit the new circumstances. In particular, having a substantial work force,
previously regarded as an advantage, became a heavy burden, and incentives which
worked in the past were no longer effective. This rigid system ofjobs for life and
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wages dissociated from individual's performances was popularly known as "eating
from a big rice bowl". The most notable feature of the state-owned company was its
low productivity and its inefficiency. In the transition a much higher percentage of
state-owned companies than other enterprises in the country were running at a loss
(Sun, 1992). State-owned companies all over the country had been facing increasing
challenges in the changing economic and social environment.
This was also true of state-owned companies producing telephone switching systems.
Unlike the joint ventures, they were struggling to become profitable, and many were
on the edge ofbankruptcy. They faced two challenges: first, they needed to develop
workable new technologies to replace the dated technology of cross-bar exchanges;
second, they needed to restructure their operation. Moreover, state-owned firms were
competing with joint ventures from an unequal position. This was due largely to the
uneven pace of reform with respect to different parts of the state machine - that is to
say, government policy, the legal system, tariffs, and so on.
The introduction of foreign switching technologies created new problems. Foreign
systems, although advanced and sophisticated, were not suitable for the poor
conditions of the Chinese network (see section 5.3 and 6.4). All these systems, to
varying degrees, encountered severe problems. Lacking PDSS technology of their
own, the Chinese were dependent on foreign suppliers who controlled not only
technologies but also the market prices.
As a part of the government guidelines for three-step technological development
strategy noted early, in 1983 China established an R&D project to develop its own
PDSS technology under a state scheme.7 The earliest switching system, DS-2000, was
based on the knowledge ofJapanese system F-150. The project was successfully
completed in 1986. Subsequently, a more advanced version, DS-30, was developed.8
During the same period, another system was being developed as a joint project
7 This is a state supported scheme for technological innovation, which selects various technological projects
considered to be ofnational importance. In China, the state has been running "Five-year Plans" since 1953,
which, in respect of Science and Technology development, have included a series ofnational R&D
programmes. The R&D project for PDSS technology was under "the key project plan during the sixth five-
years".
8 This is according to my interview with Prof. Liu Ximin, specialist on telephone exchange technology, the
leader ofR&D project ofChinese system DS-2000 development, 3.1993 in Shanghai.
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involving a military R&D institute - the Centre for Information Technology (CIT) in
Zhengzhou Institute of Information Engineering of the People's Liberation Army, and
a state-owned manufacturing company and the industrial unit of the MPT. It is this
development ofHJD-04 that forms the central focus in my second case, as a contrast
to the Shanghai Bell joint venture case study of System 12.
4.4 Summary
In the past, China's telecommunications system was one of the poorest in the world.
The socialist centrally planned economy had contributed little to the construction of a
telecommunications infrastructure.
It was the economic reform which made the whole nation realise that this placed
serious constraints on the country's economic expansion. The central government, as
well as local governments, therefore, gave priority in investment to the
telecommunications sector, to expand the telecommunications network and modernise
technologies and services. Apart from this, Chinese culture helped build up the
"bandwagon effect" and speeded up the demand for telecommunications services. All
these together provided an extra capital resource for the investment in the
telecommunication network. More important was that the Chinese government
decentralised partially the tight control over the telecommunications sector and
introduced to some extent market mechanisms. This brought in various resources
from local governments for investment, at the same time allowed different
telecommunications products from overseas to compete in the market.
The strategy of the state for the longer term technological development in China,
involving the transfer of advanced foreign technologies alongside indigenous
technological development to build up technological capabilities was applied.
Thorny problems facing the Chinese switch producers were the long standing
monopoly tradition in the telecommunications industry, as well as the uneven
development ofnew economic system combining state control and market
mechanisms. Those who suffered the most were state-owned firms. In the course of
introducing foreign advanced technologies into the Chinese telecommunications
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market, the domestic industry was put under intensified pressure of the lack of
financial support and lack of new technologies. While new types of enterprises, such
as joint venture and private companies, emerged and were supported by the state
during China's transition period, state-owned firms were struggling with inefficiency
stemming from the previous socialist tradition. The same phenomenon, on the other
hand, became a driving force to compel the domestic industry to strengthen itself
through technological learning and the development of indigenous technologies.
The two case studies investigated here were chosen to illuminate both technological
strategies as they unfolded in the context described here: the systematic transfer of
advanced foreign PDSS technology, System 12, through a joint venture; and the
indigenous development ofPDSS technology, HJD-04. These two cases will be
examined respectively in following two chapters.
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Chapter 5:




The System 12 technology transfer project could be considered to be an archetypal
example ofhow a country could achieve a quantum jump in technological capabilities
by importing an entire advanced technology, including production capacity from
abroad. The technology transfer project was initiated, and carefully planned by the
state. It was one of the largest advanced technology transactions in the history of
China's foreign trade. I investigated this project in China from November 1992 to
March 1993. This chapter provides a detailed account of the findings of this case
study. This focuses on the process of acquiring advanced foreign PDSS technology in
the System 12 technology transfer, through the establishment of a joint venture
project - Shanghai Bell. It highlights the problems encountered in developing System
12 production capacity, and the subsequent 'domestication' of capabilities to
manufacture the components required, and how these were shaped by the changing
context ofChina's economic reforms.
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 explores how this technology
transfer project was initiated: it highlights the role the Chinese government played in
the first place, in line with its policies for technology development in the country; and
how the international environment was responding to the potential Chinese market
and the Chinese intention of acquiring advanced technologies. It also describes the
scope of the System 12 technology transfer. This provides the framework for
understanding the implementation of the technology transfer, and sets the parameters
for the future development of System 12 technology in China. Section 5.3 is about the
early efforts of Chinese to adopt System 12 technology - in its broadest sense,
including not only technologies of the switching system, production technologies,
engineering and services, but also management. Section 5.4 focuses on the process of
assimilating the foreign technologies. Section 5.5 examines the formally organised
technological learning activities. The final section 5.6 presents a summary and
conclusions of this chapter. Drawing on this, it also raises some issues for further
analysis in the final part of the thesis.
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5.2 The Initiation of System 12 Technology Transfer
The System 12 technology transfer was set up immediately after the inauguration of
economic reforms in China. This demonstrated the Chinese government's early
determination to build up indigenous technological capabilities by acquiring advanced
foreign technologies. The central government played an important role in searching
for collaboration and setting up this project. The section gives the details of the
Chinese government's objectives through this technology transfer; the international
environment for such an advanced telecommunications technology transfer; how the
central government conducted this initiation process; and the scope of this technology
transfer.
5.2.1 First Move - Searching, Mutual Selecting, Negotiating
As mentioned in chapter 4 the Chinese government decided from the outset that direct
import of finished foreign systems could only be a short term solution for China. As
the most populous country in the world with a huge potential market, transferring
technologies by setting up joint ventures was considered necessary for China to
increase local added value, maintain local employment and speed up the process of
industrialisation; and more important, through technological learning, to build up
indigenous technological capabilities. Facing pressing demands for an adequate
telecommunications infrastructure, MPT approached almost all the prestigious
telecommunications companies all over the world, to explore opportunities for
technology transfer through joint venture projects. At that time, several state
councillors and premiers, during state visits to industrialised countries, explored the
possibility of transferring foreign switching technologies.1
However, at that time, most telecommunications companies in the world were only
interested in exporting their finished products into China. Bell Telephone
Manufacturing Company (BTM) was one of the few who attempted to exploit the
potentially huge market through wholesale technology transfer ofmanufacturing,
components through a completed turnkey project.
1 Interviewwith China's leading switching experts, Xie Xiaoan and Liu Ximin who themselves involved in such
overall search of the opportunity of technology transfer from outside China.
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"In 1980, BTM was convinced that its technology could be successfully transferred to
the People's Republic ofChina", given China's "skilled personnel, sound Chinese
financial policies, and a suitable partner, PTIC" (Zhou2 and Kerkhofs3, 1987: p. 186).
Obviously, the attractions of a potentially large market and the opportunity for long-
term technological and commercial partnership with a successful local manufacturer
were key elements for BTM in their decision to draw up a contract for the technology
transfer project. The first preliminary agreement between BTM and PTIC was
therefore signed in Luoyang,4 in November 1980. PTIC initially proposed that this
joint production venture would be situated at the LTEF factory. BTM preferred an
alternative location. The final agreement was to set the joint venture at the factory of
another MPT telephone exchange producer in Shanghai.
The Chinese side was convinced that System-12 was, at that time, the most advanced
technology as well as the technology the most appropriate for the Chinese
telecommunications network. For example, System-12 was the only switching
equipment available at that time with fully distributed-control. It was designed to
avoid the weakness of central control systems, so to be relatively fail safe. It was able
to handle the complex user-interface and large call processing which was essential to
operate in China. ITT's (International Telephone and Telegram Corporation)
reputation was an additional attraction, as, at that time, BTM was a daughter
company of ITT. In addition to these functions, the Belgian government had agreed to
issue a long term loan at a "country to country" level, which guaranteed the Chinese
continued financial support. The most important was that BTM agreed to transfer
technologies for component production, including the production technology of its
custom LSI (large scale integration) chip. This was remarkable. At that time no other
supplier was prepared or able to offer the transfer of such advanced technology.5
2 Zhou was the director of the Shanghai Telecommunication Construction Bureau in overall charge of the
System-12 project, and the Chairman of the board of the Sino-Belgian joint venture, Shanghai Bell, at that
time.
3 Kerkhofs was the programme manager for the BTM-China contracts in 1985, and the general manager of
Shanghai Bell in 1986.
4 The city where LTEF is located.
5 Interview with Xie Xiaoan (see footnote 1), and other interviews in Shanghai Bell.
97
The initiation of the System-12 technology transfer project involved the Belgian and
Chinese governments, MPT, BTM, ITT and PTIC. Since this was by far the largest
high technology transaction in the history ofChina's foreign trade (Zhou and
Kerkhofs, 1987), the Chinese side set up a strong negotiating team. Within this team,
the ChiefRepresentative was a deputy minister ofMPT (also a senior specialist of
telecommunications technology). Many senior experts in both technologies and
foreign trade from various state institutions also took part. The negotiation was an
arduous marathon lasting 33 months. As far as the Chinese side was concerned, the
major technological issue was whether the System-12 technology suited the
conditions of the Chinese telecommunications network. For this, the features of
System 12 were checked one after the other. Trade negotiation was also time
consuming. The whole process was a challenge for the Chinese team. As noted above,
the most thorny issue was the transfer of the production technology for the custom
LSI chip, as it was a high technology within the category ofCOCOM's (Co¬
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control) restrictions.6 The Chinese side
insisted that all the technologies of component production had to be included in the
transaction, lest component provision be stopped in future as result of a change in
political relations between two countries. On this issue alone, both sides took a year
to reach an agreement.
BTM undertook to lobby COCOM to ease the control.7 The Belgian government,
from time to time, took up the matter as its involvement became necessary. In 1983,
the Belgian Minister ofForeign Affairs sought to convince the US government to lift
the restrictions against China. In June 1985, even the Belgian Prime-Minister
intervened. The Belgian Embassy in Washington acted on behalf of the Belgian
government in obtaining the US government approval for LSI technology transfer. In
this period, BTM delegations had travelled frequently to Washington and Paris to
pursue this goal. Even ITT was involved in these efforts. In March 1987, the transfer
6 In 1949 the USA, Japan, and the NATO countries created COCOM to restrict the flow of strategic goods and
know-how, concerned that technology transfer might strengthen the strategic and military potential of
socialist countries. Industrial sectors such as electronics and telecommunications were ofparticular concern
in this context.
7 Information provided by the first Chinese general manager and the present general manager ofShanghai Bell
on my interviews in February 1993.
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of the chip (LSI) production technology to Shanghai Bell, at last, obtained an
approval from the USA and the other relevant governments.
5.2.2 Scope of the Technology Transfer
The contract for the rest of the technology was agreed and signed on 30 July 1983,
before the final agreement on technology transfer of the LSI chip. BTM's equity share
amounted to 32% of the total, the Belgian government contributed 8% and the PTIC
ofMPT shared the remaining 60%.
According to the contract, PTIC was primarily responsible for providing land,
buildings and necessary facilities for the plant and for exploiting the domestic market
for locally produced System 12 exchanges; BTM provided the technology together
with various services; and the Belgian government contributed capital. The joint
production venture, Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Company
(Shanghai Bell), was registered with capital of $27,000,000 US dollars and designed
to produce 300,000 lines per year of System-12 switches (Shanghai Bell, 1992).
The technology to be transferred between BTM and Shanghai Bell included
manufacturing and installation technology, as well as engineering technology. This
was to be carried out during the contractual period of 15 years with an extension-
option for a period of 5 years. It concerned the transfer of hardware and software
technologies. The hardware technologies included: custom LSI production of 3
micron CMOS and 8 micron Bi-MOS; thick film hybrids, double sided and multi-layer
printed circuit boards, and assembly line technology; computerised test facilities; and
numerically controlled equipment for piece part manufacturing. The software included
full Country Development Engineering (CDE) and Customer Application Engineering
(CAE) capabilities and computer systems.
BTM was committed to transfer all the technologies that the Chinese requested.
However, the Chinese did not order all the technologies, but only those which were
considered necessary. For example, the Chinese did not use the fully automated
production assembly that BTM used in its own factories, in order to save on capital
costs. The Chinese decided to conduct manually many jobs which could be carried out
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by hand without having an impact on production quality.8 In other words, where
possible, the Chinese preferred to use labour rather than expensive automatic
machines. Some equipment which they judged they could make in China was also not
ordered. One example is the automatic operator-position, which was later developed
jointly by Shanghai Bell and a local university.9
The earliest System 12 technology transferred was the release 5.0 based on the
evolution line circuit technology,10 which at that time was the latest version.
Subsequently, Shanghai Bell selectively transferred the later innovations of System 12.
In 1989, Shanghai Bell obtained the last development of the version 5 - release 5.2. In
1992, a new contract between BTM and Shanghai Bell was signed, deciding that the
project of technology transfer would extend for another twenty years from 1994 to
2014.11 The new version of System 12 to be transferred was release 7. With the
hardware, the size of the exchange would be smaller than the existing one - release 5.
With the requisite software, release 7 was able to provide ISDN (integrated services
digital network), IN (intelligent network) and so on, as well as to meet the new
requirements of the international standards body CCITT. The new contract also
included an updated technology for manufacturing LSI with 1.2p. The registered
capital of the company increased to $40,000,000 US dollars and the planned annual
production volume from 1995 would be 4,000,000 lines (Shanghai Bell, 1992).
5.3 Adopting the Foreign Technology
From the outset, the Chinese decided to adopt the foreign technological capacity as a
whole, not only technologies for production, engineering and services, but also
institutional organisation and management. The Chinese side believed that, only after
adopting all these, would it be able to judge whether they are appropriate for the
Chinese environment. To this end, considerable effort was made by the Chinese. The
8 Interview with the Deputy Manager ofOperation Department, 6.11.92.
9 Interview with the Deputy Director ofEngineering Department, 30.1.1993.
10 The development of switching system technology is characterised according to the circuit technology. The
earliest is 'analogue line circuit' with a micro-processor controlling 60 lines; the next one was 'Evolution line
circuit' with a micro-processor controlling 128 lines and the newest one is 'New generation line circuit' with
a micro-processor controlling the same lines as the former one but the number ofmodems reduced.
11 Interview with a deputy director of Engineering Department, 30.1.1993.
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Belgian company's experience in technology transfer was also crucial. In spite of this,
Shanghai Bell encountered a range of acute problems. These resulted variously from
the technical imperfections of System 12 per se; and the inappropriateness of this
technology to the Chinese environment; common problems of using foreign
equipment and services, e.g. maintenance and spare parts supply; as well as the
weakness of indigenous technological capabilities, particularly in relation to
production quality.
Chinese government policy and its direct support for Shanghai Bell helped the
company out of the crisis which arose at the beginning ofproduction, and provided
the joint venture with privileges - e.g. low tax, autonomy in management, human and
material resource supply etc.- which allowed Shanghai Bell to conduct its business
free from many of the constraints from which local firms were still suffering.
Section 5.3.1 first describes the implementation of technology transfer. It then (5.3.2)
illustrates the difficulties that Shanghai Bell encountered, especially concerning the
weakness of Chinese indigenous technological capability in production and quality
control; and incompatibility between System 12 as a foreign developed technology
and the environment ofChinese industries and the poor condition ofChinese
telecommunications networks. It also depicts the prestige that Shanghai Bell had
enjoyed during the early stage ofeconomic reform because ofdirect government
support as well as the general policies favourable to joint ventures like Shanghai Bell.
5.3.1 Implementation of the Technology Transfer
The product and manufacturing technology transfer had three phases. The first
comprised the assembly of components or parts as well as testing, including incoming
inspection, the assembly and test of cables, back-panels, printed boards and racks. The
entire process undertaken was to BTM standards: it used the most modern production
and test facilities; all components or parts and other materials were directly imported
from BTM or from the companies which BTM specified; every single incoming item
and each sub-assembly was inspected. This detected quality control continued until
the final system tests which were followed by a performance trail (Zhou and
Kerkhofs, 1987).
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The second phase involved the building up of a workshop for the production of
printed circuit boards and metal and plastic piece-parts. Again, these were all a copy
of the BTM's, from workshop equipment, functional tests over all sub-assemblies, to
waste water treatment and etc. The installation of the equipment was completed by
the end of 1986, and the production line was brought into operation in the first
quarter of 1987 (Zhou and Kerkhofs, 1987)
The final phase was the manufacture of the LSI chips. In order to save capital
investment, instead of following the original plan to establish a completely new
production facility in Shanghai Bell, a new arrangement was agreed between the
Chinese and Belgian sides to set up a joint venture, between Shanghai Bell and an
existing chip producer - the No. 14 Shanghai Radio Factory, to manufacture the chip.
Under the new arrangement, the No. 14 Shanghai Radio Factory contributed 60% of
the equity and Shanghai Bell shared 40%. This new contract was signed in September
1988, and the joint venture was named as Shanghai Belling. Product and
manufacturing know-how were transferred from BTM via Shanghai Bell to Shanghai
Belling for System-12 custom LSI chips. In the middle of 1991, Shanghai Belling
began to provide System-12 custom LSI chips for Shanghai Bell (Shanghai Bell,
1992).
As well as hardware, transfer ofengineering know-how was essential to foster a batch
ofChinese engineers able to perform independently. There were two major areas -
CAE (Customer Application Engineering) and CDE (Country Development
Engineering), which were needed to allow the Chinese to adapt the system and build
operational software packages to meet specific custom applications. CAE is the
know-how by which the system is made according to individual customer
requirements, as each exchange office has its specific physical layout, and each
exchange requires a different number of subscribers and trunk lines with different
conditions. The hardware know-how involved mastering the techniques ofenabling
specifications to be prepared for manufacturing; software expertise was required to
understand and operate programmes, in order to produce the system load tapes for
each exchange.
102
The CDE was necessary for the system to be customised to meet the specifications of
the Chinese network. For example, in China the telecommunications network
embraced exchanges of different generations, which were using different signalling
systems, the System-12 therefore needed specially designed software to identify these
signals. Furthermore, as the specifications for the network had been updated over
time by MPT, CDE know-how could enable the system to follow the changes.
Hardware and software installation and testing in the field ofeach exchange office
were critical undertakings. The first locally produced System-12 was installed in 1985
and however was not cut over (brought into operation in place of the existing
exchange) until a year later in December 1986. This was the most problematic and
critical time in the early stage for Shanghai Bell (section 5 .4).
The technology was transferred by means of technical assistance, management
participation, training and documentation. During the "pre-operation" period and the
early years ofoperation, technical assistance by BTM reached the highest level. Later
on, the number ofBelgian engineers gradually dropped. Since 1987, after the
inauguration of the first exchange, the Chinese had taken over all positions, and were
able to operate the whole process by their own. In December 1992 (the time ofmy
visit), there were merely three Belgian technical assistants left in Shanghai Bell,
compared to over 12, on average, during the first three years of operation.
Management participation began with an attempt ofcopying BTM's style, encouraged
by the Chinese government's desire to introduce modern management methods into
national enterprises. The posts ofDirector of Shanghai Bell, and ofManagers of
engineering and quality control departments were held by BTM experts. In the first
six years, all Belgian managers sent to Shanghai Bell had strong engineering
background. With the increasing technological capability of the Chinese engineers'
and rapid expansion ofproduction, managerial problems came to the fore. In 1991
BTM, for the first time, appointed a managerial expert to be the Belgian general
manager of Shanghai Bell in order to enhance management (section 5.4.5).
Since 1989, Shanghai Bell's production capacity had been increasing rapidly.
Compared to its designed annual capacity of 300,000 lines, its actual output was
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336,000 lines in 1989, 455,000 lines in 1990, 736,000 lines in 1991 and 1,380,000
lines in 1992. "Chinese has produced four times than what was foreseen in the
beginning. This is a great growth, unpredictable!", as the Belgian general manager of
Shanghai Bell concluded.12 Furthermore, the production volume continued to increase
to 2,700,000 lines in 1993 (Shanghai Bell, 1992). The expansion rate was not 10% as
at most other companies, but at about 100% per year. According to the plan, at the
end of 1994, after the completion ofnew workshops, the annual production volume
would be 4,000,000 lines.13 Shanghai Bell expected to be the one of the largest
exchange producers in the world by that time.
5.3.2 Difficulties and Privileges
Quality control in the process ofproduction was the main issue in Shanghai Bell,
while production capacity was rapidly expanding. In 1989 the first year of full-scale
production, the Department ofProductivity and Quality Management was set up in
Shanghai Bell, with a Belgian quality control specialist in charge.14 He set up routines
in the production process in line with world class standards including motivation,
examination in each section, regular reporting, record-analysis and internal and
external auditing. As with BTM, the target ofproduction quality control in Shanghai
Bell was to reach the level of ISO (International Standard Organisation) 9001.15 A
year later, a young Chinese engineer took over the position. However, the level of
quality control was not attainable in the short term, since it is closely related to
people's understanding which are associated with their living environment and general
culture. Because of the old tradition, for many, the "quality" ofproduction was
merely a question of reject rate. A Belgian manager had a vivid explanation:
You should not expect there will be a overnight change. Quality is, first of all,
the people's perception. Look! (standing by his office's window, he pointed
through the window, to the area - one of the poorest housing areas in
Shanghai, where Shanghai Bell's workshops are located) People are living in
12 Interview with Mr. De Graeve, who was the fourth Belgian general manager. His predecessors were: Mr. J.
Loontiens, Mr. M. Kerkhofs and Mr. S. Abbeloos.
13 Figures was provided by a deputy manager of engineering department, 30.1.1993.
14 According to the director of the Productivity & Quality Management, "He is a very experienced manager.
Apart from building up a quality control system in Shanghai Bell, he also introduced his knowledge to other
local companies and had a very good relationship with Shanghai Quality Management Association". (Director
ofProductivity & Quality Management, 9.11.1992)
15 Most detailed material about production quality control was provided by the manager ofDepartment of
Productivity and Quality Management on the interview, 9.11.92.
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the environment like these. How could you expect them to have a good sense
ofquality?! (Director of Engineering Department, 2.2.1993)
The young director of the Department ofProductivity and Quality Management
described the current situation:
Workers are still not aware enough about the importance of quality. There are
two major problems: first, quality ofproduction is often ignored when
quantity ofproduction becomes urgent; second, understanding of the
importance ofquality has not penetrated much beyond management circles.
Quality incidence changes in cycles. After managers stress on the importance
ofquality, then workers begin to pay more attention and quality becomes
good. However, it usually declines bit by bit along the time, until, when it
reaches 'red line', the managers have to 'sound the alarm' again (The director
of the Department ofProductivity & Quality Management, 9.11.1992).
System 12 was developed in industrialised countries. No matter how experienced the
developers were, some problems were inevitable in applying the technology in China.
On top of that, when the technology was first introduced into China in the early
1980s, System 12 technologyper se was still immature.16
Some problems were obvious. For example, System 12 uses English as a human-
machine communicating language, and all the technical documents and the kernel and
common application software were written in English. In the documentation transfer
alone, "several hundred thousand documents" had to be translated into Chinese (Zhou
and Kerkhofs, 1987: p. 191). Moreover, many posts using the computer required
operators who could understand English. For candidates applying for a job in
Shanghai Bell, in most cases, one special requirement was English language
comprehension. Further there was a compulsory requirement for new recruits to
undertake certain English courses to reach the firm-specified level.
Another related problem was technical training for customers. As a normal
requirement, to operate System 12 needs special technical training for customers. In
the case of Shanghai Bell, it had to add the teaching of the technical terminology in
English to training. In the early stage, Shanghai Bell's technical training courses used
BTM's text book which had been translated into Chinese. Because it was a (poor)
16 The first System 12 exchange in use anywhere in the world was in June 1986 in the Netherlands. It was only
six month before the first Shanghai Bell-made System 12 was put into operation in China.
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translation, the book was so difficult to read, that, as the manager of the Training
Centre described:
Those who could easily understand the technology avoided reading this book,
whereas those who would read this book in order to understand the
technology did not get any help from this reading (Manager of the Training
Centre, 29.1.1993).
When System 12 was installed in large or middle sized cities, it was not difficult to get
reasonably educated people who had learned more or less English. These people, after
taking technical training courses in Shanghai Bell, could undertake the operation
posts. However, as System 12's market share were expanding and some exchanges
came to be installed in small towns or villages, it became very difficult to find suitable
candidates for even the technical training course, who could, at least, understand
English.17
Irritations also came from using imported equipment and machines. All machinery and
equipment used for exchange production in Shanghai Bell were specified by BTM,
including the brand and/or producer. Problems arose with their maintenance and spare
parts supply, because most of them were imported from abroad - apart from a few
produced in joint ventures in China. For example, the surface mounting technology
was fairly advanced technology in production ofprinted circuits. Shanghai Bell
bought this British made machine at a cost of $200,000.18 However, since its
installation, the machine broke down often, and Shanghai Bell couldn't get it repaired
in time. Chinese engineers tried to make the broken parts by themselves. However,
because they lacked the proper material, locally made parts wore out easily, making
the machine break down more often. The inserting machine provided by Universal,
which was supposed to work continuously, broke down approximately every twenty
hours. Since Universal had already set up a joint venture manufacturing the same
machine in China, spare part supply was much easier.19
In the early stage, one of the biggest problems for the System 12 technology was the
condition of the Chinese telecommunications network, which was poor in general and
17 Those with such a degree ofeducation could have better jobs than being a phone operator in these places.
18
According to my discussion with shop-floor engineers and workers in Shanghai Bell's workshop, 1.3.1993.
19 Ibid.
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uneven over the country, in terms of facilities and equipment. For instance,
transmission lines varied from bare open wire in remote districts to fibre optic cable.
As a result, signalling conditions differed from place to place and changed from time
to time depending on weather. Different generations ofexchange technology were
operating in the same network, ranging from manual exchange, early step-by-step,
Strowger, and cross-bar electric-mechanical exchanges to advanced digital switching
systems. Moreover, when the first Shanghai Bell system was installed in the Chinese
network, even the signalling systems used in the network differed between exchanges.
System 12 was a sophisticated technology, designed with a presumption ofhigh
transmission quality. In the very different rough conditions of the Chinese network,
System 12 often failed to identify correctly the different kinds of signal.
During the first few years ofoperation, Shanghai Bell encountered acute problems,
both technical and financial. Serious technical problems occurred on installation
because the technology itselfwas immature and because BTM experts were not
familiar with the Chinese telecommunications environment. Interrelated with this,
there was a financial crisis. During the early stage of technology transfer, Shanghai
Bell was only assembling piece parts imported from BTM. However, the price of
these piece parts was high, with the result that the total cost of assembled exchanges
was higher than directly importing finished exchanges. To make matters worse,
Japanese companies were offering their exchanges at a lower price. At that time,
Shanghai Bell's System 12 cost $250 per line, compared to $150 per line on average
for the Japanese systems.20 Shanghai Bell barely got any orders from the domestic
market.
During this period of time, the production volume was very low: 66,000 lines in 1986,
which fell further to 15,000 in 1987 (Shanghai Bell, 1992). The company was running
at a loss. Between the 1984 inauguration of production and 1987, Shanghai Bell had
run up a total debt of $15,000,000.21 Shanghai Bell was not able to pay fees for
technology transfer, and even felt hard pushed to pay the Belgian engineers' salaries.
At the same time, BTM was unhappy and threatened to stop the transfer.
20 Interview with the vice-chiefengineer in Shanghai Telephone Administrations, 10.2.1993.
21 Interview with a deputy manager ofPersonnel Department, 3.11.1992.
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In this situation, MPT adopted strong measures to attract customers. Users buying
Shanghai Bell's System 12 could receive an MPT subsidy of $30 per line. In total,
MPT provided 60,000,000 yuan RMB (equivalent to around $17,000,000) in
subsidy.22With this support, Shanghai Bell regained its momentum. In 1988, it
recovered and produced 189,000 lines. That year was the first year ofprofit for
Shanghai Bell. After the 1989 Tiananmen debacle, foreign government soft loans were
greatly reduced, and the domestic political situation drove the market towards locally
produced systems. Ever since, Shanghai Bell's production has been rapidly increasing,
and its position in China was privileged in many respects.
As a joint production venture, Shanghai Bell was allowed to pay much less tax than
domestic companies,.23 Shanghai Bell was free of tax for the first couple ofyears, and
tax charges were deducted by 50% in the following few years. After this, as it was
classified as a high-tech company, tax reductions were still applied.24 In addition, the
state granted a license for Shanghai Bell to import component at a low tariff rate
(section 5.5.2). Shanghai Bell was given the right to purchase components directly
from overseas and, moreover, allowed to collect a certain portion of its payments
from Chinese customers in foreign currencies.25 A joint venture like Shanghai Bell
was also given management autonomy to decide the internal organisational structures
and material rewards.
MPT gave considerable attention to Shanghai Bell's creation, resource allocation and
the market for System 12. From the outset, it set up a dedicated bureau in Shanghai to
co-ordinate with local government on the building of Shanghai Bell's factory. To
ensure its domestic market, MPT decreed in an internal circular26 that System-12 was
22 Figures provided by a deputy manager ofDepartment ofOperational Finance at PTIC.
23
According to The Law ofthe People's Republic ofChina on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, Article 7, "a joint venture equipped with up-to-date technology by world standards may apply for
a reduction of or exemption from income tax for the first two to three profit-making years". This law was
adopted on July 1,1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress; Promulgated on July
8,1979. (Shanghai Municipal Foreign Trade and Economic Committee, 1985)
24 Interview with the deputy manager ofDepartment ofOperational Finance at PTIC.
25 Domestic enterprises did not have such rights, (see more detailed description in chapter 6)
26 Interview with the vice chief engineer in Shanghai Local Telecommunications Administration and was
confirmed in other interviews in Shanghai Bell. I did not see the internal circular. However, there is the State
Council No. 56 dispatch in 1989 which indicated clearly, "it is requested for all purchasing of foreign
switching systems to use the ones which have already been selected by the government". (The
Telecommunications Administration Bureau at Zhejiang Provincial Posts and Telecommunications
Administration, 8.1992, p.93)
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one of the principal switching systems for use in the Chinese telecommunications
networks. MPT also endeavoured to obtain funds and loans required by Shanghai Bell
from relevant government departments.
In terms ofhuman resources, at the end of 1983, MPT brought together a group of
highly skilled staff fromMPT's R&D institutes, universities and factories across the
country to Shanghai Bell to set up the plant. Among them were many experienced
senior engineers, and knowledgeable professors in telecommunications field. They
played a crucial role in building up the company in the early stage. Thereafter, most of
them returned to their institutes, and some subsequently used the knowledge they had
obtained of System 12 to carry out various R&D projects for Shanghai Bell. In
October 1985, when the first production assembly was to be put into operation in
Shanghai Bell, MPT again took the role in recruiting capable graduates and
experienced young engineers all over the country to join the work force. Many of
them, later on, became departmental directors, and section managers and formed the
technical nucleus of the company .27
As a joint venture located in Shanghai, Shanghai Bell had received substantial support
from the Shanghai Municipal Government. In particular in the early stage of
constructing the joint venture, Shanghai Municipal Government helped the company
in obtaining required resources within its territory, from electric power supply to new
work-force recruitment. As Shanghai Bell was regarded as a source of advanced
technologies for the region, it was even better treated than its state-owned
counterparts by the government. In May 1991, with the Shanghai government
nomination, Shanghai Bell was conferred the title as one of the Top Ten Joint Venture
Companies in China. In June of the same year, the Shanghai Municipal Government
awarded the Shanghai Bell's Belgian director the "Magnolia Medal" - a high honour
paid by the city.
As mentioned in chapter 4, following the Cultural Revolution, China was short of
almost everything. Shanghai, one of the biggest industrial bases and the commercial
27
Many of the young managers I interviewed in Shanghai Bell belonged to this batch of recruits, which was
arranged by MPT.
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centre of country, suffered from shortages ofelectricity power supply, water, housing,
etc. For many local manufacturing companies, power cuts occurred for several hours
almost every day, especially in summer at "peak-hours". However, because of the
particular concerns of the local government, Shanghai Bell was able to avoid this
problem from which other companies suffered badly. The harsh conditions facing
other companies was expressed by a non-Shanghai Bell engineer:
The power supply in our factory has been often cut off, sometimes we were
notified beforehand, sometimes not even this. Frequent cut-offs in power
supply causes unstable temperature ofthe soldering torch and therefore often
causes quality problems, as well as low productivity. In summer, when the
power supply gets worse, even air-conditioning in the workshops was
restricted to rally several hours a day. You can imagine, how awful it is to
stay in a workshop with natural temperature at 35 - 38 centigrade for eight
hours, not to mention working with soldering (A non Shanghai Bell engineer
in workshop, 2.2.1993).
As noted in chapter 4, under central planning, human resources were arranged by the
government. This was based on the regulation requiring registration of residence. In
other words, people were not mobile unless there was government approval, e.g.
because of their particular level of education and/or occupation. Because Shanghai
was already an overcrowded city, Shanghai enterprises could only employ Shanghai
residents. Any other new recruitment had first to be approved by the municipal
government. During the first ten years of economic reform, these regulations were
still effective. In the case of Shanghai Bell, which had recruited manpower from all
over the country, the Shanghai government always gave a green light to this.
5.4 Assimilation of the Foreign Technology
After the first stage of technology transfer when Shanghai Bell tried hard to master
the technology as a whole, Shanghai Bell realised that it could not simply copy these
technologies but that it had to adapt them to the Chinese environment. This section
tells how Shanghai Bell, in the face ofdifficulties, gradually mastered more and more
of the technology and were able to work better on not only System 12per se but also
on production process technologies. In particular, as a joint venture having a special
position in China during the transition period, Shanghai Bell had learned to take
advantage of its connections with its locality and the Chinese government as well as
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overseas to strengthen its capabilities in marketing, sourcing and management. At the
same time, while enjoying support and protection from the government, it made
efforts not to fall into the rut that state-owned companies found themselves.
In this section, there are five sub-sections, which respectively examine: the adaptation
of System 12 product to Chinese telecommunications environment (5.4.1); the
adaptation of the production process (5 .4 .2); the accumulation ofmarketing
capabilities (5.4.3); the accumulation of sourcing capabilities (5.4.4); and the
combination ofChinese and Western management methods (5.4.5). The last three
subsections are very much related to how Shanghai Bell, based on the Western
business values of efficiency and productivity, pursued its market share, secured its
human, financial and technology resources and sought a high performance from its
workforce.
5.4.1 Adapting System 12 to Chinese Environment
System 12 software consists of several layers. The generic system kernel is the basic
layer which is common to all System 12 applications in all countries, providing the
operating system, database, input/output and system maintenance functions. In
addition, there are the application layers. Some application software was specially
designed for the system to meet country-specific requirements (e.g. CDE), some is
needed to fit the switching requirements of particular customers (e.g. CAE). If System
12 is applied in a country where telecommunications technology is largely
internationally standardised, then its application related software has a higher degree
of commonality. As already described in 5.3.2, China had very complex conditions,
and its technologies in public network were far from the international standards.
Therefore, to ensure the success of System 12, a proper adaptation of this system to
the Chinese telecommunications environment was essential.
However, this adaptation took time. It did not happen in Shanghai Bell straight away.
Rather it arose through a gradual learning process, which included growing demand
from the market. As the Chinese general manager described:
In the first instance, we had technical problems. However, we did not quite
understand the system and were not able to change the slightest detail of the
products. That time we had to rely on the Belgian Engineers. Now, we
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understand more and more about the technology and begin to do a few
changes here and there with help from experts. We do this and are allowed to
do this, because ofour customers' needs. However we cannot do much as we
are still learning; besides, these changes need BTM's approval (Chinese
general manager, 1.2.1993).
As mentioned above, the transmission conditions in the Chinese networks made it
difficult for the exchange to identify signals. For this, Shanghai Bell developed
supplementary instruments to monitor and identify the condition of the transmission
lines. This was done with the help of local universities and R&D institutes.
With the continual development of the country's telecommunications infrastructure,
the regulations and specifications for the networks and services had also been
modified. To integrate System 12 with the country's specifications, Shanghai Bell
from the outset set up a task force to update CDE. According to the previous
agreement between BTM and PTIC, CDE projects would mainly be performed by
BTM engineers, and only a few Chinese engineers in Shanghai Bell would be selected
to participate, as this task requires deep understanding of the system. However, as it
turned out the Chinese team undertook 80% of the CDE software development work
compared to 20% by BTM mainly in the form of supervision and consultancy.
At the same time, MPT and Shanghai Bell established a working group, named the
Communal Co-ordination Group (CCG). Its major task was jointly to set targets for
System 12 technology innovation in line with the development of the
telecommunications network. In particular, this sought agreement on CDE innovation
between MPT (which was both user and administration) and Shanghai Bell (supplier).
CCG organised working seminars involving a deputy minister ofMPT as the chair,
and many senior engineers and senior research fellows from various MPT R&D
institutes, and key officials from relevant MPT's administrative organisations to
discuss the issues. A successful result was the CDE software package-5X, which
involved more than 30 person-years by the time of its completion. At the end of 1992,
the first toll exchange equipped with the package-5X was put into operation in
Shanghai. With the CDE package-5X, which integrated theMPT's specifications that
were compatible with new CCITT regulations, the exchange was able to provide
many new features for advanced services. In February 1993, the fourth CCG meeting
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was held in Shanghai, with up to 80 participants, to discuss further targets for the new
version of System 12 NGLT - release 7. The new CDE project was to be completed
by the end of 1994 in time for the expansion of Shanghai Bell's production in the
second halfof 1995.28
To meet a wider range of customers' demand, Shanghai Bell developed a remote
autonomous switching module (RASM) with a capacity of about 1000 lines, which
suits rural areas where population densities are low, and was also for engineering
teams working in areas without existing telecommunications networks. The
technology was designed by several Chinese engineers and was patented in August
1990. It proved to be welcome by users, since China has a large rural area where
people could not afford the expense of System 12 to this date.29
However, there were differences ofopinion within Shanghai Bell about whether it was
necessary for Shanghai Bell to master every single technology of System 12. Almost
all the young Chinese managers believed that the most important issue was the
profitability of the company: they thus saw the need for technological capabilities
solely in terms of the ability to adapt System 12 to satisfying user requirements, and
strengthen Shanghai Bell's position in the market. They argued:
Just as China is a 'tree' in 'the world national forest', so Shanghai Bell can
play a part amongst all System 12 producers in the world. The relationship
we prefer is technological complementarity between one another, each with its
own particular strengths. Now we, Shanghai Bell, can produce the best
software and tapes for Chinese market, and one day we will achieve more (the
Deputy Director of Engineering Department, 10.11.1992).
In contrast, many older engineers had different views. They hoped that Shanghai Bell
would build up its own strong R&D base, and could undertake the development work
independently, anticipating the eventuality that the supply from overseas might be cut
off.
28 About the CCG group, the deputy director ofengineering department provided most details at the interview,
30.1.1993.
29 Details ofRASM from interview with the deputy director of Engineering Department, 30.1.1993.
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5.4.2 Adapting Production Process
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, in manufacturing System 12, Shanghai Bell introduced
the latest production facilities and production processes. Over time, these production
technologies were updated in line with BTM's technological innovation. Although
these technologies were at the world level, e.g. in 1992 the surface mounting
technology was the most advanced technology in circuit production in the world, they
were still foreign technologies which Shanghai Bell depended on. In other words,
Shanghai Bell always had to follow BTM and transfer the technologies which are
adopted by BTM in order to upgrade its technology. The deputy manager of the
Operation Department (production) described the situation:
We are still at the level of 'copying' in terms ofproduction technology,
including the production process, production organisation and techniques.
When BTM has any technological change, we copy it. The equipment we are
using, its types, producers, and variables, are decided by BTM. That was the
agreement between BTM and us. Even ifwe want to use a more advanced
machine, we have to get BTM's approval (The deputy manager ofOperation
Department, 6.11.1992)
Nevertheless, there were some technical achievements that Shanghai Bell was proud
of. As mentioned in section 5.2.2, for economic reasons Shanghai Bell did not transfer
some technologies, which were not considered to be the core of the production
process. In the early production stage, their functions were undertaken by manual
labour. With the growth in production, Shanghai Bell developed some of this ancillary
production equipment in co-operation with local universities and R&D institutes. One
example was the automatic test apparatus for checking the DC-AC converting board.
The development that Shanghai Bell was most proud ofwas a new set ofCAE. This
set of software tools was used for running an automatic production process
transferring the specifications of each application onto programmed data tapes which
were then loaded into the production system to produce individual exchanges. In the
beginning, Shanghai Bell used the CAE which had been developed by BTM, which
did not work very well in practice. Chinese engineers in Shanghai Bell therefore
gradually modified the software package: they began by adding a patch to the
package, and then another one. Over time, their understanding of the software
package also developed. When the number of the patches grew substantially, over
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300, they rewrote the whole package. It proved to be simple to use and very effective
and involving fewer problems.
Although this set of software tools was aimed to improve production by Shanghai
Bell itself, it came to attract the attention ofother System 12 producers. The first
buyer to come to the door was SESA (the System 12 producer in Spain). It was
turned down by Shanghai Bell. SESA turned to its sister company - BTM for help.
BTM did send engineers to Spain to help improve its existing CAE software, but the
result turned out to be not as good as Shanghai Bell's. At the end of 1992, SESA
came back to Shanghai Bell, and eventually made a deal that Shanghai Bell would sell
the software package to SESA and in return SESA would provide Shanghai Bell with
$1.8 millions ofbusiness per year over five years.30 Shanghai Bell was very proud of
this success. Both the Chinese general manager and the Belgian general manager
declared that Shanghai Bell was able to provide the best application software for the
Chinese market.31
For BTM, Shanghai Bell had gradually become a technically reliable partner. When
BTM's customers in China needed technical assistance, it often asked Shanghai Bell
to send engineers to solve problems. Once its international exchange (trunk)32 in
Beijing needed a capacity extension, and some new functions to be added. As BTM
was short-staffed, it turned again to Shanghai Bell for help. Despite the fact that the
Chinese engineer had never done any international exchange work, the mission was
successful.33
5.4.3 Accumulating Marketing Capabilities
In the Chinese PDSS market, demand was huge and always exceeded supply. By the
end of 1992, orders taken by Shanghai Bell were already queued up to 1994.
Shanghai Bell's share in the Chinese PDSS market already exceeded 50%. Its
30 This material was provided by the deputy manager in the engineering department at the interview on
30.1.1993.
31 Interview with the Belgian general manager of Shanghai Bell, 10.2.1993 and the Chinese general manager,
1.2.1993.
32 Which is technically more complicated than the exchanges used for telecommunications switching within the
country.
33 Interview with the deputy manager ofEngineering Department.
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products had covered almost all the provinces of the country. Despite this, Shanghai
Bell sought to ensure its future market. While increasing the scale ofproduction, it
gradually brought down the price. Compared to $250 per line in 1984, the price of the
exchange was reduced by 50-60% in 1992.34 Apart from that, Shanghai Bell's
marketing strategy was to rapidly cover as many districts of the country as possible
with its products. This was because they knew that once they had installed the first
exchange of a region it would often lead to further purchases later on, for reasons
either of technical continuity or ofeconomics. For example, noting that Tibet area did
not have any System 12 exchanges, Shanghai Bell offered them one for free.
Over time, Shanghai Bell's installation team became more and more experienced, and
its work force was meanwhile expanding. Compared to the first installation of
Shanghai Bell's System 12 which took about a year, the current set up time for an
exchange, from hardware and software installation to system debugging and to final
cutting-over, needed only about a month. The quality of installation also improved. As
the production capacity of Shanghai Bell expanded rapidly, the activities of the
installation team increased dramatically. In 1992, it installed around 318 exchanges -
nearly one exchange per day.35 To meet the demands, Shanghai Bell used fully its
connections in the sector. It hired several MPT engineering teams to carry out
installation works in neighbouring areas which they were familiar with. It also used
engineers who had been technically trained in Shanghai Bell (for more details see
section 5.5.1) to carry out a relatively difficult job in installation - software testing.
This measure proved to be economical for Shanghai Bell, as well as effective.
To provide adequate after-sale-services, Shanghai Bell had built up a number of
maintenance centres, in Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei, Guangdong and Shandong, (by the
time ofmy visit) and was planning to set up more in all 29 provinces and autonomous
administrative districts of the countiy. Apart from that Shanghai Bell's computer
centre had been providing 24-hours services for users, it also established the
Customer Association with members across the country. Every six-months, it invited
users to a meeting to give feedback on using Shanghai Bell's products. The meeting in
34 Interview with the Manager ofMarketing Department, 28.2.1993.
35
According to the deputy manager ofEngineering Department, LuoWei, who was in charge of installation.
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April 1992, for instance, gathered over four hundred users. Shanghai Bell also
arranged a "System 12 Column" with two pages in a telecommunications journal -
Telecommunications Technology - whereby Shanghai Bell regularly introduced the
system to users and discussed trouble-shooting experiences. In addition, Shanghai
Bell circulated widely an occasional publication named "Bell Dispatches", the first
edition ofwhich was published in 1992. Along side this, in its user's computer
network, it ran an "information" system which collected a large number of issues on
the utilisation of System 12. Some essays were instructions written by specialists and
others were engineers' experiences; all were carefully classified to allow users to
search easily on-line. Taking advantage ofMPT's traditional arrangement, involving
the development of a couple ofhighly experienced engineers in each district, Shanghai
Bell co-operated with them to solve technical problems on-the-spot.
In line with general Chinese government policy, Shanghai Bell was encouraged to
export its products. However, because of the pressing demand for PDSS in domestic
market, Shanghai Bell's exports were very limited. A few System 12 exchanges were
exported to Russia, Vietnam and Cuba. More widespread export of System 12 by
Shanghai Bell would have been against Alcatel's interests, as the Belgian general
manager noted:
It is common knowledge that, through technology transfer, the technology
supplier wants to create markets rather than create competitors. I think, if
Shanghai Bell attempts export, the process of technology transfer will be
slowed down by the Alcatel side. Obviously, Alcatel doesn't want to have a
rival who is as strong as itself in technology (Mr. De Graeve, 10.2.1993).
On the other hand, Shanghai Bell had achieved high value-added exports of system-
load-tapes and their CAE software tool package which were attractive to other
System 12 producers which had sold or were going to sell System 12 in the Chinese
market. These producers included SESA (Spain), BTM (Belgian) and SEL
(Germany). Other System 12 producers from Norway, Italy and Australia were still in
the process ofnegotiation with Shanghai Bell at the time of the fieldwork.
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5.4.4 Accumulating Sourcing Capabilities
With the expansion in production capacity by Shanghai Bell, more human resources
were required. Learning lessons from state-owned companies, Shanghai Bell sought
to recruit young graduates. Every year, it enroled selectively a certain number of
graduates from universities and colleges. Moreover, in the recruitment ofmanual
workers, Shanghai Bell took a very cautious stance to avoid creating a possible labour
surplus in the future. Instead of recruiting permanent staff, it "borrowed" a large
number of labourers from other companies which were economically stagnant and
suffered a burden of labour surplus. In this way, Shanghai Bell had, on the one hand,
avoided an excessive increase of labour force, which might become burdensome to it
for example in requiring provision of long term welfare facilities, and on the other
hand, solved the current problem for both Shanghai Bell itself and the companies
which had a labour surplus.
By the end of 1992, the number of enlisted employees in Shanghai Bell was 1,313,
and the average age was 28.6 years old. There were also over 300 labourers who had
been temporarily transferred from the other factories and institutes.36 Most of them
were low-skilled workers. They received the basic salary from their original
companies, which was a relatively smaller portion of their income, compared to the
bonus that Shanghai Bell gave them. Although their average income was less than that
of Shanghai Bell's employment, it was still much more than what they previously
received.
Shanghai Bell also managed to get many highly skilled external "workers" working
for the company. They were all engineers sent by customers to Shanghai Bell. By
agreement between Shanghai Bell and its customers, after their 6 months training
courses, these engineers would continue their further practice in Shanghai Bell for 1.5
to 2 years. As a result, given these previous experiences in the field and these newly
acquired knowledge about System 12, they were very capable indeed. They played an
important role in helping Shanghai Bell to install and maintain System 12 in the field
36 Interview with Manager ofpersonnel Planning & Education at Personnel & Administration Department
3.11.1992
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as already mentioned. The benefits of this arrangement were mutual. Most of these
engineers were happy to work for Shanghai Bell at that time. On the one hand, with
their salary from their own company plus the portion Shanghai Bell provided on top,
their income became much higher than usual, and, on the other hand, working with
Shanghai Bell, they could acquire new expertise.
Shanghai Bell's policy was to use external human resources as fully as possible in
order to keep the company's complement of staffat a low level. In terms ofR&D,
Shanghai Bell co-operated with local universities and research institutes. In
installation and maintenance, it sought help from MPT engineering teams and
experienced engineers in local PTAs. It hired local professionals to provide other
logistic services, such as providing food and medical service to its staff rather than
establish its own hospitals and canteens. Through this policy, Shanghai Bell's
employment only increased by 54% from 855 in 1989 to 1,313 in 1992, compared to
a 317% increase in its production capacity during the same time.
The Chinese general manager's joke told the truth, - that Shanghai Bell had been a
"big school", fostering a great number of qualified engineers for the country. Every
year, around 3 to 4 percent of the engineers left the company to work elsewhere,
whilst more new ones joined. Among those who left Shanghai Bell were many good
engineers. As the deputy manager of the Engineering Department (himself28 years
old) said, "they are good enough to find good jobs elsewhere easily".37 For example,
whenMotorora established a new joint venture in Shanghai, it recruited three senior
engineers, two ofwhich were from Shanghai Bell. Some went even further to join a
local PTT in Australia. Although, for Shanghai Bell, this was still far from a threat to
the company, as it could always find proper candidates to fill the vacancy, top
managers were convinced that there were something the company should do to keep
these capable engineers.
Apart from providing material incentives, such as high salaries and relatively luxurious
housing conditions, top managers gradually realised that material incentives were not
everything, but that job satisfaction was also important. At that time, some newly
37 Interview 31.1.1993.
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established joint ventures and private companies were offering much higher salaries to
get the manpower they needed. However, Shanghai Bell for reasons we discuss
below, was not able to respond in this way. The problem was that there were too
many capable young engineers in Shanghai Bell, but there were not enough interesting
jobs for them. For these capable young engineers, routine work in the production field
was too repetitive, and most job posts required little creative instinct. To fully use
these young people's talents, as well as to keep them there and not join Shanghai
Bell's rival companies, the Chinese general manager was planning to set up some
R&D projects allowing them to devote their energy to projects which would also be
useful for System 12 production, installation and services.38
A joint venture like Shanghai Bell attracted enormous government attention. Its
managers, and in particular Chinese managers, who understood the importance of this
connection, had learned how to utilise the government's concern. While the Belgian
managers found the government intervention irritating, Chinese managers seemed to
be more relaxed about it. For example, Shanghai Bell's annual production volume was
usually decided jointly by BTM and the Chinese government through their
representatives on Shanghai Bell's Board ofDirectors. In 1992 soon after the time for
both sides to work out the production volume for 1993, and the Board ofDirectors
decided that the year's production volume was to be 1,500,000 lines, a new message
came through from the Chinese government indicating that production volume should
increase greatly. The State Planning Committee proposed a number as high as
2,200,000 lines, and MPT pushed this even further and made the figure 2,700,000
lines. The Belgian side was irritated, and also thought this attempt was incredible.
However Shanghai Bell's Chinese top managers reacted differently. Soon, they went
to find out the reasons for this recommendation and decided that fulfilling it would be
also good for Shanghai Bell. First, from the Chinese government's point ofview, at
that time, it had already become inevitable to open domestic PDSS market for the
USA. To ensure Shanghai Bell's position in the market, the government wanted
Shanghai Bell to expand its market share as far and as quickly as possible. This
coincided with Shanghai Bell's interests for the long term development. Second, now
38 Interview with the Chinese general manager 1.2.1993.
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that the State Planning Committee had given this quota, it gave Shanghai Bell the
possibility of low import tariffof components needed to produce 2,200,000 lines.
Shanghai Bell therefore accepted this figure and moreover, reached this level of
production in 1993.
Apart from taking advantage ofthe Chinese government's support, Shanghai Bell was
also able to use frilly its technical resources overseas. By 1993, many System 12
components could be purchased locally. Nevertheless, Shanghai Bell still continued to
import a portion of these components, even though this irritated the Custom Office.
Shanghai Bell had a particular purpose for this - to keep open its links to
technological changes in the world. As the deputy manager of the Department of
Engineering explained:
I have to say that, in terms of technology, the core technology of System 12 is
still not in our hands. The future of System 12 depends more or less on
technological development in the industrialised world. We do not want to
drive foreign suppliers away. Rather we want to be kept informed by their
product changes. Although we have to pay more, compared to purchase local
products, we would like to keep the pace with the world (Deputy manager of
Engineering Department, 30.2.1993).
5.4.5 Mixed Style of Management
At the outset, the management in Shanghai Bell was to copy BTM. Later Shanghai
Bell gradually developed its own style which was considered to be a hybrid between
Chinese and Western methods. In the very beginning, the Chinese decided to adopt
Western management approaches, in particular those ofBTM, in terms of its
institutional settings and managerial methods. For this purpose, some young Chinese
managers were sent to BTM and other Management Schools in China and abroad to
learn advanced modern management theories and methods. However, very soon,
practice proved that it was impossible to apply many Western methods to the Chinese
environment. Inevitably, the outcome ofadapting Western management method to the
Chinese environment was a mixture ofboth. Western methods dealt with question of
productivity and efficiency whereas the Chinese way dealt with incentives of staff
First ofall the objectives of company was market growth and achieving profits.
Shanghai Bell's management had been concentrating on this target, with the result
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that it had achieved a high level ofproductivity. In 1992, the production output was
1,380,000 lines, with only 800 workers. Accordingly when production volumes
reached 4,000,000 lines after the completion of a new workshop in the end 1994,
Shanghai Bell planned to keep the number ofworders as low as 1,400, compared to
the BTM's estimate of, at least, 1,650.39 Although there were political organisations
in the company, such as the Communist Party, Trade Unions, the Youth League and
Women's Association, their importance had already given way to productivity: their
organisational activities only took place after work; and they took up only the smallest
fraction of the company's agenda, compared to state-owned companies, where the
Party's activities were always given high priority.
Material incentives were explicitly adopted, as already noted. In comparison with
state-owned companies, Shanghai Bell offered much higher salaries, although the
salary level was still far from the highest in the Shanghai area. As an early established
joint venture, Shanghai Bell was allowed to raise the salary level for its employees
only by up to 30 percent above the average of state-owned companies. This was set
by the government in order not to provoke workers in state-owned companies,
especially in MPT's companies. Over time, as more and more joint ventures and
private companies had been set up and started to compete with each other in offering
high salaries, the average salary had increased rapidly. Shanghai Bell, as a large
company was simply not able to follow the pace. In 1992 it raised its general salary
levels, but very soon, the other companies caught up and overtook it.
To compensate for this, Shanghai Bell provided employees with housing.40 It spent
50% of the company's total welfare expenditure on housing for staff. By the end of
1992, about 10% of its employees lived in company flats. The flats which were
provided for key persons, such as, department managers and senior engineers, were
fully furnished, and some were even equipped with all household electrical appliances.
For ordinary Shanghai residents, it was just paradise and could not be better. One
department manager, a flat-holder said:
39 Interview with the Deputy Manager ofOperation Department, on 6.11.1992.
40 Housing in Shanghai was extremely scarce, as in a popular saying it vividly described that, "It is easier to
find a wife than a flat".
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I won't expect any better than this, and I think that our company's offer is the
best in the whole Shanghai area, although our salary is a bit low (Deputy
Director of the Engineering Department, 30.2.1993).
A condition attached to this offer was that, if one leaves Shanghai Bell, then one
should leave the flat too.41
Chinese management traditions tended to treat the company as it was a family. Its
administration system was fairly hierarchical, but the relationship between the upper
and the lower was not necessarily very formal. The authority of a director of the
company could be very much parent-like. Even a manual labourer at the lowest level
was encouraged to approach directors or higher level managers of the company for
help with personal problems, even bypassing intermediate management. In this
respect, Shanghai Bell still kept the old tradition. A department manager explained:
People still turn to us for help when problems occur with their family, things
like that a child was ill or couples have a row, etc. Although these are now
not considered to be our responsibilities according to the job specification.
However, we have got used to it. The company takes care of them, and they
take care of the company (Deputy Director of Engineering Department,
30.1.1993).
The Chinese general manager of Shanghai Bell believed the combination ofChinese
and Western management method was necessary and said:
Working for foreign companies will make you feel that you are only working
for the company which belongs to strangers. But in our company you still feel
you are working with people who belong to your 'family', having a feeling of
part and sharing. When a member of staff has got a problem, he or she can
approach me directly, either with or without an appointment, in working or
non-working time, as long as I have got time. This is Chinese culture.
Although Western management provides us with efficiency in production
organisation, we still need staffwho are devoted to hard working. The feet
that we, Shanghai Bell, could achieve such a production expansion, has to be
attributed to the combination of Chinese andWestern management (The
Chinese general manager, Li Dalai, 1.2.1993).
Belgian managers were very sympathetic to their Chinese counterparts, believing that
they must be exhausted dealing endlessly with problems, such aswages, housing and
so on, which they themselves could not have stood. They were happy with the
division ofmanagement responsibilities, whether explicit or implicit, that the Belgian
41 The Manager of Personnel Planning & Education at Personnel & Administration Department, Shanghai Bell
provided me with the details about material incentives which Shanghai Bell provided to its staff.
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managers would concentrate on production and leave personnel issues altogether to
Chinese managers.
5.5 Technological Learning
Technological learning in Shanghai Bell had taken place throughout the whole process
of System 12 technology transfer. This section in particular looks at the learning
activities planned and organised by Shanghai Bell, as well as the Chinese government
and Shanghai municipal government. The major focuses are: technical training courses
which were run by Shanghai Bell to educate its own staff and its customers; and the
project of local production of System 12 components which was linked to Chinese
government policies for technological development and was mainly organised by the
Shanghai government to promote technology renewal in local industries. This section
examines the successes and difficulties that arose with domestication of imported
components, which related to the attitudes of local companies including Shanghai
Bell, which had been changing during the period ofChina's social and economic
transition.
The first sub-section (5.5.1) describes Shanghai Bell's technological training
programmes for educating staffand customers. Section 5 .5.2 explores the attempts at
import substitution of System 12 components by Shanghai Bell and local industries,
and section 5.5.3 explores the difficulties and successes encountered in this state-
organised project, and then broader implications for government policies and macro
environment ofeconomic reforms.
5.5.1 Training42
Since the establishment of the joint venture, there had been a variety of training
programmes in Shanghai Bell. In the beginning, engineering training programmes
combined BTM's classroom training and participation in BTM operational
departments, as well as training at the premises of the other technology suppliers in
USA and Hong Kong. The engineers who were trained abroad, in turn, came back to
42 The manager (Associate Professor) of the Training Centre provided the most detailed material.
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initiate training courses in Shanghai Bell, transferring their acquired skills and
knowledge to the others. Ever since, training whether technical or managerial had
become an important part of the operating agenda of Shanghai Bell. As a result,
according to a comparative survey in 1987, the performance abilities of the Chinese
engineers in Shanghai Bell ranged from 70% up to as high as 100% percent of the
performance abilities ofBTM engineers in similar functions (Zhou and Kerkhofs,
1989).
From 1987, Shanghai Bell began to run a series of training programmes for both staff
and customers. In 1991, it set up a training centre, which had been expanding rapidly
because of demand.
Shanghai Bell introduced a new measure in staff training, that all new recruits had to
be trained before taking any job post. The compulsory training for potential engineers
was for six-months and three to four months for new shop-floor workers. In addition,
every employee was encouraged to take after-work courses run by external training or
educational organisations. For this, the company undertook 70% of tuition fees,
provided the staff obtained "diplomas or certificates" at the end of their courses. With
these diplomas or certificates, they could apply for a more suitable post in Shanghai
Bell. Apart from that, because of the complexity of System 12 technology, people
involved in one part ofthe work, did not necessarily know the others. In these
circumstances, staffwere encouraged to take training courses in order to get more
knowledge about the context and how their jobs fitted in the whole system. As a
result, the number of staff receiving training had been increasing over time. In 1993,
the number increased to 160 person-years, compared with only 43 in 1989.
Shanghai Bell's philosophy on customer training was that the more people know
about the system, the larger the market will be, the more maintenance work which can
be carried out by users, and the less work will be left for Shanghai Bell itself. It
therefore encouraged customers and potential customers to take training courses to
learn System 12 technology. Shanghai Bell set up its customer training programme
with three levels: "A" level training was for system engineers within 6 months
including classroom and practical training; "B" level was for technicians, lasting three
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or four months; and "C" level was for operators, lasting only two to three months.
The users were trained to carry out various jobs including test, installation, operation
and maintenance. Especially, those engineers taking "A" level training would continue
practice in Shanghai Bell. As noted above, usually, after this period of time working in
Shanghai Bell, they would be able to deal with various problems independently. Some
of them, later on, were even hired by SESA (the Spanish System 12 producer) which
paid them a salary so high that, it did indeed, make Shanghai Bell's engineers jealous.
In 1987, Shanghai Bell could only carry out "C" level training, until 1990 when the
three levels of training courses (A, B and C) were all set up. Since 1989, orders for
System 12 had increased dramatically. Simultaneously, the number of customer
receiving training increased too. By 1990, the number had reached 297, including 44
"A" level students, 42 "B" level and 211 "C" level, compared with only 102 students
in 1987. Shanghai Bell therefore began to anticipate problems that might arise with
the increasingly large scale of training in the foreseeable future. Usually, one exchange
needs two operators working on each shift. Accordingly, for round the clock
operation, there are at least she people who need to be trained. On average, one
exchange has 2,500 lines. If Shanghai Bell's annual production volume was 1,380,000
lines like in 1992, the numbers needing training would be more than 3,300. Surely,
Shanghai Bell could not deal with such a large training undertaking. As early as 1989,
the company began to seek help fromMPT's universities and technical high schools
to run its customer training courses in their premises, using their teachers and
facilities.
Apart from this, Shanghai Bell had set up a mobile training team which was equipped
with a System 12 exchange in a container lorry. The team ran a range of intensive
training courses for officials in local telecommunication administrations, and local
sales-agents. The training courses last from 4 days to a month long. By February
1993, 1,216 people had been trained in this way.
As noted earlier, the BTM's teaching materials used by Shanghai Bell in the beginning
proved to have many disadvantages. In addition, because the division of labour in
Shanghai Bell changed over time, it had different job classifications from the original
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one that BTM used (BTM's job division was finer and more specialised than that of
Shanghai Bell). It therefore became more problematic to use BTM's teaching text
book. To overcome the problems, Shanghai Bell called several senior engineers
together to edit a new set of textbooks for training courses. By the end of 1992, three
of the four textbooks had been completed.
5.5.2 Domestication of Imported Components - Reacting to Government
Intervention
As part of its technological development strategy, to ultimately achieve indigenous
technological development of the country, in the 1980s, while more and more
advanced technology transfer from industrialised countries took place, the Chinese
government pursued vigorously its policy of import substitution. A range of related
regulations and practical measures sought to compel companies to replace imported
components with locally produced ones. For example, first ofall, the government
applied a high tariff to direct import of components. Second, to ensure that this policy
would not drive away advanced foreign technology transfer to China, the Chinese
government granted exemption or a low import tariff to individual projects which
were considered to be in the national interests. Third, to pursue the spin-off of
advanced foreign technologies, the government urged the companies which were
using imported components to gradually reduce imports and replace them by locally
produced ones. To help realise import substitution, government financial support was
available for promising projects. The Ministry ofMachine Building and Electronics
Industry (MMEI) and the State Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
Committee were jointly in change ofcontrolling import licences, granting low import
tariffs, setting up targets for import substitution and examining their implementation
by companies.
The MMEI and the State Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation granted licences
for Shanghai Bell to import components at a low tariff. At the same time, they put
pressure on Shanghai Bell to take action about the local production of components.
They set up targets for import substitution for Shanghai Bell. The target for the first
few years was 20% of total components, and gradually increasing to 70% by 1993.
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Shanghai Bell's performance in this matter was regularly examined and linked to the
renewal of their licences to import components.
Since achieving import substitution relied on not only Shanghai Bell, but also local
industries and resources, government financial support, and etc., the issue was always
negotiable. The government knew that there was no point in trying to force Shanghai
Bell to buy local products which nobody in China could produce or which could not
meet the quality criteria. Besides, there was even a specified method for measuring
companies' achievement in import substitutions, which was internally issued in the end
of 1987 by State Planning Committee. According to this formula,
Total cost of all components - Total cost of imported components
100%,
Total cost of all components
individual items add different weight to the level of import substitution. The bigger
the differential is between total costs at local price and the imported price of this item,
the higher its contribution will be to the import substitution. Hence, the companies'
choice of components for local production could lead to different results. However,
variables in this formula can be interpreted differently. For instance, an "individual
component" can be an assemblage of components. To count it as an item or break it
down to details may have different results, because ofprice differences. A computer
can be either counted as one item or many items; the price of a whole computer and
the sum of the prices of its individual components are different.
It was Shanghai municipal government that actively pursued local production of
System 12 components, as it considered Shanghai Bell to be a source ofadvanced
technology to bring the local industries to a new level. In 1988, it adopted the
Shanghai Bell's System 12 Project as one of the fourteen "Major Projects for District
Development". The new Shanghai Mayor43 even came to visit Shanghai Bell on the
second day ofhis arrival in his new post. The local government meantime established
an office, named as Shanghai Bell System 12 Project Conducting Group. This
organisation was jointly run by Shanghai Bell, the Municipal Electronic Equipment
43 The mayor Zhu Rongji is the Vice Primer of the state council.
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Bureau, the Municipal Economic Committee and the Municipal Planning Committee.
The local production of components for Shanghai Bell's System 12 comprised 38 sub-
projects. The major role of the Shanghai Bell-System 12 Project Conducting Group
was to examine the feasibility of individual sub-projects, to raise funds for them and
co-ordinate between Shanghai Bell and local companies which were considered as
potential components producers. Financial support for this project from the State
Planning Committee and the local government comprised grants of 10,000,000 yuan
RMB (equivalent to about $2,860,000) as well as access to foreign currency loans
(for which the Municipal governments could draw on a $150,000,000 US dollars
reserve held by the Chinese government).44 Shanghai Bell received a portion of this
amount, 3,000,000 yuan (RMB), for R&D.
Shanghai Bell followed the government's instructions and set up the Domestication
Division in the company to deal with local production of System 12 components.
Although, in the early stage ofproduction, due to various technical and financial
difficulties, Shanghai Bell had very limited interest in this undertaking. However,
subsequent developments made it give greater attention to conformity to governments
requirements. Under this pressure, Shanghai Bell co-operated with the local
government and actively engaged in the project of import substitution. To achieve the
target of local production of components set by the Chinese government was not an
easy task. In the late-1980s, China already possessed more than 100 electronic
component assembly lines, but non of these could meet Shanghai Bell's standards. For
exchange uses, components have to be functionally very stable and durable. To meet
this criteria required not only technology and finance, but also technological support
from BTM and increased technological capabilities of local producers (which was,
after all, the government's motive in building up these capabilities).
BTM did not oppose the project ofproducing System 12's components locally. It was
instead supportive, as it assumed this project would lead to cheaper component
supplies for itself. BTM prepared all the documents required with technical details,
(Shanghai Bell had to pay for these), sent specialists and engineers to inspect local
44 Interview with the deputy director of the Shanghai Bell-System 12 Project Conducting Group.
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companies' production facilities, and help them to master the production
technology,45 as well as to help Shanghai Bell set up a test system for examining
locally produced component.
More sceptical attitudes towards this project came from local industries, state-owned
companies, which had relatively better production facilities and human resources,
which would be System 12's potential component producers. During that period, the
financial position ofmost state-owned companies in Shanghai was not so bad, as the
economic reform had not yet stimulated them to desperately seek new technological
opportunities. At the same time, they were still constrained by traditional approaches,
relying on the state. As a result, they were happy to get involved in project as it was
arranged by the local government and it allowed them to get extra money from the
government for renewing facilities and technologies. However, they lacked the sense
that they should take full responsibility for making products of sufficient quality for
the customer.
Therefore, while things did not work out exactly as the central government had
requested, an important role emerged for the Domestication Division of Shanghai Bell
to deal with the government officials in charge. First of all, it drew up a tactical plan
corresponding to the targets scheduled by the government in that period and to find
the best way of calculating to show a higher import substitution rate. Its other
functions were to write convincing reports for the government and often to negotiate
with officials in charge in relevant government organisations, in particular those in the
Customs Office. For example, in February 1993 (the time ofmy field work), Shanghai
Bell had 200 lots of imported goods including over 700 different kind of components
kept by the Customs Office at Shanghai airport, while the workshops in Shanghai Bell
were waiting for the new supplies to come in. There was a dispute between the
Customs Office and Shanghai Bell which was, as usual, over the import duty, and in
particular about which import rate Shanghai Bell should pay according to its record of
import substitution.
45 Interview with the head of the Domestication Division.
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Things like this happened often, and the shortage of imported materials and
components became one of Shanghai Bell's headaches. This above all irritated the
Belgian managers, especially, after 1 January 1993 when the Chinese PDSS market
was opened up under strong pressure from the US government. The tariff for
importing whole system was merely 9% whereas for the components which Shanghai
Bell needed it remained about 30%.46 The Belgian general manager could not find any
justification for this:
We are manufacturing System 12 locally. Why do we have to pay higher duty
for importing portions of the components required for local production.
Shanghai Bell is a business organisation which has to compete with others in
the market in terms ofprice and quality. We ofcourse would like to buy
locally produced components, which would involve less trouble. However, we
cannot find proper products. One can not expect us to produce good quality
and cheap products, while, at the same time, buying the components which
are expensive and worse quality. It's just impossible! (Mr. De Graeve, the
Belgian general manager of Shanghai Bell, 10.2.1993)
Most ofyoung Chinese managers in Shanghai Bell did not believe that the import
substitution policy was necessary - and in particular that the high pressure put on
Shanghai Bell was necessary. They argued in favour of the market mechanism, "if
buying them in would be cheaper and better quality, why we should insist on
producing them locally?" A department manager said straight forwardly, "We should
buy better quality and cheaper products from the market regardless ofwhether they
are Chinese or overseas." Others agreed in principle that the import substitution
policy was good for the country as well as for Shanghai Bell in the long run, as local
production would make component supply much convenient. However, they felt that
the government's intervention against them was too onerous, and it would not help
very much to achieve the target.
Nevertheless, the government requirement of local production of components was not
negligible. As a manager in the Operation Department described, "the cost of
importing 1,500,000-line components is about 120,000,000 RMB. If the tariff could
be reduced to 10%, it is a big deal for Shanghai Bell". The Chinese general manager
of Shanghai Bell express the extremely pragmatic stance of the company:
46 This was according to the deputy manager of the Engineering Department.
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The Government has its view for the entire country, similarly we have ours.
We are seeking profit for the company. However, the government policy
changes, we will pursue our own goals. When government is pushing us to
adopt import substitution, well, we will do it, as long as the interests of the
company would not be compromised. We have our own programme. When
the time comes, we are going to vigorously pursue local production of
components, to establish a large local supplier network to strengthen our
position (The Chinese general manager of Shanghai Bell, 1.2.1999).
The head of the Domestication Division hated the situation that she had to play
calculating games with the government officials, "that is a waste of time and does
nobody any good", she said. However, she valued the policy of local production of
components in general:
To get a local company to make quality products is hard work. It needs so
much effort, and sometime we had to give up. Our local industries need to
learn new technologies and most ofall new concepts ofproduction. They do
need help. Without government policy, this process might take much longer.
Nevertheless, when it succeeds, we all feel happy. Shanghai Bell can also
benefit from that. Supply from abroad has many disadvantages, for example,
transport. Once, we were waiting for a lot of chemical material, but it did not
arrive till the workshop had run out of the material. Later on we were
informed that the cargo ship with Shanghai Bell's articles on had sunk.
Import substitution, as I believe, needs the initiatives from three sides: the
government, local industries and us - Shanghai Bell. It is very difficult
without one of them (The head of the Domestication Division, 28.2.1993).
5.5.3 Difficulties And Successes47
At the beginning, government intervention to achieve local production of System 12
components did not obtain strong support from local firms, so the outcome of the
project was far less successful than expected. Some sub-projects were ultimately
abandoned for various reasons. And some completed ones proved to be not very
successful because of either the high cost ofproduction or unsatisfactory quality.
System 12 had about 4,000 individual components in total, which could be classified
into four groups: racks and sub-racks and printed circuit boards; nine types of large
scale integrated circuits (LSI); circuit boards and tapes; and components such as
hybrid circuit, relays and the others. By February 1993 at the time ofmy visit, there
were 794 items, which were able to be locally produced. However, most of them were
low technology components.
47 The head of the Domestication Division at Shanghai Bell provided detailed materials in this section.
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Several major factors had influenced the accomplishment of local production of
components. First was the financial issue, relating to the dilemma - whether to select
low or high technology projects. In most cases, local production of components with
low technology involves low costs, whereas to produce high technology components
locally was unlikely to be attainable by local companies given existing local
technological capabilities and low levels of investment. Some projects require a large
amount of capital investment, in order to introduce new assembly machinery, and/or
to even transfer new technologies from abroad. For instance, the project for the relay
production alone absorbed around $8,000,000. If selected projects all required
expensive high technologies, only a very limited number ofprojects could be
undertaken within the limit ofavailable finance.
Apart from that, the uncertainties surrounding technological development, future
markets, etc. made many projects less attractive to local producers and made people
wary ofmaking too large investments. According to the head ofDomestication
Division in Shanghai Bell, in some cases, local producers were not taking up the
opportunities at all: some spent the project money but did not produce reasonable
results; some even used the project money for other purposes, since they were
doubtful that the final outcome of the projects would bring them a profit. To them,
the future market was unpredictable, and, at that moment, demand for components
from Shanghai Bell was not that large, and there were, as yet, no other customers for
such products. Some projects had been abandoned before completion, as System 12
technology had been changing. It was difficult to anticipate whether one day some
components would be no longer needed because ofnew technology. To take one
example, the project to produce a specific resistor, which had already completed the
R&D and sample production stages by Shanghai Radio Factory No. 1. It was
terminated because of the lack of further financial investment for mass production.
According to the government's original plan, a state bank would issue a loan to
support the production. However, when the bank learned that Shanghai Bell might
not need this resistor in future because of technical innovation, it withdrew its
commitment to this project, determined that such a large sum ofmoney would not be
another untraceable loan lost in the state sector.
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Second, problems often resulted from the weakness of the entire industry in
production related technologies across the country. For example, the Ministry of
Machine Building and Electronics Industry had a state-owned company manufacturing
electronic components for national defence products. Since the demand from the
national defence sector had been shrinking, the company was running at a loss. MMEI
was very keen to get the company out of its financial problem, and determined that
Shanghai Bell could be a suitable customer for its two products: transistor and TTL
circuits. It therefore did not grant Shanghai Bell a low tariff for importing these two
components, and indicated that there was a local company which was able to produce
them. However, MMEI overlooked the fact that in China most defence companies
which were considered to have capability to make high technology products were
only able to produce small batches of samples to satisfy limited number of customers.
These technological capabilities were not geared for commercial production. In
particular, when this company was manufacturing products for the defence sector, it
did not need to consider the cost very much. In addition, most products required were
made in a small quantity which did not require mass production technologies.
Obviously, if the company attempted to make products in high volumes in the same
manner as with small batches, the production costs would be very high - so much so,
that the price of these components was higher than the imported ones. Shanghai Bell
therefore refused to buy these transistors and TTL circuits. This became a long time
negotiating battle field between Shanghai Bell and MMEI.
Last, but not the least, were quality problems closely related to the weak production
technology. It was a common phenomenon in the country, that sample products were
usually fine, but the quality ofmass produced products often was much lower
(chapter 6). The head ofDomestication Division described the confrontation between
Shanghai Bell and local producers, saying:
No matter whether high-tech or low-tech products, we have often had battles
with local producers about quality, which often ended up with unpleasant
feelings on both sides. They thought we were unreasonable hypocritical, and
went to the municipal office to complain about that we did not like to use
local products. Quality problem can be traced back to our socialist tradition:
no market, no competition; users could only buy whatever producers made,
and producers took this for granted. We understood the problems of local
producers. However, we could not accept their products. We have our
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standards, which we have learned from BTM. Local producers have to face
the challenge too (the head ofDomestication Division, 28.2.1993, Shanghai).
As a very typical example, once Shanghai Bell was to buy a lot of screw, a commonly
used product. It sent an order to a local screw producer and attached to the order
with the technical specifications of the screw. However, when the lot of screws was
delivered to Shanghai Bell, many unexpected problems were found. For example, the
thread of the screw was not deep enough; the surface finish was not smooth enough,
etc. Shanghai Bell insisted on returning this lot ofproducts, since these defects would
reduce the screw's endurance and, further, influence the exchange's quality. The
manager of the local producer was astonished and did not understand this, as for this
company, this batch ofproducts was all up to their standards, and had certificates of
inspection. Besides, the company had been producing screws for ages, and they had
never ever come cross such a complaint.
Another example was that Shanghai Bell went to find a local producer for a
component - a LED (light emitting diode). After having checked all technical features,
the engineer from Shanghai Bell found, the angle of the light beam was not wide
enough and asked the local producer to make a modification from 75 degree to 120
degree. He explained that, as the LED was used on the front panel of the exchange, a
wider angle could make it more visible for operators. Although the engineers at the
local company still believed that Shanghai Bell was pernickety, and the change was
unnecessary, they eventually agreed to make the change. However, that was not the
end of the story. After the angle was modified, another problem was found: the
brightness ofLEDs differed from one and another, which meant that, when they were
fitted, on a same panel, some would look brighter and some dimmer. This again
caused friction between two sides. The producer argued that this was too tiny an
imperfection to be a problem, whereas Shanghai Bell side persisted with its standard.
Despite such problems, over time, local production of System 12 components has
gradually materialised. This was not because government stepped up its intervention.
Rather Shanghai Bell and local companies had become active players.
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Since 1989, the production capacity of Shanghai Bell had been rapidly expanding and
its demand for component was growing. Even existing local production of
components, such as the production of racks and sub-racks and printed circuit boards
in Shanghai Bell and the production ofLSI chips in Shanghai Belling, could not keep
up with the increasing demand. Increasing component imports would have increased
problems of supply which had led to inconvenience and, sometime, had affected their
ability to meet orders in time. Local component supply proved more reliable because
transport problems were reduced as well as avoiding the need to deal with
government officials to get import licenses. Cost reduction was another important
factor, since local production was usually cheaper than imported products, because of
lower labour costs and international transport costs. For example, in the case of cable
import, the cost of air transport was higher than the cable itself. More importantly, the
foreseeable future market of System 12 was clearly seen to be promising. For these
variety of reasons, Shanghai Bell determined that it was the time to reallocate its
component supply nearby.
During the same period of time, the macro economic environment pushed local
manufacturing companies towards the market place. The state no longer took
responsibility for selling whatever a state-owned company produced. Companies had
to survive in the market oriented economy by themselves. They had to find new
products and new markets, and to produce the products which could meet market
requirements. In this circumstances, most local companies wanted to be a component
supplier for Shanghai Bell. Even providing packing boxes for Shanghai Bell had made
a box producer into a booming concern.
As both Shanghai Bell and local companies were all keen to produce components
locally, things became much easier. Lacking finance, they went together to lobby the
government, as well as mustering founds from their own channels. Even for quality
problems their attitudes were no longer mutually hostile. Shanghai Bell provided local
producers with as much help as they needed, such as approved technical documents
with detailed specifications for each component, and helped solve technical problems
in local production. At the same time, to let component producers understand the
importance ofproduct quality, Shanghai Bell invited local producers to visit the
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Shanghai Bell's production workshop, to see how their components were fitted into
the system through the assembly line and were functioning in the switching system. To
ensure the local production quality in a longer term, Shanghai Bell established a
programme with each local component producer for periodically inspecting the
production process and examining products as well as random checks. This
programme sought to track down the source of quality problems and finally helped
ftMljftoducef to solve them. To take the exampleof a local producer providing
Shanghai Bell resistors. Every technical feature of the resistor was tested and matched
the required specifications except for the hardness of the material for its two pins.
That was a slightly too soft. For the local producer, it seemed merely a tiny technical
differentiation. However, after visiting the production line in Shanghai Bell and seeing
that, while going through an automatic inserter, many pins of the resistors were bent
before being properly inserted into the printed circuit board, they realised that they
were wrong.
By the time ofmy fieldwork in February 1993, government direct intervention for
import substitution had gradually reduced, although its control on import licences and
tariffs was still there. However, Shanghai Bell had established a supply network.,
which had been expanded to about 50 local companies. All locally produced
components had obtained BTM's approval. Each component had more than one
supplier, (e.g. the hybrid circuit had three suppliers). Because ofcompetition between
them, the price was also kept down.
During the course ofdomesticating production of System 12 components, local
companies' awareness ofproduct quality had gradually developed, production
capabilities had been strengthened, although quality problems were still occurring
from time to time, as these could not just disappear overnight. Even the most
successful import substitution project - the Shanghai Belling joint venture project, to
manufacture large scale integrated chips (LSI) for System 12 still had a reject rate of
end products of60%, lagging behind the producers in industrialised countries. But,
compared to the reject rate at as high as 98% at the early production stage, it still
represented big progress.
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions
In the initiation of System 12 technology transfer, the Chinese government played the
sole role in searching for available technologies across the world, selecting the
appropriate switching system, and negotiating the transaction. The government was
determined to bring China's telecommunications to the world level and, eventually, to
build up indigenous technological capabilities based on its three step strategy of
technology development. This was clearly reflected by its persistence in transferring
all aspects ofPDSS technology including the LSI chip production technology, which
would not only suit China's telecommunications network, but would also bring the
opportunity for China to gain access to the most advanced technology and ensure that
China was able to produce the entire technology system independently in the near
future. As a result of its efforts, the technology transfer agreement more or less laid
the foundation for the co-operation between the Chinese and Belgian sides and so
ensured the future success of the project.
All these government actions were crucial during the early stage ofeconomic reforms
for several reasons. First, after having been isolated from the world businesses for so
many years, individual Chinese companies lacked experience to deal with international
trade. Because the significant differences in political, social and economic systems
between China and Belgium were very likely to pose considerable obstacles for
companies on both sides, Chinese government involvement meant that the PDSS
collaboration was a matter to be dealt with at the country to country level. Second,
since a large-scale technology transfer project like public digital switching system
required a large investment, there were very few companies in the world, that could
handle the finance without any state help. Third, the collaboration engaged the
Belgian government in the successful lobbying ofCOCOM to lift the ban on
transferring LSI production technology to China.
Again it was direct and indirect government support that overcame acute problems
arising in the course of implementing System 12 technology transfer. First of all, since
in China the social and economic transition had only just started and this was still a
centrally controlled system, government direct involvement was needed to handle the
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new establishment of a joint production venture like Shanghai Bell, which had to go
through bureaucratic procedures at various layers in order to get official approval and
to deal with difficulties - from land, human and material resources to utility supply -
that were still allocated on a planned rather than market basis. Government approval
was needed in particular at that time for Shanghai Bell to be allowed to adopt
Western methods ofmanagement and to free it from the normal economic and
political obligations (e.g. about taking on staff, involving political organisations in the
management). MPT's support in gathering capable human resources across the
country, and Shanghai local government's approval for this, greatly assisted Shanghai
Bell in quickly mastering a wide range of technologies (needed for example to
overcome technical problems occurring in the first installation of System 12 in the
Chinese environment). The large MPT subsidy ensured the market for Shanghai Bell
and extracted it out of the crisis at a critical early stage.
Having such a favourable environment, Shanghai Bell was gradually able to adapt
System 12 to the poor conditions ofthe Chinese telecommunications network, and to
modify some parts of the production process. Most important was high productivity
which Shanghai Bell achieved through its efforts in building up technological
capabilities in management, marketing, and resource allocation. In China's changing
environment from a centrally planned system to a more market oriented one, Shanghai
Bell learned to take advantages of its position as a newly established joint venture. It
developed pragmatic policies and measures, and articulated its domestic and overseas
strengths drawning upon its natural connection with the both.
Despite the significant success of Shanghai Bell in developing production capacity and
in application software technologies, its technological capabilities in the innovation of
System 12 and core production technologies, especially hardware technologies, were
still very limited for several reasons. First ofall, as a consequence of this model of
technology transfer, the technology ofdesigning and updating the core technology of
System 12 was difficult for Shanghai Bell as a manufacturing company to master,
especially as only limited technological support was available from within the country.
Shanghai Bell has also limited opportunities for exporting System 12 exchanges, as
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this would offend BTM. However, it may be debatable whether it is necessary for
Shanghai Bell to be able to independently innovate the core technology of System 12.
Apart from this, many hardware technologies, for example, production technologies in
China were very poor (a general feature of the old socialist system), and would take
quite a while to improve from scratch in terms ofdesign ofproduction processes and
production quality control in particular. The best example was the production quality
control. Its improvement had to start by improving people's perception ofwhat
quality means. Some problems, e.g. the inconvenience ofusing English as a human
and machine interface language, were not economical to solve.
In terms of the production domestication of System 12 components, we can see that
government intervention was not that successful until the domestication of supply
became in the interest of Shanghai Bell and local industries, as a result of changes in
the macro environment in China's transition. This issue showed clearly the different
interests between the state and individual companies in building up technological
capabilities. It also demonstrated the important role ofboth the state intervention and
market forces in providing incentives for technological development.
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Chapter 6:




This chapter presents the outcomes ofmy investigation of the Chinese HJD-04 case.
It describes the process ofdevelopment ofHJD-04 technology. It then explores the
state-owned firm, LTEF, which was one of the major developers of the Chinese
system, including the situation particularly in relation to the development of
production capabilities for HJD-04 and technological learning. Finally it analyses how
the main technical features of this system were shaped by both social and technical
elements involved in the development process.
This chapter consists of six sections. Section 6.2 depicts the entire process of the
Chinese PDSS technology project: how this HJD-04 project was initiated and further
progressed; what were the social and technical driving forces behind it; and how the
social and technical elements necessary for this PDSS development were brought
together and contributed to this development process. Section 6.3 and 6.4 shed
particular light on the development of technological capabilities at firm level, focusing
on the state-owned firm, LTEF, manufacturing the Chinese PDSS. The former
explores the enormous challenges facing LTEF to survive in China's changing social
and economic context. The latter focuses on how technological learning took place in
the firm as well as the problems that remained, relating to the accumulation of
technological capabilities and basic operational capabilities (e.g. production,
marketing, management, etc.) in particular. They were essential to turn a blue-printed
technology into a concrete product and to make profit out of it, especially since firm-
level capabilities were very weak in China because of the previous socialist tradition.
Section 6.5 focuses on the local shaping of the artefacts. It shows how Chinese PDSS
technology benefited from cheap electronic components available in the international
market and knowledge of advanced foreign PDSS technologies being imported into
China. It examines some special technical features of the system which reflects the
make-up of the R&D team and their desires, linked to the broad social and economic
environment at that time and knowledge about the PDSS and relevant technologies
available domestically and internationally.
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Section 6.6 summarises the main findings and concluding points in this chapter, and
picks up some issues to be further analysed in analytical chapters.
6.2 The Process of Developing the Chinese HJD-04 System
The Chinese HJD-04 system was born out of the socio-economic transition taking
place in China. Its development process reveals interesting elements of technological
development different from the System 12 case. To make it easier to tell this story, I
start by section 6.2.1 describing the three major actors involved in the development
process. The entire process of the Chinese PDSS technology development is divided
into two phases, illustrated in separate sub-sections. This distinction partly reflects my
understanding of the development process and partly the nature of the process.
Section 6.2.2 describes the initiation phase - how a military research team became the
initiator of this project and how other social and technical elements necessary for
creating this technology were built up. In this phase, although there were some
uncertainties and reversals, an effective team was formed, and three major players
worked together to overcome the technical, financial and political difficulties
encountered, and obtained the technical success and official approval. Section 6.2.3
examines how, in bringing the technology to the market, tensions and conflicts
emerged between these three parties around competition for profits and the large
potential market. However the players still stuck together as they needed each other
for further technological development.
6.2.1 Three Major Developers
Three institutions became core actors in developing the HJD-04 system - the Centre
for Information Technology (CIT) in Zhengzhou Institute of Information Engineering
ofPeople's Liberation Army, the military research team, that was the initiator; the
Posts and Telecommunications Industrial Corporation (PTIC), the industrial unit of
the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications (MPT) (see Figure 1.); and the
Luoyang Telephone Equipment Factory (LTEF) ofMPT, originally a cross-bar switch
producer and later the main manufacturer ofHJD-04.
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CIT's involvement could be traced back to the early 1980s. In the past, this institute
worked on designing large capacity computers, but only for R&D projects on national
defence. Once economic growth became a main target of the country, the state budget
for national defence, including military R&D projects, decreased. At the same time,
the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued an
instruction calling for the army to make a contribution to the civil sectors. Under this
pressure, the military research team ofCIT started looking for some R&D projects in
civil sectors.
ProfessorWu Jiangxing played a key role in this episode. He was formerly senior
engineer and later the head ofCIT. In the early 1980s, ProfessorWu was working in
Fuzhou,1 as a research fellow doing computer design. This was the time and the place
that the first foreign PDSS, the Japanese F-150 system,2 was imported and installed.
The Chinese encountered many problems with this system: from the day the contract
was signed, it took two years to get the system into operation. This frustrating
experience highlighted the dangers for China from lacking its own technology and
deeply impressed ProfessorWu. Thereafter, he established a research team in CIT,
which started working in the field of telecommunications.
The Luoyang Telephone Equipment Factory (LTEF) was one of four HJD-04
manufacturing firms under the MPT. It was also the earliest party to co-operate with
the military CIT research team. LTEF was established in the 1970s to produce cross¬
bar telephone exchanges. One of28 MPT firms, LTEF is a relatively newly-equipped
company. It initially benefited from being state-owned. Soon after economic reform
began, however, its products became less favoured by users as foreign advanced
PDSSs began to pour into the Chinese market. Following the "foreign technology
fever" (section 4.3), LTEF first bid for the joint venture with the Belgium Bell
Telephone Manufacturing Company (which eventually became Shanghai Bell) and,
later, was involved in another bid organised by MPT, for one of ten joint ventures to
produce private digital switches. Having failed twice, in 1986, LTEF decided to co-
1 Fuzhou is the capital ofFujian province on the Southeast coast ofChina.
2 In Dec. 1980 the contract for import system F-150 between Fujitsu and the Post and Telecommunications
Administration ofFujian province was formally signed. It was eventually put into operation in Nov. 1982.
(Gu, ed. 1992)
144
operate with the military CIT's research team to seek for a new technological
opportunity.
PTIC was the industrial unit ofMPT set up at the start of the economic reforms to
co-ordinate the activities of the MPT's 28 firms. It had previously undertaken the
equipment provision for MPT's public network. As noted already in chapter 4, MPT
was one of a few ministries, which was quasi-militarised historically. As a result, it
had a very firm monopoly position in the country. However, economic reform had not
left MPT untouched. PTIC, and MPT's R&D institutions, were allowed to become
increasingly independent ofMPT control. UnderMPT, there were 31 R&D institutes.
In the past, any technologies developed from these institutes were given freely to
manufacturing firms. The reforms changed this relationship, because technologies
were now perceived as profitable goods valuable in the market. Without an R&D base
of its own, PTIC feared the loss of its technological resources. The pressure to save
its loss-making state-owned firms also concerned PTIC. As a result, PTIC took a risk,
and joined in CIT's technology projects.
6.2.2 The Initiation and Creation of Chinese PDSS
In the early 1980s, under pressure to turn to civil projects, ProfessorWu studied
available written materials on foreign PDSS technologies being imported to China -
System-12, F-150 and E-10b.3 PDSS is based on a range of computer technologies,
completely different from the old generation of electro-magnetic switching systems.
For people steeped in the telecommunications field, PDSS was not easy to master.
But having experience in the field of computer technology, ProfessorWu could
readily understand it as simply another kind of computer system. This made him
decide to attempt some work on digital programme-controlled switching systems.
The major task for the CIT research team was to find a partner with expertise in
telecommunications, especially in telephone exchanges. LTEF as a telephone
exchange producer was immediately under consideration. It was also a good choice
that, geographically, LTEF was near - just over one hundred kilometres away from
3A French switching system, also the first commercial digital local exchange system ofAlcatel-Thomson.
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CIT, and politically, as the two cities which LTEF and CIT were located are in the
same province. However, at that time, LTEF was concentrating on bidding for joint
ventures, and had no interest in the joint development project. So CIT enlisted
another telephone equipment manufacturer in the city of Changchun, in Northeast
China.
In September 1984, CIT and its partner embarked on the project of a digital program-
controlled private automatic branch exchanges (PABX). CIT chose this as a way of
getting into switching technology, but one that was smaller scale and simpler than a
public telephone exchange (for example, it only needed to interface with a narrow
range of equipment, and regulatory requirements were less demanding). The
technology was thus not a big problem for ProfessorWu and his team. However, a
setback occurred as the work was near completion. CIT's partner was informed that
the Directorate-General ofTelecommunications (the top telecommunications
administration unit of the country, see Figure 1.) suspected that the proposed PABX
was inadequate. It thus withdrew from the project, and the military research team was
left alone to carry on. In June 1986, laboratory work was completed. The technical
design of this PABX passed an examination organised by the provincial science and
technology committee which concluded that the CIT research team had produced
some "novel ideas" in design. This result exceeded CIT's expectations and
encouraged the research team to continue their R&D in this area.
In October 1986, after LTEF's attempts to establish a joint venture had failed, it
expressed an interest in CIT's project and received a positive response. In November
the two new partners signed a contract to improve the design, and convert the
laboratory prototype for production. Engineers in LTEF had expertise in telephone
exchange technology, the requirements of telephone networks and the regulation of
the telecommunication administration. The researchers in the military team were
skilled in computer design. So the co-operation was quite successful. An improved
PABX was delivered from the laboratory in August 1987 and, in May 1988, it entered
into production.
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At that time, as already noted, PTIC was also under pressure. After LTEF joined the
R&D project, PTIC kept an eye on it, from time to time sending specialists to
examine the product on the spot and to check the progress. Expectations arose in
PTIC about the possibility using CIT to develop a domestic digital program-
controlled switching system. Soon after, PTIC decided to invest three million Chinese
yuan to develop a PABX with 2,000 lines. This project was only the start of a bigger
plan, ofwhich the second step was to develop a terminal (local) PDSS with 6,000
lines; the final target was a full-size PDSS.4 Its investment in the military research
team was, however, still risky for PTIC for both political and technological reasons:
first, being outside the telecommunications sector, CIT was out ofPTIC's control;
and second, the stakes were large while CIT's technological capability was unsure.
Nevertheless, PTIC saw CIT as a potential R&D base that could provide it the
opportunity to fulfil its ambition. After the research team had gained enough practice
on PDSS technology, PTIC planned to send the team to Singapore to develop a
Chinese PDSS, with more advanced equipment and assistance of some experts from
Taiwan and Singapore.5
In 1987, a contract to develop a PABX with 2,000 fines was signed between CIT and
PTIC. Since then PTIC had played the role of general project manager and financial
sponsor; CIT was the main technological force, with LTEF as a technical assistant as
well as a test workshop.
PTIC's support was crucial to the CIT research team. The earliest result, a PABX of
1000 line capacity named HJD-03, was registered officially with the MPT. This was
the largest capacity ofdigital programme-controlled exchange developed domestically
at that time. The very success ofHJD-03 and financial backing from PTIC greatly
encouraged the CIT team. However, as a research organisation, largely driven by the
motivation of technological novelty, it no longer had enthusiasm for developing
another PABX (as PTIC planned). Instead, CIT aimed directly at a terminal (local)
4
By that time, digital computer programme controlled exchanges developed by CIT were small-size PABX and
terminal (local) exchanges. The full-size PDSS meant that the new system shall have a capacity of
approximately 30,000 subscriber lines and can be used as local or tandem (toll) switches.
5 This is according to my interview with ProfessorWu, Director ofCIT, in Zhengzhou, 26 April 1993.
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PDSS, which it saw as a necessary step to gain a full range ofknowledge ofPDSS
technology.
PTIC's response to CIT's proposal was lukewarm, for two reasons: first, it was
suspicious of the capability of the military research team; and second, it feared that the
project would offend MPT which, as mentioned above, had been investing for some
time in the development ofanother PDSS, the DS series.6 Duplicated R&D effort was
always considered a waste ofmoney; in addition, PTIC might be suspected ofbeing
unfaithful to MPT by attempting to build up its own technological strength. PTIC did
not oppose the programme; it just took a watching stance, thus defacto allowing the
CIT research team to carry on anyway.
Eventually, as the military research team had hoped, a workable terminal (local)
PDSS, HJD-15, was developed. From the viewpoint ofCIT computer specialists,
their major technical obstacle - the lack of expertise in telephone switching systems -
had been removed. In November 1989, PTIC agreed to the CIT's proposal to develop
a full-size PDSS. It organised a conference to examine the development plan and the
feasibility of the Chinese PDSS, to which it invited almost all authoritative experts in
Beijing. The result was ambiguous. Although the telephone switching experts were
not able to understand the detailed design (because ofhaving less experience in
computer technology), most of them found the architecture of the system distinctive.
Nobody could be sure that the project would be successful in the end, but the
conference concluded that "if the design can be proved in practice then it will be a big
success". Consequently, the development project was initiated. This involved
registration of the project with MPT. The system was registered by the PTIC with the
name HJD-04, although officially, HJD was the name for a range ofPABX
technologies. By using this name, PTIC could avoid being accused of duplicating
research or offending MPT. In fact, the development still irritated MPT - but, so long
as PTIC did not submit its application for approval, MPT could not respond to it.
6 The system DS series were a range ofChinese PDSS technologies. DS-2000 was the first successful PDSS
developed by Chinese R&D teams and latest version was DS-30 (see also section 4.3).
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The HJD-04 development project went smoothly, until test-system debugging was
initiated in October 1990. Hardware debugging was completed, but serious problems
arose on the software side. According to the original, rather optimistic plan, this test-
system was to be put into test operation by the end of 1990, and simultaneously MPT
would conduct a general examination. When the time came, MPT insisted on carrying
out the examination on schedule, while the project was facing serious problems on
software side. This put the joint R&D group under enormous pressure to show that
the product could succeed.
At that stage, MPT was not happy to accept the project, probably because the work
was done by a military research team from outside the sector and, to their even
greater irritation, because PTIC had become involved in the project without its
approval. Besides, the system had been declared by its developers to be better than
the system DS series which was developed by MPT's own research institutes.
Eventually, PTIC managed to get the examination postponed, but MPT set some
other obstacles. It did not carry out the examination, but instead demanded
documentary evidence that the initiation of the project was approved by the
authorities in MPT. Because the HJD-04 had not got MPT's approval as a bonafide
PDSS project, in December 1991, a presentation of the project proposal was held in
Beijing, before the formal examination of the system. Eventually, MPT sent a 20-
person inspection party (a daunting prospect since the HJD-04 research team was
only 18 people) to carry out an initial examination of the machine. Among the
examiners were some who had been involved in the development ofDS-2000 and DS-
30, and experienced engineers from Shanghai Bell. The final inspection party was
even larger. Indeed, it was the most authoritative examining party ever sent by MPT,
and included examiners from many relevant ministries and organisations. The final
result was favourable, and the HJD-04 was, at last, officially acknowledged.
6.2.3 Further Development - Bringing the Technology to the Market
From then on, HJD-04 development entered another phase related to production and
to markets. No longer a bastard child, the technology was sought after by many
companies who saw its potential market to be immense. The three parties co-
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operating in the HJD-04 project began to face problems, such as product quality,
further technology improvement, and resource allocation. New conflicts emerged
among them with respect to each party's right to possess the technology and each
party's responsibility for the group's co-operative actions.
According to the contract, PTIC possessed the right to produce HJD-04, while CIT
held intellectual property rights for the core technology - for which it received a
certain percentage of the profit from the producers, and took responsibility for
training engineers and technicians from factories to master the technology. PTIC
allowed four of its manufacturing firms (including LTEF) to produce the HJD-04
system. LTEF had no special role or relationship once the other three firms had joined
in as producers.
In China, economic legislation was new - for legislators, implementors and
undertakers alike. The relevant legal system and provisions had not been completed
and elaborated. In the past, if conflicts occurred between people or organisations, they
went to the Party for justice. Now, with only a hazy understanding of the law, people
were having to use legislation to protect their rights. At the same time, many
businesses and organisations ignored the laws; some even took advantage of
imperfections in the legal system, and people's immature understanding of it, to avoid
the constraints of the laws upon their efforts to pursue profits.
In the HJD-04 case, the technological co-operation surrounding its development was
not actually based upon the contract between the CIT and the PTIC. Instead, it was
largely based on mutual understanding of the importance of the roles of each party.
This facilitated co-operation in the initial development ofHJD-04. However as it
moved towards commercial exploitation, efforts to maintain or enhance each party's
strength in this co-operation led to a series of conflicts.
One conflict arose because CIT sold its technology to other manufacturing companies
without PTIC's permission. The telephone switching market was so attractive that
many companies wanted to obtain the HJD-04 technology - for instance, professional
telephone equipment producers or newly-established electronic joint production
ventures belonging to the Ministry ofMachine Building and Electronics Industry
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(MMEI),7 as well as some military factories. CIT's action increased the number of
HJD-04 manufacturers to seven or eight. This greatly offended PTIC, which
considered CIT's move an illegal action and a breach of the written contract. But
PTIC dared not risk damaging its relationship with CIT, as their co-operation was
obviously crucial for any further innovation of the technology.
So PTIC fought back, but without a head-on battle with CIT. MPT's monopoly in the
management of the telecommunications sector was still unshaken, up to this point. Its
administrative unit in telecommunications, the Directorate-General of
Telecommunications, was in charge of the whole public telecommunication network
and all telecommunications services. Each new type of switching system had to be
approved by the Directorate-General ofTelecommunications before being used in the
public telecommunication network. However, at that stage the HJD-04 system had
not obtained the necessary licence for installation on the network. In this situation,
PTIC's strategy was to stop HJD-04 units produced by non-MPT companies from
gaining access to the public network. Instead ofapplying for a full licence for the
HJD-04 system to enter the public network, it managed to get Directorate-General of
Telecommunications' permission with the proviso that the system was allowed to be
installed in the network for the purpose of "test operations". This permission was
exclusive for PTIC's companies. With this, de facto, PTIC's companies could
produce and sell their products as much as PTIC wanted, whereas the other HJD-04
producers could not!
The attitudes of the ministries and top state leaders involved were interesting. The
above dispute inflamed the already sore relationships between MPT and MMEI. Each
stood by its own companies. MPT took the HJD-04 technology as its own and tried
to protect the right ofPTIC, while theMMEI accused MPT of exploiting its unfair
monopoly over the PDSS market. PTIC was worried that MMEI could take revenge,
through its control of the tariff rate on imported components needed for the
production ofHJD-04. The case was passed on to some senior leaders. One state
7 The MPT was originally established as a posts and telecommunications administration entity for the country.
The MMEI was an industrial management body. However under Mao's self-reliance philosophy, the MPT
and MMEI both established their own industrial enterprises during the Cultural Revolution. As they both
have their own telephone switch producers, this gave rise to confrontations between them.
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councillor, who had once supported the HJD-04 project when it was in difficulties,
expressed his personal opinion that "as long as the HJD-04 is an indigenous Chinese
technology, why not stand for the whole nation to develop the technology all together
first and leave conflicts to later on".8 So, the dispute on the surface was calmed down.
But, a major initiative aimed at establishing an alternative telecommunications
network had been brewing withinMMEI and several other ministries, in order to
break MPT's monopoly in telecommunications services.9
The relationship between PTIC and LTEF was also complicated. On the one hand,
PTIC had been doing its best to help LTEF in finance and marketing; on the other, it
had been trying to tighten its control over LTEF in order to make more profit from it.
In turn, the firm enjoyed PTIC's support, while trying to avoid its tight control.
PTIC pursued its interests in several ways. First, it successfully lobbied the
government, with the result that the HJD-04 technological development project was
put under a state scheme in 1992. A $4.98 million long-term loan with low interest10
was offered by the state for the modernisation of the production assembly line in
LTEF's workshop. With this sum ofmoney, plus $300,000 which it generated itself,
LTEF could purchase advanced machines and facilities needed both from abroad and
within the country.
Second, PTIC persuaded the government to waive import tariffs specifically for the
HJD-04 components with effect from late 1993.11 This was critical, since the system
used many imported components, the tariffon which might be as high as 140%.
Third, PTIC established a new company, Beijing Long Term Technology
8 This is according to my interview with an high ranking official in Ministry ofMachine Building and
Electronics Industry (now, Ministry ofElectronics Industry).
9
Apart from the public telecommunications network, in China, there were several private networks run
individually by the Ministry ofRailways, the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry ofElectronics Industry,
and etc. which have excess capacity. In early 1993, they were to initiate a joint company - Lian Tong Corp.
and to jointly establish a rival network, in order to challenge the MPT. This plan was still being debated
when I was there in April 1993.
10 This is according to my interview with the official who was in charge with the HJD-04 technology. However,
when people in the LTEF mentioned the sum ofmoney, they simply called it "the money given by the state".
For state-owned companies, a long-term loan is equivalent to a gift, because the firm does not belong to
anybody, neither director nor the others in the firm. In the case of a 20 year term, these directors and
managers will probably have left by the time of repayment. Whether this will make trouble to their
successors is not their concern.
11 This is according to my interview with a key official in PTIC, 6.4.1993.
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Corporation, to deal with all business and matters concerning HJD-04 technology -
purchasing equipment, importing components, capital investment, technology control,
and so on. As an independent company (which in fact had very close relation with
PTIC, as shown by the fact that its director was the head ofPTIC's Directorial
Office), Beijing Long Term Technology Corporation could freely partake in
commercial activities. Since LTEF was not allowed to gain access to foreign business
partners directly, the purchase of components and machinery must be carried out
through other commercial companies. This was a highly profitable business. Soon
after its establishment, Beijing Long Term Technology Corporation replaced the trade
companies who had been undertaking LTEF's business, importing components and
purchasing machinery from abroad. However, because ofBeijing Long Term
Technology Corporation's lack ofbusiness experience, problems in supply arose
which cost the LTEF a lot.
Finally, as part of the reforms to bring in a market system, marketing became an
undertaking of firms, rather than of the PTIC. This weakened PTIC's total control
over the production volume of firms, which was directly associated with its drawing
profits from its daughter firms.12 However, PTIC found an alternative way of exerting
control over its firms. It kept secret from the firms the password necessary to process
all the software for producing HJD-04 systems. Thus, when LTEF got orders from
users, it must apply for decoded software from PTIC's new company, Beijing Long
Term Technology Corporation, and pay it for production ofeach line of the system.
In addition, to gain more technical control over its partners and daughter companies,
PTIC established a HJD-04 software centre.
LTEF was unhappy with this PTIC control but, as a daughter company, it would not
fight back. In any case, it relied on PTIC for finance, as well as for obtaining
government support. LTEF had learnt the danger of lacking technology of its own,
and was determined to strengthen its technological position. In February 1993, the
firm established a research institute in which it assembled its best manpower.
Ambitiously, the firm hoped that one day it would be able to master the entire
12 The PTIC as an entity which functioned as an administration organisation also lacked money, under China's
economic phenomenon that every body and every work unit was trying to make profits.
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technology ofHJD-04 and to extricate itself from external technological
dependence.13
LTEF had worked closely with CIT's research team during the technology creation
stage. However, after the technology was developed for the market and became
profitable, technological capability became an important card to play in the power
balance among the three parties. Information flow between users, manufacturers and
the R&D institution was crucial in this technological improvement stage. But LTEF
and CIT were no longer exchanging their expertise freely, because both parties were
trying to protect their technological position. For example, a problem had been
occurring in the firm since the beginning ofproduction, because a component with
two pins which had a larger diameter than the holes they were to fit in on the PC
board. Before soldering, the two pins had to be filed smaller to fit the holes.14 It only
needed a very minor change in the design specifications ofthe board to overcome this
problem, but this had not been done by the time of the study (April 1993). The LTEF
said that the change should been made by CIT, since the firm was not allowed to
change any documented specifications. However, CIT argued that LTEF should be
responsible for this matter. On another occasion, CIT asked LTEF to get regular
feedback from users, with whom LTEF had close links, but LTEF did not respond.
So, CIT had to send its own team members to the field to collect feedback.
The same type of technology protection activities occurred among HJD-04 producers
under the MPT. They were competing with each other in almost all aspects, including
resource allocation, marketing and technological capability. The desire to prevent
technology leakage between these four firms ruled out information exchange and co¬
operation which could have promoted overall technological development.
Confrontation (both overt and covert) had been a recurring theme in this stage of the
improvement ofHJD-04 technology. In spite of these conflicts, however, all parties
13 On one occasion, some people in the firm talked about breaking the security code of the software of the HJD-
04, but the head of the firm immediately received an angry response from the PTIC, indicating that it would
definitely not be allowed. In contrast, Professor Wu did not take the idea very seriously. He laughed and said
to me in the interview that it would probably have been impossible anyway.
14 This impairs the quality of soldering, because the coating material of the pins is designed for making a good
soldered joint.
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involved in the project know that they were bound up with each other through the
HJD-04 system. They all knew that they had to put these conflicts behind them.
According to current plans, CIT was to complete a new version, HJD-04AD
(advanced version) in 1994, with new functions (for example, using No.7 signalling
system and remote modules). In a few years, ISDN and intelligent networks would be
available. The question was how to conduct a co-operative relationship at an
appropriate level of competition. In order to achieve this, in 1993, PTIC established a
new co-ordination organisation named 'Production Co-ordination Committee', with
the aim of finding the best solution to conflicts between institutions, and of
encouraging co-operation to accelerate improvement of the technology. They knew
very well how important PTIC and CIT were for it - with respect to financial, political
and technological support - in the past, currently and in future.
6.3 LTEF - Technological Capabilities at Firm-Level
Technological capabilities at firm-level are ultimately critical. The blue-printed HJD-
04 technology had to be turned into products and thereafter to be tested in the
market. This section illustrates how LTEF performed and contributed to this
technological development process. It explores the problems and difficulties which
had surrounded this state-owned firm since the economic reform.
Sections 6.3.1 explores how LTEF developed its production capabilities in the
struggle to survive during the transition, and spells out the organisational reform of
the firm to root out the inefficiencies and lack of incentives stemming from the old
system. Section 6.3 .2 examines how technological learning took place under intense
pressures to overcome obstacles arising from both the traditional economic system
and the transition. This section provides a detailed insight into how the firm operated
and the problems it faced during the economic transition period, as these are typical to
a state-owned firm in China.
6.3.1 Pressures and Opportunities in the Transition
Luoyang Telephone Equipment Factory is a fairly typical state-owned enterprise, in
terms of the institutional structure, incentives and operating mechanism. The project
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to build the new factory from scratch started in 1972 under the "self-reliance" policy
of the government, prior to economic reform, that the country must build up the
telecommunications industry on its own. The factory came into operation in 1980,
producing cross-bar public telephone switches with a maximum capacity of200,000
lines per year. This domestically designed switch was an advanced technology at that
time in China and the technology was freely transferred from an R&D institute under
the state scheme.
Like many state-owned factories that were located away from the coastal area during
the "cold war" in order to avoid the imperialists' attacks, LTEF was situated in the
middle of China. The factory lies in the remote outskirts of the city ofLuoyang, in
Henan province. This created inconvenience in transport between the city and the
factory. Because of this, when the factory was set up, it decided to establish its own
social welfare facilities for its employees working in the factory: providing houses
near by; kindergarten and schools for their children; a hospital, a post office,
telecommunications service; buses to and from the city to the factory seven or eight
times per day; restaurants and canteens, guest houses, bathhouse, travel agent and all
kind of services. As staff described vividly: "Here we have everything except for a
crematorium".
The factory employed a large number of staffwhich was due partly to labour-intensive
production, and partly to the socialist ideology that was supposed to provide
everyone with a job. By 1992, the number of employees was over 2,700. The whole
community including the families of its staffwas estimated as around 7,000. People's
jobs were permanent. The director of the firm played a role as head of a community,
and accordingly managers ofeach department and section took care of their staff to a
large extent. For instance, if someone was ill, the company would be obliged to send
him/her to hospital and pay the expenses. If someone's family experienced disaster,
his/her boss should, on behalf of the group, offer help and express their sympathy.
Similarly, if a member of staff could not find a partner, the trade union of the factory
would possibly play the role as a match maker.
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As already noted earlier, the LTEF was a newly equipped cross-bar switch producer.
It used to produce almost every component for the cross-bar switch, and the process
was conducted completely within the factory from the input with raw materials to the
output of the finished switch. All raw materials were supplied, and products were
sold, at fixed prices by arrangement of the state. All the chief officials regarded as
important to the firm, such as the director, major department managers, chiefengineer
and accountant etc. were appointed by the MPT. The recruitment ofgraduates the
factory received every year from universities and technical schools (most ofwhich
were run by the MPT), was organised according to the state plan. Without the
economic reform, a factory like the LTEF would be a plan-taker immune to any
problems from the imbalance between input and output.
Soon after LTEF established its production and social facilities, its social and
economic environment, and the underlying socialist doctrine begun to change. In the
first five years of the economic reform, it remained untouched within MPT's
protection. But it sensed the insecurity of its position due to one event. In the
beginning of the 1980s, MPT offered the newly equipped LTEF factory to its foreign
partner BTM15 to establish a joint production venture. The offer was turned down and
the foreign partner chose another cross-bar manufacturer in Shanghai as its base. This
made the LTEF feel sour. However, at that time, the economic reform was merely a
gentle breeze for the firm, and it did not exert much pressure.
In 1984, the central focus of economic reform had gradually shifted to the
reorganisation of the industrial sector, involving provision ofgreater autonomy to
firms and reduction ofgovernment protection. In other words, firms had to organise
fully or partly their resources and sell their products in markets.
This made LTEF face both internal and the external pressures. Financial constraints
became stringent - how to sustain the unduly large work force and more urgently to
feed about 3,000 staff. The existing institutional establishment - once well suited for
the central planning system - did not provide the structure and incentives for high
productivity. Instead, previous socialist advantages - the significant community
15 It was Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company of ITT, now it belongs to Alcatel.
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function of the firm - became a heavy burden. The emergence of the PDSS market
favoured foreign advanced systems rather than Chinese cross-bar technology even
though international prices and import tariffs made them more expensive. At that
time, some authorities suggested that cross-bar could remain for quite a while in
China. As noted in chapter 4, however, orders for cross-bar products decreased
sharply.
The LTEF was faced with two alternatives: either to co-operate with CIT in seeking
for a new technological opportunity or to bid for joint venture projects. It turned
down the earlier offer ofCIT because of the lack of enough momentum at that stage.
After it failed twice in its bids for joint ventures, it could not afford to not join CIT.
For LTEF, it was an chance to renew its technology and ultimately to maintain its
position in the market.
In collaboration with CIT, LTEF provided expertise in exchanges and networks in the
telecommunications field; it offered its workshop as a test ground and undertook the
designing of a variety of racks for holding switches. In turn, it benefited from
producing new technologies: the PABX HJD-03 which at that time was the digital
switching system with the largest capacity developed in the country; and the terminal
public digital switching system - HID-15 which was also new for the country as a
locally developed system. By producing these two systems, the firm turned around its
loss-making position. Later, the firm obtained HJD-04 technology which had a great
potential in the domestic PDSS market, although it had to compete with other HJD-
04 producers inside and outside MPT's territory.
6.3.2 Reform to Survive
Efficient production capability was the key to turn the new technology from a blue¬
print to a product which could succeed in the market. The situation had reached a
point where the firm could not move on without restructuring its entire organisation,
to address productivity and the requirements for producing the new technology.
However, this was the most thorny problem for a state-owned firm like LTEF.
Restructuring would touch every member of staffand their individual vested interests.
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The stakes were so high that the firm would have avoided getting involved in these
issues if this had been at all possible.
Instructions for reform eventually came from above. These were applied all over the
country, although the speed and incidence of their application varied from place to
place. At this stage, the major target was an administrative innovation in firms to
shake off the rigid system, popularly known as "smash the big iron rice bowl", it was
based on a belief that employees of enterprises from shop-floor workers to the
director of the firm lacked motivation to work hard. The new one to be built,
described as the "responsibility system", was based on a contractual arrangement,16
which also defines the respective roles of the enterprise director, Party secretary and
the other chiefmanagers. However, because the rules of the new arrangement, and
the dogma of "socialist market mechanism" underlying it, were not explicit, people's
understanding of the responsibility system varied considerably.
At LTEF, the most urgent problem was not the rigid administration system, but the
unduly large work force especially since the new technology required much less
labour. As it was a relatively new firm, and staffwere newly enroled and young on
average, people's performances were not that bad. However, the production ofHJD-
04 was capital-intensive, requiring only 800 to 900 people, whereas the total work
force in the firm was 2,700. It therefore faced a dilemma: to follow 'socialist'
principles the firm had to be concerned with the basic needs of the majority; to fit the
'market mechanism' it must cut off its community roles and be more efficient. How to
solve this problem became critical for the firm, as well as, a matter of concern for the
director who was in charge. As he noted
The market economy is the market economy, no matter whether one calls it
socialist or capitalist. What I care about is that I have been living with people
here for so many years I can't see them jobless. Ifwe just kick workers out
after they have served this country for so many years, where is justice and
humanity? We are trying to find a way for them to make a living. Otherwise
we would rather wait for a solution from central government (The Director of
LTEF, 22.4.1993).
16 This kind ofcontract varied from firm to firm. Usually, workers signed contracts with the head of their
departments, heads of departments signed with the director of the firm and the director with his boss at
higher level organisations, accordingly.
159
This was a common reaction in state-owned firms all over the country, especially from
those who, like the director ofLTEF, had lived together with staff in a same living
quarters for many years. However, as the financial pressure on the firm intensified,
some measures had to be taken.
LTEF eventually established an internal labour market. Surplus labour was allowed to
stay at home on 70% of their salary. A bureau was set up to organise the internal
labour market and meanwhile seek new jobs for them, e.g. to find some products
which were in demand at the time for them to make; to arrange for them to work
temporarily or long term in other companies which needed spare labour; to train them
technically in order to return to workshops with different skills, and etc. This had the
positive result that each department ofLTEF could choose better labour from the
internal labour market. The internal labour market did not solve the fundamental
problem of the unduly large work force, but it created great scope for engineering a
dynamic system. Its positive side was that it created a buffer that reduced the current
intensity of immediate pressure on LTEF. As it was accepted by the majority of its
people, it did not produce any danger of instability which was a major concern of the
administrative group of the firm.
Simultaneously, the firm re-organised its management institutions and operating
systems, and introduced new incentives. In preparation for this reform, the firm sent a
large group to visit Shanghai Bell, in order to adopt foreign managerial methods
which were considered effective. In the last quarter of 1992 when the internal reform
was unfolded, LTEF adapted the "responsibility system" to introduce what it
described as the "optimum constituting system". Under this new company
constitution, posts became selective with appointments made on only a one-year
contract; and the performance of an individual in his/her post was annually assessed.
The role of each post was defined more clearly than ever before, especially that of the
managers of each department. They had more scope to make decisions, and took on
more responsibilities, compared to the previous tradition of collective decision¬
making. The biggest change was with the Department ofProduction. It became more
autonomous and had its own internal accounting system which gave a great scope for
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the department to fully use its income as a means to motivate workers to improve
both quantity and quality of production.
A new salary structure was introduced, described as "performance-oriented salary".
Under this system, the salary was broken down into two parts: basic pay and
performance-related pay. The basic pay depended upon how long the employee had
worked in the company or in other state-owned organisations; what qualifications
he/she had, etc. The performance-related pay was based on performance, in so far as
the employee's working hours and output met the standards set by the firm, and the
output exceeded the quota. Alternatively, good group and departmental performance
would lead to bonuses in the individual's salary. The sum of these two parts is then
weighted by a measure of the quality of individual's work.17 In this way, control over
workers was intensified through a set ofdetailed regulations and disciplines. In
addition, because of the great size of the labour force, there were many to choose
from for each post. Thus, for people with posts, the workers standing-by were a
pressure on them - an "internal" reserve army of labour!
All these changes focused upon improving the productivity of the system. Material
incentives were seen as an important means ofmotivating every cell of the system to
achieve the firm's aims. At the same time, efficient production organisation was put
on the firm's agenda (see below). This reform, more or less, achieved its purposes.
Workers on the shop-floor were working harder than before. When the firm needed,
they worked in their lunch breaks and in the evenings. So did the engineers, especially
young and unmarried engineers. Since they live alone in the dormitory of the firm (just
5 minutes walk from the workshop), they often came back to work in evenings18.
In spite of these achievements, the state-owned firm could not yet get rid of all its
burdens. In comparison with private and joint venture companies, LTEF was still less
productive. Because government tariff policy also favoured joint ventures19, the
17 The formula for counting is "the total salary = (Basic salary + performance-oriented salary) x Quality as
weighted variable from 0 - 1.
18 This is according to my personal interview with three engineers and technicians. All of them had graduated
from university and left their home town and came to work in this factory. One had got married living in the
dormitory, the other two were single.
19 For attracting foreign investment in Chinese industry, the government issued several tariffbills: "Regulations
for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic ofChina on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
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disparity between a state-owned firm and a private and/or joint venture firm was big.
As one department manager said:
We are competing with these companies on an unequal basis. As such, we
will never catch them up (Manager of the Planning Department, 23.4.1993).
Apart from these developments, the nature of the state-owned firm had not changed
much to date. All of the social welfare facilities were still there; without them staff
could not live. For instance, if the firm cancelled the bus, people living in town would
have to walk for hours to get to the factory. The firm's role in taking care of staff
well-being had not changed much either. According to the Director, recently, when a
newly employed worker was seriously ill, the firm spent several tens of thousands of
Chinese yuan on his medical expenses. As he explained:
Tell me, how could I just kick him out even though we are very tight in
finance? We are a socialist country after all! (Director of the LTEF,
4.22.1993)
When I was interviewing the manager of the Department ofProduction, somebody
came in urging him to leave: he apologised to me that, as a head of the department, he
must act on behalfof the whole department and go to visit a member of staffwhose
mother had just died. At that time (April 1993), the firm was laying pipes in its living
quarters to install a central heating system to improve the staffs living conditions. The
former head of the Directorial Office of the PTIC viewed this situation in a broader
sense. He said:
We state-owned enterprises were and are still undertaking the role as a
backbone of this country. Now, the other companies can select people who
are relatively young and healthy, and can escape from paying pensions,
providing medical care or child care and the other expenditures. But it is us
who are looking after possibly their parents, spouse and children. Everybody
knows the ideal structure of a family is that father works for joint ventures
and mother works for state companies, so their dependants can still be in the
welfare scheme. Without us, this society would have already lost its balance
(The former head of the Directorial Office of the PTIC 6.4.1993).
Foreign Investment", promulgated by the State Council on 20 September 1983, indicated that,'... A joint
venture can apply for reduction or exemption of industrial and commercial consolidated tax for a certain
period of time ...' (Shanghai Foreign Trade Committee, pp 223-256); "Some Provisions of the People's
Republic ofChina Concerning the Reduction of or Exemption from Income Tax in the Absorption ofForeign
Funds", 21 September, 1982, indicated that,'... A newly-established joint venture, jointly operated for a
period ofmore than 10 years, with the approval of tax authorities upon an application filed by the enterprise,
may be exempted from income tax in the first profit-making year, and allowed a 50 per cent reduction in the
second and third years...'(Shanghai Foreign Trade Committee, pp. 386-391). Along with that, many coastal
cities and districts added some more radical local policies to give joint ventures more privileges.
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6.4 Technological Learning
Pressures stemming from the new economic environment compelled state-owned
companies like LTEF to seek newly emerging technological opportunities, and to
strengthen its basic capabilities as an enterprise to survive in the more market-oriented
system. The future facing them provided little options: to involve intensively in
technological learning; otherwise to drown slowly in the increasing competitive
environment.
To a state-owned company like LTEF, the environment for technological learning was
not the best, compared to private and joint venture companies. Learning processes
were also not the most pleasant, as they had inherited substantial social burdens.
However, LTEF was drawn into the learning process, and has gradually built up basic
technological capabilities.
6.4.1 Resource Allocation in the Market-oriented System
State control over raw materials had been gradually liberalised. A state-owned firm,
like the LTEF, was ultimately bound to lose its privileges ofgetting low-price
supplies. However, the firm remained dependent on the state, and in particular on
MPT, until it found that the state price was much higher than that in the freely
negotiated market. This discovery provoked an important change of attitudes in
LTEF. Its immediate reaction was that it sold its spare copper materials bought in at a
low state-regulated price on the negotiated market at a much higher price without the
state's permission. More importantly, through this the firm learned that it had to rely
on itself.
To produce HJD-04 technology, a large number of components needed to be
imported from overseas. But LTEF did not have direct access to overseas companies.
Components had to be purchased through various means: usually through some
domestic trading companies which then purchased the goods from trading companies
in Hong Kong. And the companies in Hong Kong might have ordered the components
through some other intermediaries. As a result, LTEF found it difficult to know who
the real suppliers were; worse, the quality of components differed to a large extent,
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and the timing of the shipping-in of the goods was often off schedule. LTEF's
frustrating experiences gradually taught its business team how to deal with these
problems, e.g. to find alternative suppliers, to make more practical plans in provision
and etc.
Despite its severe problem of surplus labour, LTEF was at the same time short of
qualified technicians and engineers for the new technology production. The market
economy had resulted in large disparities between private, joint venture companies
and state-owned companies with the ability to provide increased rewards for such
manpower, so that LTEF, which could not provide high wages and bonuses, lost its
attractiveness as an employer.
In the past, people, once assigned to work in the firm, could only leave with the firm's
permission, unless the transfer was ordered from a higher level. Now because political
control upon private and joint venture companies had been loosened, they accepted
new employees without official leaving certificates as long as they had professional
qualifications. Skilled workers and qualified engineers could quit and leave the firm
for a better paid job in a joint venture or private company locally, or even in the
southern economic zones. LTEF had not experienced much of a problem with people
leaving, because once people were settled - e.g. when their children were in school or
kindergarten and their spouses were working in the same community - it was not easy
for them to leave. However, there was an urgent need for the firm to recruit new
manpower and then get them to stay.
One of the most reliable sources ofnew and skilled labour for LTEF had been the
recruitment of new graduates, but even this became difficult. Under the centrally
planned system, graduates from universities, and especially from those MPT
universities, were annually assigned to MPT enterprises. The reforms which had made
technology more important, for similar reasons, increased demand for university
graduates. Graduates, in particular those with a good degree or from a reputable
university, could chose where they preferred to work. As state-owned firm, the LTEF
was clearly not a favoured choice, especially because of its geographical location. The
manager ofLTEF Personnel Department said of these difficulties:
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In the past, according to the state quota, graduates were assigned to our
factory annually. They came but hadn't got enough to do. We often felt there
were too many graduates and only a few suitable posts for them. Now, things
have changed. My boss has been constantly pressing me to get some new
graduates. It's not easy. We are not Shanghai Bell which has got privileges.
Well, as long as we are determined to do it and are not stingy with money, we
will make it. I have been travelling around attending 'human resource
exchanging meetings'.20We are not attractive, indeed. We can't get the best
students, but it doesn't matter. I always tell them the truth: our living
conditions are not that good, but our HJD-04 is good, it's a Chinese system;
the mastery of this technology is like having personal property [as the skills
are in great demand]. We need those who are willing to work on the
technology. We have got some contracts done this year [1993], This year, our
budget for this recruitment is about 100,000 yuan, with it we can get 40
graduates. You know, we have to pay for it. Well, it is understandable that
universities need money too (The head of Personnel Department, 23.4.1993).
On the one hand, the firm was actively recruiting manpower from external resources.
On the other, it was running a retraining programme - by sending people to study in
universities, notably, to CIT to be trained directly in its laboratory; and by inviting
experienced and knowledgeable engineers within the firm, and experts from the CIT,
to give lectures in the classroom or teach practically in the field. As the director of
LTEF understood:
Now, we see that competition means a race in technology rather than only in
the market. After all this is a competition for manpower (Director of the
LTEF, 22.4.1993).
Also the firm had been trying its best to attract key staff to settle down in the
community, by providing them with the best living and working conditions that the
firm could afford. The new incentives were: higher salary, better housing and,
moreover, job satisfaction.
6.4.2 Production Capability - to Achieve High Productivity
People in LTEF learned gradually that there is a profound difference between a
centrally planned socialist system and a market mechanism. "Efficiency" and "high
productivity" are essential for a market-oriented system, and are closely linked to the
profitability of a firm. In the past, the socialist tradition was to a large extent designed
to protect people from the competition that results in brutal class struggle. Under the
20 This was organised for the purpose of letting companies and student get to know each other.
165
central planning, high productivity was hardly a major consideration. Now, two key
factors affected the firm's manufacturing operation. The first was derived from the
new technology. Cross-bar was based on electro-mechanical technologies, whereas
digital switching like HJD-40 is based on electronics technology. Production of cross¬
bar switching technology was labour-intensive whereas the HJD-04 is technology-
intensive. For the firm, it was a fundamental change not only in production
technology, but also in production organisation. Hence, the second problem was how
to effectively control production quality in this new situation.
In the previous production of cross-bar switches, LTEF used to produce almost every
components by itself. However, the only part of this technology which could be used
for the HJD-04 system is the technology of racks and rack units. The LTEF believed
that its capability in rack design and production exceeded the other HJD-04
producers. The very new and difficult undertaking for the firm had been the assembly
ofprinted circuit boards. In the beginning, assembly was done manually. Later the
firm was equipped with a wave soldering machine and a pin bending machine. After
the machine bent the pins of circuit components, they were inserted into printed
circuit boards by hand and delivered to the soldering machine. Some joints were still
soldered by hand. The final procedure of the production was testing the products, for
which the workshop lacked proper apparatus.
The first and biggest problem was product quality. In the past, one of the socialist
economic phenomenon was shortage ofmaterial supply. Because of this, products
were allocated on a rationed bases. In practice quantity therefore came to be more
important than quality. As a result, there was little perception of the need for quality.
However, the new HJD-04 production was put in a competitive environment in which
advanced foreign system had already set high quality standards for any switching
system. Since LTEF lost the protection of the state and was pushed into the market, it
had to compete with foreign companies, joint ventures as well as the other HJD-04
producers. From the market it learned the vital importance of quality.
"No quality, no quantity" became an almost everyday phrase spoken by people in the
firm from the director to shop-floor workers; it was discussed on programmes made
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by the in-house wired-broadcaster everyday; and mentioned by every manager I
interviewed. It was not a phrase from propaganda; rather, it was a lesson learned from
their experiences in markets. Without quality, there would be no market, and the firm
would not survive. That was the reality they were facing. Hence gaining high product
quality had become the major task of the firm. More importantly, people's perception
ofquality with regard to market standards had gradually been changing.
Changing people's perception of quality was not enough. In the past, people also paid
attention to product quality, but because the production was not the only undertaking
of the firm, quality control was often left behind while the other tasks took
precedence. Quality control was addressed by a series of disconnected mass
movements like other political tasks. After each campaign, quality would remain high
for sometime and then deteriorate until another movement was needed. From its
recent experiences, the firm learned that quality control needed a set ofwell designed
methods and that these methods needed to be implemented over the whole production
process. In the beginning of 1993, after the institutional reform of the firm, the
Department ofQuality was set up and a knowledgeable person21 was made head of
the department. Compared to the previous quality control organisation which
involved several small teams working in individual departments, the new department
had more power.
The first target of the new department was to improve the quality of imported
components. As mentioned above, the firm had no direct access to international
markets, with the result that these components' quality was unpredictable. For this,
the firm increased its investment on testing equipment within the factory. At the same
time, some components were sent out of the province to two electronic R&D
institutes which had appropriate test apparatus, as the firm lacked qualified labour and
necessary equipment at that time.
The implementation ofquality control methods in the process of production was more
difficult, given the shortage of expertise, manpower and the means ofproduction
21
According to my interview, he had been involved in quality control work since 1973 and was sent to study on
production management in some college during that time.
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needed. For instance, in the workshop, many work procedures were done manually.
Women workers sat in lines, soldering components on printed-circuit boards by hand.
Under these conditions, the quality ofproduction varied depending on individual
workers, their experience, attitude towards their job and, possibly, upon the time of
day and on how workers felt. In addition, uneven availability of components often
made the things worse. When one lot of imported components was rejected by the
LTEF due to poor quality and needed to be returned to the supplier, the time delay
was severe. As a result, the workshop sometimes ran out of components while, at
other times, too many piled up. As a consequence, workers had nothing to do on
some days and on other days had to work over eight hours to catch up. The stress and
fatigue of such long hours meant that quality became uneven on these occasions.
Apart from that, even though some quality problems appeared, as long as they were
not too serious, workers as well as their managers would not like to stop work,
because their salary was also linked with the quantity of their work, according to the
new salary system.
It was very hard to solve these problems within the firm, given the lack of
development ofproduction technology and production systems. This must be
understood in the context of the 30 year history ofChinese socialism, in which people
had got used to Mao's idea that: "Ants can move Mount Taishan", and "The more
people and the higher inspiration, the better the thing will be". Along with a system of
non market competition, this left the industries of the country with underdeveloped
production organisation, including adequate production means, technical design of the
production process and the production management. In LTEF, when HJD-04
production was started the assembly procedure had to be completed manually. The
practice taught the firm that (as was described by the new manager of the Department
ofQuality):
The HJD-04 production is technology intensive. Its quality is not visible and
tangible. You just can't expect such a technology to be made by hand and be
of a good quality. This is in complete contrast with the traditional idea: 'The
more people and the high inspiration' can't do any good to product quality.
We've got to have an automated production process. In assembling
components, anti-electrostatic measures are necessary. The fewer the people
involved, the better the quality of production. Besides, while the degree of
integration ofprinted-circuit board gets higher, soldering on it by hand
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becomes more and more impossible. Automation is the only and best solution,
whether we like it or not (The head of the Department ofQuality, 27.4.1993).
LTEF could not afford automation in the workshop. It was PTIC which successfully
lobbied the government, and obtained the financial support for the purchase of the
facilities needed, as already mentioned in section 6.2.3. All machines were to be
shipped to the workshop in July 1993. The firm was looking forward to it, at the time
ofmy visit.
The manager of the Department ofTechnology was still worrying about the
management of the whole production process. He realised that the firm's capability of
technical design for the production process was weak. The final documentation of
technical design for the whole assembly procedure had not been completed by April
1993. Shop-floor workers were not used to strictly following documented
instructions. Taylorism was never fully applied in socialist China; instead, workers
were usually encouraged to complete a piece ofwork in their own ways as long as
they could complete their job. For example, ten different workers might drill a hole in
a piece ofwork in ten different ways, rather than following a standardised procedure.
Obviously, this could not meet the standards ofmass production of the HJD-04
system. The manager pointed out:
In the past, technical design of production used to be considered less
important than the design ofproduct itself. This was common all over the
country. As a consequence, innovations of production technology used to be
considered less significant and, worse, technologists working on the
production process were easily ignored. Because of this, we now lack
technologists and expertise on production organisation. We have to learn
gradually. It takes time; it's not easy (Head of the Department ofTechnology,
27.4.1993).
The internal institutional reform transformed the Department ofTechnology. The
department laid down new operating rules for workers, tightened the procedures in
the workshop. In order to speed up the improvement ofproduction organisation, the
firm raised the salaries for all in this department, and allowed the department to
recruit technologists from different sources, as many as were needed. "I have been
working in the area since the 1960s, for me, the change is remarkable", noted the
head of the Department of Technology.
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By contrast, the head of the Department ofQuality who was not satisfied, could not
help complaining:
Till now, many ofour managers are still sticking on the old thought that
quality control is only the responsibility ofour department. Each department
for different reasons tries to cover up quality problems rather than put the
problems on the table and track down the sources so as to root them out. We
lack co-operation between departments and sections. Apart from this,
pressures come from PTIC which asked to produce 25,000 lines this year
[1993]. When production 'quantity' becomes critical, 'quality' can only be
left behind. You know, we have got too many problems, and new machines
have not arrived yet (The head of the Department ofQuality, 27.4.1993).
"Product quality" can only be the result of a successful process made up from the
combination ofevery piece ofqualified work done by each worker. The experience of
LTEF shows that this capability takes time to build up with respect ofexpertise of
quality control and know-how ofproduction organisation, as well as qualified
workers, technicians and engineers.
The firm had been strengthening its technological capability with regard to
production, installation and maintaining capability. Between October 1992 when
HJD-04 technology was put into production and April 1993, about 80,000 lines and
ten systems had been produced and installed.
6.4.3 Marketing
To sustain its financial situation and expand the domain of the HJD-04 system, the
firm was doing its best to produce as many systems as it could.
Since the reform, LTEF had been enhancing its marketing department. There were
over 20 sales persons in the department. They were sent away from home, travelling
around the country for more than 200 days a year in average. The company
encouraged them by offering a higher bonus which was related to the number of lines
they sell. According to the manager of the marketing department, the average income
in the department was 30% higher than the whole company. The new approach was
expressed strongly by the former head of the Directorial Office of the PTIC:
Now, firms are allowed to use material incentives, for instance, a good
salesman, if he sold 100,000 line system, why shouldn't we give him a certain
commission fee. In the new commercial economic environment, we should not
keep the idea of 'iron rice bowl'. Those who contribute more to the firm, must
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be paid more, more than expected (The director ofBeijing Long-Term Data
Technology Corporation, former head of the Directorial Office of the PTIC,
6.4.1993).
This would not have happened in the past, because people were taught by a socialist
dogma that each job must be treated equally, as long as it was for the revolution. A
gate-guard would not necessarily be paid less than a engineer. Income differences
between different professions were never that big. In LTEF, since the reform, such
differences have been gradually widened.
As mentioned above, because the PDSS market was so big, there was considerable
scope for the HJD-04. However there was one problem that some foreign
governments were providing soft loans which in most case were for the purpose of
supporting their own country's exports. Since many Chinese local Posts and
Telecommunications Administrations had been operating at a loss and were not able
to afford any PDSS, and the MPT was also short of finance, foreign soft loans had
become an important source of finance. Having been offered this, recipients might be
forced to buy foreign products as a precondition. Local administrations preferred
using these loans to buy an expensive foreign system to buying a cheaper Chinese one.
This involved two considerations. First, if it was a 20-year deferred loan, the official
who took out the loan would not be in that post when the time comes to repay them.
Second, purchasing a foreign system might well mean a free tour abroad for some
officials!
However, there were opportunities for HJD-04, considering that, first, applying for
soft loan takes time and the result was not always positive; and, second, even if it is
successful, buying in foreign system may be slow. Since profits in the
telecommunications service were very high, the investment could be returned in a
short time. In this circumstance, buying HJD-04 was also a reasonable option.
In order to compete with foreign products, LTEF introduced some new policies. As
some users were too poor to afford this product, LTEF made its payment policies
more flexible, and even allowed some to pay less. LTEF had been holding information
exchange meetings with current and potential users about one to three times a year to
introduce HJD-04 technology to them, to collect feed-back from users and, in the
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meantime, sell its products. For this, it made a substantial expenditure, including
arranging banquets and tours for all participants around the historical spots of the city
ofLuoyang in order to build and maintain good relations with users. This was
impossible in the past, because of state regulations over accounting at firm level. Even
corruption was used as a means of selling its system. It had arranged long distant
tours, for local Posts and Telecommunications Administration officials in charge of
purchasing the switching system, to different places around the country, some tour
even further to Hong Kong, Thailand and so on. These expenditures were then added
on to the cost of the system sold. The director of the firm commented about this with
sorrow:
It's not the way we would like to go deep in our hearts, but it is a way against
'no way'. We have so many mouths to feed (The Director of the LTEF,
22.4.1993).
In the recent period, marketing in China had involved many complicated factors.
LTEF's behaviour had been led by the reality of and the requirements from the
market.
With the effort made in marketing, LTEF's exchanges were currently operating in
seven provinces, including in the far north, Jilin province and Inner Mongolia, in the
west, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces, and also the neighbouring, Shandong province
and the home province, Henan. The firm was very proud that two systems with
20,000 lines had been installed in Shenzhen, the most advanced economic zone next
to Hong Kong.
6.4.4 Co-operation with Others
Technological innovation in the production process also demands co-operation
between R&D institute and industry. In the past, under central planning firms could
get fully technical support from R&D institutions in accordance with state plans
without any condition. Therefore, firms like LTEF were not familiar with the new
type of co-operation in a context of production for profits. The co-operation with the
CIT and PTIC was such a new experience for LTEF that they were sometimes
confused, as described in previous section. When the three were working together on
the HJD-04 and to gain official approval, the things important for co-operation, e.g. a
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written document with detailed items to clarify and guarantee responsibilities and
profits ofeach side, were overlooked. But, after the technology had shown its great
potential in the market, they had to face the problems and conflicts emerging between
them.
It made LTEF really uneasy that the core technology was held in other people's
hands: for some things LTEF had to ask for CIT's instructions, and for others, it had
to ask PTIC. Notwithstanding thus, the firm had to work together with CIT, as the
system was still new and there were many adjustments to be done. Problems small and
large arose frequently, especially, in the installation field. Similarly, LTEF needed the
help ofPTIC in many aspects. This did not rule out LTEF's intention to reduce its
dependence upon CIT and PTIC. The establishment of the research institute by LTEF
was such an effort. It was not that simple, that LTEF had decided to strengthen its
technological capabilities. It gathered its best manpower in the research institute and
gave them privileges in terms ofbetter working conditions and higher rewards as well
as living conditions. Although the firm's provision, in material sense, was far from the
best, the firm intended to make these people feel their future would be promising.
However, to master entirely a technology like HJD-04 is not a matter of short-term
endeavour, and may not be possible under certain conditions. As the firm was
engaged everyday in dealing with urgent problems arising in workshops or switching
offices elsewhere, these engineers could not help functioning like a fire-brigade. They
worked 14 hours a day on average and even often over-time through the night. This
situation did not allow them to engage seriously in any research work. Despite the
firm's ambitions to, one day, master the entire technology ofHJD-04 and be able to
extricate itself from the external technological control, it remained under immediate
pressure to improve production. Although LTEF was the most successful producer in
general amongst all HJD-04 producers (bothMPT and non-MPT), the quality of its
products was still poor according to CIT. From the CIT's point ofview, LTEF should
concentrate on production organisation and product quality, and leave technological
innovation to CIT.
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As mentioned in section 6.3.1, LTEF was also very worried that the other HJD-04
producers would become strong rivals. The desire to prevent technology leakage to
these firms made its relationship with them very sour. As one producer, which once
ordered one lot of racks from LTEF, complained, LTEF was so nervous that this
company might steal its technology of rack design and production, that it was
reluctant to supply this company any racks ofgood quality. As the result, that lot of
supply was not usable.
6.5 The Local Shaping of the Artefact - the HJD-04 System
HJD-04 technology was shaped by the particular social, economic and technological
context in which it was developed and used, as well as by global developments in
information and computer technology and PDSS technologies. The development of
the Chinese HJD-04 system reaped benefits because its developers adapted existing
technology without going through some of the developmental stages which preceded
them in advanced industrialised countries. The HJD-04 was not a new technology in
the strictest sense. When the development project started in 1989, many foreign
PDSSs had already been introduced in China. R&D for most of the major PDSS
technologies in the world started in the 1970s. By the end of 1989, these systems had
been updated and were more sophisticated. The R&D for the Chinese system HJD-04
was built upon studies on several different advanced foreign systems, so it could
integrate their advantages while avoiding their disadvantages. Moreover, by then,
many software design tools could be purchased on the world market and many
advanced electronic components (such as micro-processors) were available cheaply.
There was thus no comparison between the development ofHJD-04 and the earlier
PDSSs, which had to start from scratch.
As noted earlier, the R&D project for HJD-04 was carried out by computer
technology experts without a background in telephone-switching technology. This
came up with a system with a comparatively simple structure. The system utilised
cheap imported micro-processors: for example, the MC68000 micro-processor cost
only 70-80 Chinese yuan each at that time. CIT's computer specialists were able to
make a full-scale HJD-04 system, incorporating 1900 microprocessors, at a
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reasonable cost. The whole system only took about 2.4 Mb memory, while its
software was packed on to only two diskettes.
As a late comer, the HJD-04 had several special features. Significantly, its switching
network consisted of a single time (T) switch. This is a "duplicated T switching
network", which is non-blocking with respect to call processing. The switching
network consisted ofup to 32 identical, relatively independent modules. The number
ofmodules depended on the size and traffic requirements of a particular switching
office. Its architecture design allowed a big processing capacity. Each switch module
was capable ofhandling a traffic load ofup to 360 Erlang with a processing capability
of2 million BHCA, whereas the average of the other PDSS systems was 1.2 million
BHCA. If a switching office was equipped with 30 modules, and the average traffic-
per-line was 0.18 Erlang22, the switching office could handle 60,000 equivalent lines.
This capacity was large enough to meet most switching office requirements in China;
it was equivalent to that of a business environment in North America. Additionally,
the structure of each module was identical, and interconnection between modules was
via cables linking the buffer memories of each module. This design allowed for
extensive office expansion, since the modules could be located anywhere within the
pre-defined distance laid down in the design specification. (Chen Junliang, 1993)
The HJD-04 system was not as sophisticated as advanced foreign systems. However,
its development had kept pace with major user demands. The process of technological
development were shaped by the exigencies of the market. Because of the constraints
of time and finance, the project could only concentrate on those features necessary for
the basic functions of a switching system which were required by majority of its users.
The Chinese telecommunications market was as disparate as the nation's economic
development - that is to say, demand was increasing rapidly in the south and east
coast areas and big cities, while remaining very low in the west and especially the
countryside. In advanced areas, users demanded sophisticated services while in less
advanced areas, users required only the simplest adequate telephone lines. The
specifications laid down by MPT had not requested advanced functions such as ISDN
22 Units of communications traffic. Defined as the average number ofcalls existing simultaneously
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and IN. Although many advanced systems installed in China had such functions, they
had not been used by then. The HJD-04 project was planned in accordance with this
reality: the use ofNo.7 signalling system would be realised by the end of 1994,
whereas ISDN and IN capabilities would be completed within the following few
years, in line with user requirements.
Apart from flexibility, another target ofHJD-04 was to keep its price low, in order to
compete with advanced foreign systems in the market. In spite of the inefficiency of
production in state-owned companies, and unfavourable tariff status until the end of
1993, the price of the HJD-04 was still lower than foreign PDSSs. Of the many
foreign PDSS systems, Japanese ones and System-12 produced by Shanghai Bell were
slightly cheaper than the others. Still, System-12 costs over 1,000 Chinese yuan per
line, whereas the HJD-04 was currently about 850 yuan.23 As had been planned, when
the volume ofproduction increased, the price would decrease and, when the import
tariffwas waived, it would no doubt fall further still. In addition, when buying
System-12, users had to pay part of the price in foreign currency; this did not apply
with HJD-04. Foreign systems were simply too expensive for low-level users and they
were, in any case, not necessary in terms of local demands.
As a Chinese developed system, the HJD-04 design had been targeted on local
network conditions and requirements. As indicated in section 5.3.2, in China,
transmission quality and transmission lines varied greatly in different areas. The lower
the network level, the poorer the conditions were. Foreign systems were rarely able to
work under these circumstances. In addition, because of the combination of low
telephone penetration rate and high demand throughout the country, most telephone
lines were located in public services and each telephone set was used very intensively.
Many foreign systems were designed around presumptions of lower usage of lines and
had run into problems in this situation, sometimes even leading to the break-down of a
local network. The HJD-04, with a processing capacity of2 million BHCA, was
designed to overcome this problem. Apart from that, the HJD-04 screen menu was in
Chinese, whereas all foreign systems used English. In big cities, it might not be
23 This is according tomy interviewwith manager ofSales Department in LTEF inApril 1993.
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difficult to find operators who could understand English (section 5.3.2). To overcome
this, the HJD-04 system had a simple interface/outlet between operator and the
machine set which made the system easy to run.
While all foreign companies were aiming at large cities, the Chinese system was aimed
at lower levels in China's hierarchical public telecommunications network. Apart from
the three international gateways, there were five levels in the public network: levels
one to four (known as CI, C2, C3, C4) were transit switches, and level five (known
as C5) was comprised of terminal switches. There were eight level-one (CI) transit
switching centres; 22 level-two (C2) transit switching centres were located in the
capital cities ofprovinces or autonomous regions; level-three (C3) transit switching
centres were located in each district; level-four (C4) were located at the county level;
and level-five (C5) terminal switches were located in every major city and town. The
HJD-04 system could be used at C4 level or lower (although technologically it was
designed also to meet the requirements at C3 level). It had a capacity of
approximately 30,000 subscriber lines and could be used as local or tandem (toll)
switches. Up till 1993, the C3 and higher levels were dominated by foreign systems.
However there was a large market for the HJD-04 at the lower levels, which foreign
systems either had not yet focused on or had difficulties in entering, because of the
poor network conditions.
The HJD-04 developers developed a market strategy targeted on the large market for
smaller C4 and C5 switches - its modular design allowed exchanges to be supplied
according to the local capacity requirements (and expanded as demand grew). Within
this strategy, the further development of the HJD-04 was planned as a remote
terminal module. This would be very suitable for exchanges in the countryside, where
telephone stations are scattered and the density of the network is low. To aid diffusion
into these areas, it was intended that the suppliers would take responsibility for
training operators and maintenance technicians on behalfofusers. Since most ofthese
areas had poor transportation, which made it inefficient to send service engineers to
solve problems in person, users were allowed to adjust some software data in their
local office when necessary.
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6.6 Summary and Conclusion
The HJD-04 system emerged as a particular product of the social and economic
environment in China during the transitional period. Political and economic pressures
led the CIT military research team turn to civil technology, and ProfessorWu's
personal experiences drew his attention particularly to modern switching technologies.
These initiated the development project. However, to develop a Chinese PDSS, it
required: a) computer technology expertise; b) first-hand knowledge of switching
technology; c) finance and political resources. Later on, the broader social context
was again important. It drove CIT, Posts and Telecommunications Industrial
Corporation (PTIC) and Luoyang Telephone Equipment Factory (LTEF) into a three-
party coalition. With their respective strengths in financial, political and technical field,
the three made an effective collaboration together.
The process can be seen as involving two phases. In the stage of technology creation,
the project was unstable and vulnerable in the face ofuncertainties and difficulties
(relating to both the technological and administrative aspects). The three parties
worked hard together to overcome technical and financial problems, and to appeal for
regulatory approval from, in particular, MPT. However, once the development project
succeeded and its potential market was recognised, the search for profit came to the
fore. In this stage, tensions developed between the parties and new conflicts began to
undermine the co-operation between them. Nevertheless, common interests still
ultimately bound them together.
We can see that, during this process, the changing behaviour of individual parties was
significantly shaped by the broader social, economic and political environment of
China's transition. MPT's attitudes, state policies and technology users' interest, as
well as the development ofmarket mechanism, all played roles in this process.
The contributions of economic reforms to this technological development have been
at least twofold: bringing in advanced technologies from abroad, and introducing the
market mechanism. The latter created the environment for integrating technological
development with economic development, which brought in pressures as well as
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incentives for R&D institutes, firms and organisations like PTIC to seek new
technological opportunities. This development projectper se, and the general type of
co-operation among these three parties, are newly emerging in the transition. The
PDSS was a relatively complex technology, and its development project required
many different kinds of technical expertise as well as large financial investment and
regulatory approval; a development project like this, initiated outside of state
arrangements, had rarely happened in the past. Similarly, the type of co-operation
between CIT, LTEF and PTIC was certainly a new phenomenon in the country. So
were the problems and difficulties they encountered, and the conflicts between them
during the development process.
The way in which the sociotechnical constituency (see Molina's approach described in
chapter 3) ofHJD-04 technology was built exemplifies the new institutional relations
offering greater technological dynamism which are emerging in society with the
introduction ofmarket mechanisms. However, this gives evidences that market
competition is the two-edged sword. On the one hand, it compelled firms and other
agents relevant to technological activities to seek technological opportunities and co¬
operation, encouraging technological changes in line with local demands and
strengthening indigenous technological capabilities. On the other hand, it put
pressures on them to keep technology secret from each other and therefore damage
inter-firm co-operation and co-operation between different technical and social
agents, which were necessary for further technological innovation.
A state-owned firm like LTEF was pushed into organisational reform and a continuing
technological learning process. Even some corrupt measures were adopted by LTEF
in reaction to the emerging competitive market economy to survive in the new system
ofChina's transition. As the previous traditions had not been completely removed and
the new mechanism was still in the process ofdeveloping, many confusing elements
arose, in the course of transition, e.g. an incomplete legislative system for protecting
intellectual property rights or established markets for technological collaboration. As
a result, the process ofbuilding up indigenous technological capabilities at firm-level
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proved to be uneven and unstable, heavily dependent on the contingencies of its
particular setting and broader social changes.
The state proved to have played an important role during the transition period in many
aspects. This case study suggests that the Chinese government's policies were
essential in promoting PDSS technology development. Buying in and transferring
advanced foreign technologies, meant that domestic technology was able to start from
a higher base line, whilst it provided opportunities for Chinese to accumulate
knowledge ofdifferent public digital switching systems. The government policy of
decentralising financial control in telecommunications construction facilitated this
process. In addition, more sophisticated foreign technologies set standards for local
technology development, whilst the existence of local technologies on the market
reined in the price of foreign products.
Because that, as noted above, market forces are a two-edged sword, the individual
firm's interest might produce negative elements for wider co-operation. In such cases,
government intervention in general is crucial to introduce measures for enhancing the
linkage between R&D institutes and industries, and for completing the legislative
system relevant to ownership of technology and regulating market competition, and to
the best use of available material and human resources within the country. As the
LTEF case shows, technological capabilities in the firm were still at a very basic level,
some of the key issues related to labour development, changing people's perception of
product quality, getting proper production equipment, developing routine quality
control procedures and etc. Without the co-operation with CIT and PTIC, LTEF
would have not been able to develop any PDSS like HJD-04.
State intervention in controlling the pace of economic reform was also necessary. As
the LTEF case shows, the large scale of labour redundancy of state-owned firms in
pursuing high productivity might have serious consequences.
From a technological point ofview, HJD-04 had unique features, shaped by both
social and technical elements involved in the development process. The most obvious
"sociotechnical" features ofHJD-04 includes the special composition of the R&D
team, which consisted ofCIT's computer designers and LTEF's switching
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technicians; their knowledge crossed computer techniques, switching applications in
Chinese telecommunication network and MPT's specifications of it. By obtaining
advanced technological information, development tools and cheap standardised
electronic products (components) available in the international market the local
development ofPDSS like HJD-04 was made possible. The convoluted process of
development in the context ofeconomic and social transition, including factors such
as the financial, market, cultural and political context, was embodied in the main
features ofHJD-04 which were adapted to local needs. Thus, it was capable of
handling a dense traffic load - a challenge which had caused break-downs ofmany
foreign systems used in China. It had a simple machine-operator interface, a Chinese-
language screen menu and a flexible maintenance strategy. In addition, its
development had been in line with users' requirements for low prices.
So far, the process ofbuilding up the sociotechnical constituency ofPDSS HJD-04
had been completed in a relatively short time - from November 1989, when three
parties all agreed to develop a full-size PDSS, to October 1992, when the technology
was put in production and its technical features were able to meet the needs of the
majority of its users. The case suggests that it is possible for a developing country to
speed up its technological development by reaping benefits from existing overseas
technologies. Although the Chinese HJD-04 system was not as sophisticated as
advanced foreign systems, it was more appropriate for the unsophisticated condition
of the Chinese network, and much cheaper. This raises issues about the strategies of
utilising foreign advanced technological capabilities, to build up indigenous
technological capabilities through effective technology transfer which we shall return
to in chapter 8.
Another closely related issue is a national system of innovation. We have concluded
that the current success ofHJD-04 development and the collaboration (and conflicts)
between CIT, LTEF and PTIC were associated with the broader social context in
China which has been transforming from a centrally planned to a more market
oriented economy. The question remains, whether the further development of the
Chinese HJD-04 system will be able to keep pace with technological development,
and the rapidly changing market. The further innovation of the Chinese PDSS
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depends largely on co-operative effort ofmany agents relevant to the technological
activities in the whole country, as well as on the improvement of production
capabilities at the firm level. The problems facing the three parties involved in HJD-04
shows that the future remains unpredictable, even though the market is large and
growing; it is uncertain whether the social and economic transition in China will
continue to improve the technological dynamism of the entire system. These issues
will be further explored in chapter 8.
A Postscript
In August 1997, four years after the fieldwork for this study ended, and when writing
up and analysis of this thesis was substantially completed, I visited China and was able
to obtain some additional information about the Chinese telecommunications industry.
Two news stories in particular threw light on the subsequent development of the
Chinese PDSS industry:
China Daily, 28 August 1997: pp.3
... The production ofHJD-04 Programme Controlled Switchboards by our
country has changed the situation of the domination of imported switchboard
in China. The national Switchboard industry made a breakthrough and has
realised the exportation of switchboards made in China, (sic)
As a leader ofnational switchboard production, GDT [Great Dragon
Telecommunication (Group) Co., Ltd.] has sold ten million lines ofHJD-04
programme controlled switchboards. ...
People's Daily - Overseas Edition, 8 September 1997: pp.2
... Now, PDSS products developed by ourselves [Chinese] have achieved a
market share of 14%. Last year, over 5,000,000 locally developed PDSS
(lines) were installed, and amongst the total new exchanges installed in the
local telecommunication networks 23.4% were locally developed ones. ...
Although it was not possible to investigate these matters in further detail, it would
seem that the hitherto fragmented HJD-04 production facilities have been reorganised
with the support ofMPT, MMEI and central government, united under a new banner
Great Dragon Telecommunication. This group seems to have been successful in
overcoming the production and marketing difficulties that threatened to hinder the
prospects of the HJD-04 system. Indeed the Chinese developed PDSS has achieved
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remarkably rapid and high rate ofpenetration of the telecommunications market,
particularly in local exchanges. I return to these points again in chapter 9 in relation to
future research (section 9.8).
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PART III: ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 7:
Acquisition of PDSS Technological




As discussed in chapter 2, this study explores how developing countries can
accumulate indigenous technological capabilities and the contribution to this of the
advanced technology transfer from abroad. The key for success is effectively utilise
exogenous technological competencies. There are a range ofdifferent strategies and
choices in selecting particular technologies for transfer and particular types of
technology transactions. These choices may also depend on the objectives and
requirements of the developing country - for example, what level and type of
competence is needed? Is innovation competence required as well as productive
capacity? Is there a difference between long and short term goals?
This chapter examines these questions in detail through a comparative analysis ofhow
China has acquired PDSS technological capabilities by utilising advanced foreign
technologies in two cases, System 12 and HJD-04. It comprises five sections. Section
7.2 analyses the different strategies represented by the System 12 case and HJD-04
case, and contrasts their strengths and weaknesses. This analysis mainly focuses on
how the characteristics of the different technologies and the type of transfer processes
affect the possibility for the Chinese to gain access to appropriate foreign advanced
technologies. It also examines the scope for local shaping of these technologies, then
how these two strategies worked in different circumstances during the Chinese
economic reforms.
In the light of these two cases, section 7.3 analyses technological learning activities,
relating to various formal or informal means for technological learning and important
roles played by different technological agents, including technology producers,
component producers, technology developers as well as switching technology users,
in the learning processes. It also stresses the importance of the wider social and
economic context and its impact on the effectiveness of the learning activities.
Section 7.4 examines the outcome of technological learning from exogenous
technological competencies in relation to the accumulation of indigenous
technological capabilities and the contribution to the Chinese telecommunications
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infrastructure. It distinguishes indigenous technological capabilities at the firm level
from those at national level, and highlights the gap between Chinese technological
capabilities and technological capabilities of individual firms' like Shanghai Bell and
LTEF. Here it distinguishes two level of technological capabilities: at the basic level,
ofoperational capabilities, e.g. production, services, marketing, resources allocation
and management; and capabilities for creating and innovating PDSS technologies.
Section 7.5 draws the analysis in the preceding sections together in order to reach
some concluding points. These relate to some of the research questions raised in
chapter 2:
• How has China strategically utilised advanced foreign technological competencies
in the area ofpublic digital switching system to fulfil domestic demands for
modernising its telecommunications infrastructure in short term and innovating the
technology in the longer term?
• Have China's attempts at technology transfer been effective in terms of acquiring
technological capabilities? Have they succeeded in using existing capabilities and,
through technological learning, further accumulating them?
• What factors were crucial in establishing the technological learning needed to
transform exogenous technological competencies into indigenous ones?
• What are the differences between the two strategies of technology transfer and
indigenous technological development, in respect of selectively utilising foreign
technologies and the scope of local shaping of these two systems?
• How has the combination of these two strategies served the country's
requirements in the reconstruction of the telecommunications infrastructure and
the acquisition ofPDSS technological competencies?
7.2 Selectively Utilising Foreign Technologies - Contrasting
System 12 and HJD-04 Cases
As discussed in chapter 2, the nature of imported technology and the type of
technology transaction together determine both the availability and appropriability of
exogenous technological competencies embodied in imported technologies, and the
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scope for local shaping of these imported technologies. Recipient countries can use
different strategies for utilising foreign advanced technology to meet domestic
requirements. This includes selecting different range and type of technology, e.g.
between "system technology" and "component technology" and different types of
transaction, e.g. wholesale technology transfer and the purchase of finished products.
This section compares the two contrasting strategies. The former involved
transferring a comprehensive package of "system technology". The latter involved
purchasing standardised "component technologies" as building blocks to develop
Chinese system. This section analyses the weaknesses and strengths of these different
strategies presented by the System 12 and HJD-04 cases. Section 7.2.1 explores their
differences as a means ofgaining access to the advanced technologies embodied in the
imported technologies in terms of the availability and approriability of foreign
technologies. Section 7.2.2 analyses the scopes for local shaping by using different
strategies, followed by section 7.2.3 which examines how these strategies have helped
to develop indigenous technological capabilities and meet the Chinese domestic
requirements.
7.2.1 Different Approaches - Comparing System 12 and HJD-04 Cases
The System 12 case is an example ofutilising foreign advanced technologies. But so
paradoxically is the HJD-04 case (which in other ways was an indigenously developed
PDSS). However, these cases are very different in many aspects. First, drawing on the
theoretical framework developed, we can see that the artefacts imported in these two
cases have very different characteristics. System 12 can be characterised as a "system
technology" although it has application layers which are configurable, and the foreign
technologies that the Chinese system HJD-04 comprises are "component
technologies" (section 2.4.3). A "system technology" involves complexes of elements
which mutually condition and constrain one another and which has its unique
proprietary architecture and elements. A "system technology" like System 12 involves
a wide range of foreign components, e.g. LSI chips, micro-processors and the other
components, which had already been configured into a particular architecture before
being transferred into China. These artefacts embodied foreign developers'
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technological, social and economic knowledge and rationales, and reflected their
technological competencies which had been accumulated over time. This is in sharp
contrast to "component technologies" which are generally designed to be used in
conjunction with other technological elements, building on with standard interfaces,
and are often available as cheap commodities in international markets (section 2.4.3).
Second, these two cases adopted different type of technology transfer transactions.
System 12 is a wholesale technology transfer project, which included the
manufacturing, engineering, and installation technologies, as well as skills of
management. A highly formal and carefully planned process of technology transfer
was adopted to ensure the transfer of all the skills needed to create in China
productive capability for System 12. In contrast, the HJD-04 technology development
project involved importing foreign standardised components as building blocks of the
system, but the architecture of the system was designed by Chinese. In addition,
software designing tools and some production facilities which China did not have
were purchased from abroad. Exogenous technological expertise was thus acquired,
embodied in artefacts - and artefacts that were themselves designed to be
appropriable. This was supplemented by the informal acquisition by CIT ofgeneral
knowledge ofglobal developments with PDSS technologies.
A "system technology" like System 12 is much more difficult to master than the
"component technologies" that the HJD-04 system is using. In the HJD-04 case,
imported foreign standardised components could be used in building PDSS
exchanges. It would seem to be impossible to master a technology like System 12,
without a comprehensive package of technology transfer. Equally, wholesale
technology transfer like System 12 almost inevitably requires a large capital input,
whereas the standardised components are usually available cheaply on the world
market. There is thus obvious scope for choice about the extent to which a country
imports these components, rather than invests money and effort to produce them
locally.
The availability of foreign technology depends largely on the way in which it is
purchased and the means of technological learning. Buying finished foreign products
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obviously provides the least access to the technological competencies which are
embodied in the artefacts and black-boxed before the delivery. Whereas wholesale
technology transfer provides access to a wide range of technological capabilities
spanning from knowledge of the artefacts to production and management techniques.
Contrasting the two different approaches, clearly, the latter provides much better
means than the former for the Chinese to gain access to advanced foreign
technologies, which was carefully planned, negotiated and formalised in a written
contract.
On the other hand, we can see that the wholesale transaction of System 12 production
capacities allowed very limited technology creating and innovating capacities. Even
the capacity to adapt System 12, needed to match the characteristics of the Chinese
telecommunications system, was confined to the application layers. Moreover, its
export capacity is also constrained as this would cut across BTM's interests in the
world market (section 5.4.3). The Chinese HJD-04 case represents a very different
model. Standardised foreign components and tools were purchased and used straight
away in the design and production of the exchanges, without the need to obtain
mastery over their design or production. Compared to System 12, the HJD-04
development required more creative effort on the part of the Chinese participants or
actors, and so was better able to integrate the technical features of the system with
local technological, economic and political requirements.
Another important difference between the System 12 and HJD-04 cases is that they
were initiated in different stage of the economic reforms. The broad social and
economic context surrounded these two cases were so different that the driving forces
and strategies by which they built up their own sociotechnical constituencies were
markedly different and required different approaches for establishing their own
technological capabilities, and particularly in marketing, resource allocation and
management. As the social and economic context is so crucial for technological
learning, this will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 8.
The final difference concerns the scope to shape and adapt the technology to meet
particular local requirements, which differed substantially between the two cases. A
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technology, even a completed PDSS exchange technology like System 12, has to be
adapted to meet the circumstances in which it will be used, and as noted both in
chapter 5 and 6, the Chinese telecommunications system was a particularly
challenging technical and social context. It is to this point we now turn.
7.2.2 Different Scope for Local Shaping of Technology
Both the nature of technology itself and the type of technology transfer transaction
constrain the scope for local shaping. Contrasting the System 12 case and the HJD-04
case, System 12 as a system has much less scope for local adaptation than the design
of a Chinese PDSS from an assemblage of imported discrete components with which
HJD-04 is made up. The extent to which original technological elements were
developed was clearly far greater in the design ofHJD-04 than in the limited level of
adaptation to local markets which took place in System 12.
Because of the complexity ofpublic switching technology, its application package has
to be customised to meet the requirements of the particular country. We have seen
that Shanghai Bell had gradually overcome the incompatibility between System 12 and
the poor conditions and un-standardised features in the Chinese telecommunications
network - by, for instance, developing ancillary equipment to help System 12 identify
signals from the telecommunications network and by customising the CDE packages.
However, in System 12, the space available for adaptation and reconfiguration is
limited, largely within the domain of the application layers. The fact that the generic
part of the system is shared by all System 12 producers and users across the world
allows little chance for Chinese to make innovative changes of the technological core.
We have seen that the further development of System 12 technology - either the
systemper se or its production technologies including equipment, process design and
operation techniques - had hardly taken place in Shanghai Bell. Rather, such
technological changes were carried out in the parent company, and then fed down to
Shanghai Bell. The most significant local adaptation activities were limited to the area
of customer application technologies and human-factor related management, e.g. the
local development of some application software and the development of a distinctive
hybrid management style in the production facility.
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Since the generic technical features of System 12 were deeply embedded in its design,
some of them could not be changed without considerable expense. For example,
System 12 used the English language for operator-machine interface: in theory, this
could be changed into Chinese written language but, because of the complexity of this
technical task, it is not currently economical. Another example is System 12's limited
capacity to handle the dense traffic loads, what are the typical situation in China,
caused break-downs (section 5.3.2). This problem highlights the presumptions
underpinning the technical design, which were to meet the requirements in
industrialised environment rather than those typical ofpoor countries like China.
By contrast, building a PDSS from an assemblage of imported discrete components,
as in the HJD-04 system, leaves great scope for local configuration. ProfessorWu and
his team were able to develop a Chinese switching system to meet the technological,
economic and cultural requirements of the local environment and conditions for local
production and operation, as well as international standards of telecommunications.
CIT's core competencies in computer design, and LTEF's competencies in rack
design and production and in understanding Chinese telecommunications network,
were configured together with an array ofavailable discrete foreign technologies -
electronic components and development tools plus some foreign design concepts. As
a result, HJD-04 is arguably the most suitable for the Chinese telecommunications
network. It is also the easiest of the two systems to operate and maintain as it does
not require operators who speak English. Being purposefully designed for the Chinese
context, there is no problem ofhandling dense traffic loads. In addition, because the
core technology is held in the hand ofChinese developers, for further updating and
innovation is possible.
However, in the case ofHJD-04, because of the type of transaction - purchasing of
finished products, the technological competencies embodied in these products, e.g.
component design and production technologies, are black-boxed. As there is no
clearly defined access to them for recipients, thus virtually no scope for their local
shaping.
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On the other hand, there was little need to get inside these technologies. The
microprocessors in particular offered generic technical functions that were rather
clearly presented (price, processing power). They combined presumptions about their
technical context that were largely standardised, but few specific constraints and
presumptions about the application context. They could therefore be deployed as
"black-boxed" solutions by the Chinese developers. In this sense, local shaping was
restricted to the choice ofprocessors available on the market. But that did not matter.
These processors were readily available on the market as cheap and standardised
commodities. As far as the Chinese developers were concerned, it was cheaper,
simpler and less risky to buy in these technologies than seek to acquire local design
and production competencies in building complex integrated circuits.
7.2.3 Different Strategies to Meet Domestic Demands
At the very beginning of the economic reforms, China lacked PDSS technological
capabilities (both overall PDSS creation capacity and capacity to build constituent
components) while domestic demands for adequate telecommunications infrastructure
was pressing. The wholesale transfer of System 12 seemed to be the best solution
under these circumstances. This project helped China to build up production capacity
in PDSS from scratch, thus more or less satisfying the increasing domestic demands
for modern telecommunications services.
The System 12 technology transfer provided formally defined means and a broad
avenue for the Chinese to gain access to a wide range ofadvanced foreign
technologies, ranging from component production to production management. The
flow of technological information from industrialised countries to China through the
System 12 transfer project was substantial. The later design of system HJD-04 had, to
some extent, also benefited from this informal flow of technological information into
China (section 6.2.2). Even in developing its production facilities and management
approaches, LTEF sought help by sending delegations to Shanghai Bell to explore
suitable solutions (section 6.3.1). Equally significant was that Shanghai Bell, through
the domestication of component production programme, enabled transfer of advanced
foreign technologies to local industries, creating components production facilities to
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meet world quality standards and technologies (section 5.5.3). In a sense, without the
wholesale PDSS technology transfer through System 12 or a similar project, the
indigenous technological development ofHJD-04 might not have been possible.
However, a wholesale technology transfer requires enormous investment and resource
inputs. The selection of the particular technology for transfer is very crucial. In the
case of System 12, the aims of the PDSS technology transfer were very clear. China
sought the most advanced technology and the latest version of its development and a
technology which was suitable for the Chinese telecommunications environment. To
ensure the transaction would provide China adequate means to obtain advanced
technologies in both the short and long term, and limit technological dependency, it
was important for the Chinese to insist on an experienced and reputable technology
supplier and a comprehensive package of technology transfer including the specified
LSI chip production at the heart of System 12. This was moreover a technological
field in which China nationally was rather weak.
As discussed in section 7.2.1, System 12 technology is difficult for a developing
country like China to master. To function properly, it also requires adaptation to the
Chinese telecommunications environment. Because China's telecommunications
condition was so poor, and because of substantial technological and cultural
differences form Europe and North America (where System 12 development took
place), this technological undertaking was very difficult for China. In such
circumstances, the Chinese selection of the technology and the type of technology
transaction involved a high risk of failure. The System 12 case confirms the enormous
difficulties that Shanghai Bell faced particularly in the early stages ofproduction and
installation of the exchanges (for more details see section 5.3.2). Without powerful
and sustained support by the Chinese government, the whole project of technology
transfer would have failed.
The Chinese system HJD-04 might not be as sophisticated as System 12. However, it
provides the Chinese telecommunications network with a PDSS which is able to meet
user requirements that most foreign systems could not provide, in particular handling
a dense traffic load. Compared to foreign systems, HJD-04 had a simple machine-
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operator interface, with a Chinese-language screen menu so as to be easy to operate.
Because of its low development and production costs, the system offers low prices to
Chinese users, which are particularly important to those in less developed areas and in
rural areas.
Most important to China is the coexistence of a foreign PDSS like System 12 and a
local one like HJD-04, which creates a dual development environment. First, foreign
PDSSs are source of advanced technologies which are continually developing
globally. Through both the international market and proprietary channel (e.g. BTM),
Chinese companies (e.g. LTEF and Shanghai Bell) can keep in touch with the state of
the art. Second, this provides a competitive environment, which, on the one hand, set
up high standards for Chinese products and, on the other, rein in the price of foreign
PDSSs and push further transfer ofupgraded version of these technologies.
7.3 Technological Learning
As noted in theoretical chapter (section 2.4.2), technological learning is the means by
which exogenous technological capabilities is transformed into indigenous
technological capabilities. This section analyses how technological learning took place
in the two cases. It looks into the means of technological learning, i.e. formally
organised learning activities and informal technological information flow. It explores
the importance of involving a wide range and number of players in technological
learning, and the different roles that technology manufacturers, designers, users,
component suppliers, etc. play in technological learning. In addition, it emphasises the
importance of the wider social and economic environment in encouraging
technological learning activities.
Substantial technological learning took place in both System 12 and HJD-04 cases.
The range of learning activities includes formally organised learning, such as, staff and
customer training courses arranged by both Shanghai Bell and LTEF; and the
domestication of component production. The System 12 technology transfer utilised
at least four different means for the Chinese in Shanghai Bell to obtain technological
competencies: technological training, technical assistance from BTM's experts; BTM
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management participation, and the transfer of technological documents (section
5.3.1). Through these formalised means, the Chinese in Shanghai Bell have
systematically obtained skills for manufacturing, installation and maintenance, as well
as engineering technologies for System 12. Western managerial methods and values
were also introduced into Shanghai Bell. This helped Shanghai Bell to develop its own
strategies and policies for marketing, resource allocation and management. It allowed
Shanghai Bell to achieve high productivity. As the production quality control is one of
the most common problems in China's industry, the help ofBTM's quality control
specialist who at the outset set up the routines for Shanghai Bell to gradually achieve
production quality at world level was critical.
Technological learning has not been solely confined to Shanghai Bell. Rather it has
been widely spread through both informal and formal channels to System 12 users,
component producers, and other related agents. The movement of Shanghai Bell's
engineers to other establishments (R&D institutes, universities, firms, etc.) provided
one means for the transfer of technological information across China. Many of the
engineers and researchers who were gathered byMPT from across the country to help
the System 12 project, later on returned to their original institutes, and thereafter,
used their knowledge of System 12 to carry out some technological projects for
Shanghai Bell (section 5.3.2). Some of them also contributed to the recognition of
HJD-04 technology by MPT when they were involved in the examination for HJD-04
technical approval (section 6.2.2).
Unlike Shanghai Bell, in the HJD-04 case, technological learning was to a
considerable degree through informal channels. ProfessorWu, the key designer for
HJD-04, acquired information about System 12 and other foreign PDSS through
public available documents (section 6.2.2). LTEF sought information about
production equipment and management through Shanghai Bell (section 6.3.2).
Interestingly, it learned the importance ofproduction quality through its customers
whose quality standards for the Chinese system were set by foreign advanced
products that had become available in the Chinese PDSS market. Apparently, market
competition drove LTEF into an intensive learning cycle in order to improve its
technological capabilities (section 6.3.2).
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Informal and formal learning activities like these have taken place in almost all the
players, involving not only those involved directly in the System 12 technology
transfer and HJD-04 development projects, but also PDSS users, installation
engineering teams (section 5.4), MPT's R&D institutes and the universities which
helped Shanghai Bell to achieve System 12 adaptation and market expansion. More
wide spread learning activities encompasses local industries, in particular System 12
component producers (see 5.5.3). The achievement of System 12 production
capabilities required the involvement of a wide range ofplayers within Shanghai Bell
to inculcate not only understanding ofmanufacturing processes but also wider
recognition of the importance of quality as well as production.
As noted in chapter 2, a supportive social and economic environment is crucial in
providing incentives for technological learning. Without it, even formalised
technological learning may be inefficient and incomplete. This was demonstrated in
the case of System 12. The government organised domestication of System 12
component production was not very successful in the beginning, because Shanghai
Bell and local producers lacked incentives. A very different situation emerged, at a
later stage, when local production of System 12 components became in the interests
of Shanghai Bell and local industries. Both Shanghai Bell and local industries were
seeking co-operation opportunities, and local producers became active in
technological learning to improve their technological capabilities.
7.4 China's PDSS Technological Capabilities
China was seeking not only to meet domestic demands for PDSS technology. As
already noted, China had an objective ultimately to bring about accumulation of its
technological capabilities. This study distinguishes basic level technological
capabilities, such as, production, operation, maintenance, marketing and resource
allocation, from higher level capabilities of innovating and creating new technologies.
It also stresses differences in technological capabilities between the firm level and the
national level. The two cases of System 12 and HJD-04 show that, from the view
point of the entire country, China now possesses a wide range ofPDSS technological
capabilities, from creation, design to production, installation, operation and
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maintenance. However, individual firms are still in the stage of accumulating basic
technological capabilities.
This section first examines the development ofbasic PDSS technological capabilities
at both the national and firm levels. For firms, to be productive requires not just
production technological capabilities, but also very basic capabilities in marketing,
resource allocation, management, which allow them to survive in a more market
oriented system in China today. Second, it analyses particularly the development of
higher level technological capabilities in PDSS technology creation and innovation.
Finally, it examines how the acquisition ofPDSS technological capabilities through
utilising foreign technologies has contributed to the Chinese telecommunications
infrastructure.
7.4.1 Basic Level Technological Capabilities
The development of technological capabilities in PDSS production, operation and
services in China as a whole was extremely successful, through advanced technology
transfer from industrialised countries, in particular wholesale technology transfer. In
the case of System 12, production capacity had expanded rapidly, from 15,000 lines in
1987 to 2,700,000 lines in 1993, during seven year's production (section 5.3.1).
Shanghai Bell's productivity even out-performed BTM (section 5.4.5). Production
capabilities for System 12 components have also been gradually established and
upgraded, e.g. the custom LSI chips, an advanced technology in international terms
(although quality was still a problem at that time).
As we have seen in both cases, the state ofproduction technology in China was
extremely poor, especially in design of the production, quality control, and production
management. This backwardness stemmed from the old centrally planned system, and
the weak links not only between technology designer and producers, but also with
technology users. Most technology designers lacked a sense of commercial issues;
producers were mainly "plan-takers" (section 2.3.1); and technology users were
accustomed to having no choice but to accepting what producers produced. This
situation has begun to change since the economic reforms and the introduction of
market mechanism. We can see The manufacturing firms involved in both cases have
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gradually established capabilities in marketing and resource allocation, and have also
been compelled by market pressures to improve production quality and efficiency.
However, improving these basic technological capabilities is obviously a long term
task - not least because it is associated with the whole economic system, and a wide
range of people within it. For example, to ensure the quality of System 12, Shanghai
Bell had first of all to improve the quality of each component when their production
was domesticated. This required the effort of all local producers - i.e. for LED,
resistors and even the screws used on the switches (section 5.5.3).
There are very few firms like Shanghai Bell possessing these basic technological
capabilities at firm level. The both cases show that most state owned companies
involved in either System 12 component production or the Chinese HJD-04
manufacture were still struggling to improve their production quality and productivity,
and to build up from scratch their capabilities in marketing, resource allocation and
management. Even LTEF, which can be considered the most successful and major
producer ofHJD-04 exchanges, still had a long way to go to catch up with Shanghai
Bell. In April 1993, its production capacity was merely 80,000 lines, compared to
Shanghai Bell's then annual capacity of2,700,000 lines.
Given China's urgent need to modernise its telecommunications infrastructure and
provide adequate telecommunications services to underpin rapid economic growth,
development of production capabilities was arguably the most important priority for
China at this stage and more immediately significant than developing the capabilities
to innovate telecommunications technologies. The development of these basic
production capabilities to overcome the poor state in the telecommunications and
electronics sectors was necessary and could also provide the basis for higher level
technological competencies in future.
The development of production capabilities required a quantum jump in production
technologies in these sectors. No less important was recognition of the need to bring
production quality in line with world-wide standards in terms of reliability and
accuracy (both are particularly crucial for switching technology, but have a more
general relevance). And this depended upon development of "non-technical"
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capabilities, such as marketing (including recognition of the importance ofusers
requirements), production management and quality control and, crucially,
understanding of all these issues by the workforce as a whole. To the extent that these
objectives were attained, there was considerable scope for domestication of
production - as demonstrated in the case of System 12 component supply. The
Chinese domestic market is huge. And low Chinese wage costs could offset the
weaker base in production technology, keeping Chinese production competitive with
foreign supply.
7.4.2 The Capability of innovation and Creation
Whilst production capacity had the most obvious immediate economic importance for
a country like China, the indigenous capability to create and innovate technologies
have been seen as more strategic in the long term in allowing China to avoid
technological dependence on foreign firms and foreign market supply, as well as
better to meet local needs. At the firm level, Chinese switch producers are very weak
in terms of technology innovating capabilities. Even Shanghai Bell, the most
successful PDSS producer, had limited activities in PDSS technology innovation. This
is due partly to the model of System 12 technology transfer, and partly to China's
existing technological capabilities. Moreover, Shanghai Bell was in the stage of rapid
expansion of its production facilities, and its products were in constant high demand,
it had little interest in pursuing major technological changes to System 12. Although
LTEF was one ofChina's most modern exchange producers, and became one of the
three key developers of the Chinese HJD-04 system, it apparently could not carry out
any undertakings in PDSS R&D and design on its own.
However, China has developed its own PDSS systems through co-operation between
R&D institution and industry. The Chinese HJD-04 system is the best example. Such
a technological co-operation brought the technological capabilities in PDSS creation
and innovation ofChina as a country to a high level.
The HJD-04 case displays the technological capabilities and ingenuity ofChinese
developers, especially CIT who were able to combine foreign and local technological
elements to create their own PDSS. The Chinese PDSS development took advantage
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ofbeing later than that ofother major PDSS technologies in the world, bypassed
difficulties (i.e. leapfrogging) in PDSS design which preceding developers had been
forced to confront, and reaped benefits from the available technologies. Most
significant is that the Chinese developers were able to turned the technical challenges
ofdevelopment into the ones that they were good at. They utilised fully their
strengths in computer technology design while by-passing their weakness in electronic
components design and production. As a result, the HJD-04 has distinctive technical
features. It is not a copy of any other PDSS technologies in the world through reverse
engineering or the like. Rather it is a good system in many respects, and moreover
appropriate for Chinese. The HJD-04 allows a large processing capacity, a challenge
for most foreign PDSSs used in China, and is easy to operate and maintain. More
essential, this system is simple and easy for Chinese to produce, given that production
capabilities were poor in Chinese industries particularly in microelectronics. The
Chinese HJD-04 is perhaps the only (or one ofvery few) PDSSs which was developed
in as little as three-year's time, with the investment ofonly a modest amount of
money, and was successfully developed by a small R&D team with only 18 people as
fixed staff (section 6.2.2). Since the Chinese HJD-04 has a modules architecture and
is designed to be open for future development, it allows Chinese developers to
develop new technical functions such as the No.7 signalling system, ISDN, IN, etc.
separately in line with Chinese users' requirements (section 6.5). This meanwhile
keeps the R&D costs, and thus its market prices at a low level.
By all these criteria, HJD-04 is a distinctive success for Chinese. However, since
HJD-04 is a late comer, compared to foreign systems like System 12, its position in
Chinese PDSS market is far from secure and its production capacity is far too low. In
addition, the system itselfneeds further sophistication, and the production
technologies ofHJD-04 need to be improved. These require further effort of
designers and producers as well as management organisations like PTIC, and more
investment in R&D and production equipment. In addition, China's economic system
did not give manufacturing firms like LTEF any direct access to foreign component
suppliers, which made stable production more difficult, let alone the many burdens
which a state-owned firm like LTEF had inherited and still suffered from.
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Technological collaboration between R&D institutes and industries is particular
crucial, but these linkage have been poor as a result of failings in the central planning
system, with the result that existing technological capabilities in China are still low in
general and are particularly weak within manufacturing sector. In the HJD-04
development case, continued technological co-operation between CIT, LTEF and
PTIC, as well as between HJD-04 producers underMPT and those under MMEI, was
not secure at the end of the study (section 6.2.3). If the problem deteriorates, it may
well shadow the future of the Chinese HJD-04 project and slow the pace of
accumulating technological capabilities. This is a reminder ofhow the broader social
context and the strategies of the players may inhibit the technological collaboration
and knowledge flows needed for developing new technologies.
Although the System 12 technology transfer was not designed to deliver technology
innovation competencies, or indeed could be said to have been designed not to deliver
this, it did lead to the dissemination ofPDSS technological knowledge across a
network of players in the telecommunications producer and user industries and
research institutes. They provided the basis for further development work on System
12 (and indirectly, could be argued to have provided a spring board for the later HJD-
04 project).
Comparative analysis of these two attempts to develop PDSS technological
competence suggest that there is not a rigid division between importing production
competence (the focus of System 12 technology transfer) and indigenous technology
innovation capacity (the focus ofHJD-04). The two cases remind us that there are
different routes to achieving technological capabilities. The wholesale import of
production technological competence for a complete PDSS system (System 12) gave
less scope for acquiring and applying innovation capabilities than the HJD-04 case,
particularly in relation to the core technologies which were proprietary. However this
did not prevent an important local innovation effort around adapting System 12 to
Chinese circumstances. The Chinese HJD-04 development has been extremely
successful in the way that it made selective use of imported technological elements -
allowing the local developers to concentrate on those areas in which it was feasible
and most advantageous to have indigenous development. There is considerable scope
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for such a selective approach, that can combine pragmatic and opportunistic
considerations (as opportunities emerging from time to time in domestic and the
world market).
Standing back from these two cases, it may be necessary to rethink earlier discussion
of the "technological dependence" thesis with its implications that only indigenous
technology innovation capacity across the full range of technologies involved could
avoid such dependence. As these cases show, there are different routes for achieving
technological capacity. It is possible to combine local technological capabilities
flexibly with buying in foreign technological capacities through the market (in various
forms - varying from component technologies to finished solutions and the facilities to
make them). The proprietary core technologies (including a dedicated LSI chip) at the
heart of System 12 did pose an important constraint. On the other hand, it was not
clear to what extent it would ever be desirable to seek indigenous innovation
capabilities for all the elements of a complex technology such as a telephone
exchange. The growth of inter-operability standards and the marketing of cheap,
commodified and readily applicable tools and components represents a challenge to
the provision of technologies, (even complex large scale technologies such as PDSS
exchanges) as finished "system" solutions. The configuration of such complex
solutions from assemblages ofbought-in and custom elements is likely to become
increasingly common. In this context, technology innovation capability across the
board is likely to be unnecessary. It may also be undesirable. It potentially increases
the cost and time investment in a new technology. It may also encourage a
segregation ofnetwork from global development - which in the long term may
threaten local stagnation and loss of economic and technological competitiveness. The
development ofnew technologies is becoming one increasingly global activity -
particularly in the case of information and communication technologies with their
potentially enormous development costs. Only the strongest and most advanced
economies, if at all, could afford to "go it alone". Most countries (and all developing
countries, surely) will be faced to resort to global markets as well as domestic
development and production - thereby reducing the costs and risks ofwholesale
development.
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And at the firm level, the continued involvement of overseas suppliers was seen as
beneficial in that it kept Chinese firms in contact with global developments - not only
in the HJD-04 case but also in the supply of components for Shanghai Bell.
Technology production in a dynamic and global sector like CIT is likely to revolve
around combinations of local production and resort to the global market.
The other way in which the dependency thesis may need revision is in its privilege of
innovation over production capabilities. Despite the undoubtedly amazing
achievements of the HJD-04 constituency, it still faced enormous problems in
increasing production capabilities. And the limitations in technology innovation
capabilities in the System 12 case does not seem to have been overwhelming and has
not threatened the ability of Shanghai Bell from becoming the major PDSS supplier in
China. More important here was competitive supply ofPDSS technologies (between
overseas provision, various joint ventures and indigenous producers) which kept
product prices at a reasonable level. Though the perhaps implicit starting point of this
these prioritised the acquisition of innovation capabilities over production capabilities
- that does not seem to be justified by these cases. Acquisition ofproduction capacity
and domestication of component supply led to the widespread uptake ofPDSS
technological competencies in the Chinese telecommunications production sector and
public sector research institutes. It also may on immediate and vital contribution to
Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and it is to this point that we now turn.
7.4.3 Contributions to the Chinese Telecommunications Infrastructure
During last fifteen years ofeconomic reforms (1978-1993), China had succeeded in
both modernising switching technologies and increasing telecommunications network
capacity dramatically. In the end of 1993, China's telephone lines reached 25 million,
and the penetration ratio 20 phones per 1,000 people, compared to about 4 million
lines and 4 phones per 1,000 people in 1978 (section 4.2). In terms of switching
technology, China leapfrogged older vintages of technology, for example, analogue
automatic switches. About 98 percent of the cross-bar switches in provincial capital
cities had been replaced by digital computer programme-controlled switching systems.
Many rural manual exchanges had been replaced by digital programme-controlled
203
exchanges, and in some areas, first installation of telephone exchange directly entered
the digital realm. These achievement in China's telecommunications infrastructure is
prominent, considering both the rate of expansion and its poor starting position in
terms of technology.
We can see it would not be possible to achieve such a quantum jump without
introducing advanced foreign PDSS technologies. Along side with directly imported
finished PDSS products, locally produced foreign PDSSs, such as System 12 by
Shanghai Bell, EWSD by BISC and Neax-61 by a Sino-NEC joint production venture
(section 4 .3), contributed greatly to the rapid development of the Chinese
telecommunications infrastructure, and helped to meet China's exigent domestic
demands for adequate telecommunications services. In 1993, Shanghai Bell's share in
the PDSS market was as high as 50% (section 5.4.3), let alone the other two joint
PDSS production ventures.
Chinese PDSSs also played a part in the improvement of the Chinese
telecommunications network services. Though small, this contribution was important.
As the economic development as well as existing telecommunications network
conditions in different areas ofChina varies to a considerable extent, many inland
districts and rural areas lag far behind the coastal urban areas and large cities. Thus
demands for telecommunications services from inland districts or rural areas often
different from large cities. They are often not able to afford expensive foreign PDSS
exchanges. Apart from this, because their local telecommunications network and other
relevant conditions are usually poor, foreign exchanges are less suitable for them. In
these circumstances, as Chinese PDSSs, such as HJD-04, which was designed to meet
these local requirements, being low cost and easy to operate, etc., are able to cover
these areas very well.
7.5 Concluding Points
The empirical case studies show that transferring foreign advanced technologies made
a crucially important contribution to PDSS technology development in China. In the
situation lacking indigenous PDSS technological capability, a wholesale technology
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transfer is recommended; arguably, the weaker the existing technological capabilities
the recipient possesses, the more a comprehensive package of technology transaction
is needed.
The key requirement is selective utilisation of foreign technology. Here two elements
are essential: the type of technology and the type of technology transaction. These
two elements determine the availability and appropriability ofexogenous
technological competencies which are embodied in the imported technologies. They
also have an impact on the scope for local shaping of the imported technologies. The
strategy used in the System 12 case can be seen as involving acquisition of a "system
technology" which embodied a wide range ofadvanced technologies from the
industrialised world, plus foreign developers' technological, social and economic
knowledge and rationales. It established the wholesale technology transfer through
various formalised channels to allow the Chinese to gain access to these technologies.
In contrast, the strategy adopted in the Chinese HJD-04 development involved using
foreign standardised components as building blocks to create a Chinese PDSS
technology to fulfil local requirements. It also used foreign production equipment and
software design tools which China was lacking at that time.
Selecting a "system technology" like System 12 seems to be a correct choice, given
the circumstance that China badly needed PDSS technology at that time. Because a
"system technology" is difficult to master, the selection ofwholesale technology
transfer was also necessary. As noted above, the transfer of a comprehensive package
provided the Chinese in Shanghai Bell with access to virtually every technology of
System 12. The weaknesses are that this strategy requires huge investment, and bring
technical difficulties. As it requires tackling a wide range of challenges, particularly
the production of proprietary LSI chips, there is high risk of failure, and so potentially
of huge losses. Apart from this, because System 12 is a foreign developed proprietary
system, some core technologies of the system are not appropriable by the Chinese
(due partly to low existing technological capabilities and partly to high expenses and
effort that Shanghai Bell could not afford at the moment). Because of the nature of
the transaction, the scope for social shaping of System 12 technology is confined to
customising its application layers and its export capacity is also very limited.
205
In contrast, by selecting the purchase of standardised "component technology", which
is usually available and cheap in the world market, the HJD-04 developers by-passed
the weakness ofChina's existing technological capability in electronic component
design and production. At the same time, this allowed the Chinese developers to
concentrate on the system design which the Chinese developers had strengths to meet
local requirements, while leaving the technologies in component design and
production to be black-boxed for the time being. As this is a Chinese designed system,
it can in principle always be improved and innovated in line with the needs of Chinese
users. Of course, to pursue this strategy requires indigenous PDSS technology
creating capabilities, i.e. Chinese developers must possess adequate knowledge about
digital switching technologies. Apart from that, the shift of the main technology of
switching system from electric-mechanical to computer technology also provided a
chance for CIT to get involved in PDSS technology design and be able to fully use its
computer design expertise and apply rapidly upgraded technologies in electronics and
computing to the Chinese PDSS.
It seems that the System 12 project has been very effective eventually in meeting the
pressing domestic demands from the rapid economic growth and the modernisation of
the Chinese telecommunications technologies and providing adequate
telecommunications services. In addition, this project played a role as a source of
advanced technologies which enabled flows of some kinds of technological
knowledge more broadly across the country. To some extent, this strategy made
possible the emergence of the HJD-04 project. Without the comprehensive transfer
package ofadvanced system technologies like System 12, the Chinese system HJD-04
development might not have taken place. Thus it is the coexistence of foreign
advanced PDSS systems like System 12 and Chinese PDSS technologies like HJD-04
which is most important for China. This has created a dual development environment,
which allows two technologies to compete with each other. On the one hand,
existence of the foreign PDSSs forces Chinese PDSSs to meet international standards,
and on the other, the existence of Chinese indigenous PDSS technologies means that
many features not available in foreign PDSSs can be developed to better serve
Chinese users who have particular needs, e.g. low price, a simple system that is easy
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to operate and maintain and is able to work in poor local telecommunications
conditions, etc.
There are differences between firm level and national level in terms of technological
capabilities. In the light ofboth the System 12 and HJD-04 cases, we can see that
China as a whole has now obtained considerable PDSS technological capabilities in a
range of areas from production, engineering, operation, services to creation and
innovation. Notwithstanding this, in general technological capabilities of individual
firms are still weak, and in particular in local industries which are till struggling to
improve their technological capabilities in production, marketing and management
which are operational and basic for a firm to survive. To some extent, acquisition of
these technological capabilities needed to produce and implement PDSS technologies
are more essential than capabilities in creation and innovation, certainly at this stage in
Chinese development. These capabilities are associated with not only a few extremely
highly skilled and creative engineers and technologists, but rather involve a wide
range ofplayers including not only producers and technological specialists, but also
users - and not only those within the same industry but also in other industries which
are suppliers ofmaterials or components or product consumers. In China, production
capabilities at firm level were so poor, that the improvement almost has to start from
scratch. Problems in production quality control and efficiency are still major obstacles
for all Chinese industries. Firms like Shanghai Bell which have achieved high
productivity and quality levels are few and far between across the country. Firms like
LTEF are more typical among those in the state-owned sector. There is still a long
way to go for Chinese firms to possess technological capabilities in creating and
innovating technologies like the system HJD-04.
The System 12 and HJD-04 cases show the importance of technological learning,
through which the Chinese could be able to master foreign advanced technologies, to
adapt foreign technologies like System 12 to the Chinese telecommunications
network, and moreover to create Chinese indigenous systems like HJD-04. Four
elements are essential in the process of technological learning. First, formalised means
are needed, e.g. technological training, operating with technical assistance, etc.
Second, these are complemented by wider informal avenues for technological
207
learning. Even making advanced technology products available through the market
has given opportunities for users to compare different products and therefore learn
what quality a user can expect. Third, mass involvement in technological learning is
crucial particularly for improving firms' technological capabilities in production.
Fourth, it is necessary to have an environment which creates incentives for
technological learning. A supportive macro environment is so crucial for technological
development, that is the other main concern of this study which we will discuss in the
next chapter (chapter 8).
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Chapter 8:
China's Changing Socio-Economic Context
for PDSS Technology Development
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8.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 left one very important issue to be discussed, which is essential to the
effectiveness ofutilising foreign advanced technologies and building up indigenous
technological capabilities. This is also one of the two major concerns of this study -
the wider social and economic context of a country in which technology development
takes place. In the light of the empirical case studies, this chapter focuses on the link
between technological development and the restructuring of the national system of
innovation during China's social and economic transition from a centrally controlled
socialist state to a more market oriented system. Two key elements have been crucial
to the above issues, state intervention and market forces. As there has been long¬
standing debate about the issue of state versus market, this chapter will focus
specifically on their roles in relation to the PDSS technology development in China.
There are five sections in this chapter. Section 8.2 examines the changes in the
national system of innovation in China during the social and economic transition.
Section 8.3 further explores the role ofboth the state and the market, in relation to
the PDSS cases. Section 8.4 highlights the policy implications following on from the
discussions in previous two sections. The final section, 8.5 sums up and presents
concluding points drawn from previous three sections. In particular, it seeks to answer
research questions raised in chapter 2 relating to the wider social and economic
context in China where the PDSS technological development took place:
• How has China's transition - both the opening up ofmarket forces and the
changing institutional context - impacted on the development ofPDSS
technology?
• What implications can be drawn from the Chinese PDSS cases about the
respective roles of state intervention versus market forces?
• What are the changes of the forms of state intervention of the Chinese government
over time during the transition and their links to different outcomes?
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8.2 National System of Innovation
Chapter 2 already pointed out the increasing interest within technology studies in the
concept of "national system of innovation", addressing the links between
technological dynamism and institutional structures and incentives for innovation. This
section discusses how China's national system changed over time, from a rigid
centrally planned system to a more dynamic one, during its current transition. In the
light of the two empirical cases, it seeks to map out how the introduction ofmarket
elements altered the links between players involved in technological activities and
generated incentives for them to explore technological opportunities, to engage in
technological learning and, ultimately, to build up technological capabilities of the
nation.
This section first looks into the problems of the Chinese socialist state in terms of its
institutional structure and the incentives offered by the system for technological
change (8.2.1). These problems were inherited from the socialist system and were
deeply rooted, and state-owned firms like LTEF still suffered to this date from then.
Section 8.2.2 explores how the introduction ofmarket mechanisms in China has
enabled new links to be developed between technology R&D institutions, producers
and users, and brought about incentives to the system for adopting technological
changes. Despite this, the analysis of the empirical cases shows that state intervention
has also greatly contributed to the PDSS technological development (8.2.3).
8.2.1 Problems Inherited from Socialist System
China just as most developing countries lacks technological resources, and its
technological capabilities in general lagged behind the Western world for centuries.
However, while making this comparison at two different levels, the national level and
the firm level, we can see that the latter is far lower than the former, which was also
concluded in chapter 7. In the case ofChinese PDSS technology, the country as a
whole has acquired considerable technological capabilities not only in production,
operation and services, but also in creation and innovation. However, individual firms
are still struggling for their basic technological capabilities from scratch, such as
production, marketing, resources allocation, etc., needed for firms to survive in a
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more market oriented economy. The lack ofbasic technological capabilities of
individual firms was deeply rooted in the old Chinese socialist centrally planned
system.
As was discussed in chapter 2, from the view point ofnational systems of innovation,
the conventional system of socialist states had two fatal weaknesses in relation to
technological dynamism:
a) the central planning mechanism could not effectively link technology developers,
producers, financiers and users;
b) it could not generate incentives in a regular basis for technological changes.
Under the centrally planned system, even within the same industry, the connection
between R&D institutions and production firms was mainly through the planning
system. R&D institutions worked according to plans. So did production firms. All
their resources, including human, material, and finance were administratively arranged
through specified state agents. So was the allocation of products. R&D institutes
received technology development projects, together with the package of resources
needed, from their superior managerial organisation. Their newly developed
technologies were therefore freely transferred to production firms. In a similar way,
firms received new technology projects, and accordingly their products were
attributed to users at more or less fixed price by the state.
When users had no option, but could only get what firms produced, then users' sense
of quality was suppressed. Without needing to face competitive challenges, producers
had little motive to pursue technological improvement. Typical illustrations have been
provided by the two case studies. For instance, were it not for the efforts of Shanghai
Bell, the local screw producers would have never realised that its production quality
needed to be improved. If it were not for the market mechanism, the electronics
component producer underMMEI would not have realised that its existing
production capabilities which were geared to producing components for the defence
sector could not meet the demands of commercial production (section 5.5.3). These
examples also reveal the fact that under the centrally planned system, the production
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design which was carried out in the laboratory often had virtually no connection with
what real production and commercial requirements were.
These are all fundamental problems stemming from the central planning system.
Because of these, financial resources might not go where they were the most needed
and might not be used effectively. Even the best human resources in R&D sector
might not be able to develop technologies that were appropriate for production
sectors or for their customers. Manufacturing enterprises lacked capabilities in
resource allocation and marketing, as they were not needed in the centrally planned
system. Instead, because of the Chinese socialist tradition, firms (especially state-
owned firms like LTEF) were encumbered with a substantial social function. These
obstacles greatly constrained the development ofproduction technology in the
centrally planned system. No doubt, to root out these problems far reaching changes
must be adopted across the entire system. Inevitably, this has to involve a wide range
oforganisations and peoples, from R&D institutions, manufacturing firms, financial
organisations to users, and from technology creators, designers, managers, engineers
to shop-floor work-forces.
8.2.2 the Introduction of Market Mechanisms
The empirical case studies have thrown light on the rapid changes occurring because
of the introduction ofmarket mechanisms. First, it brought about new types of
collaboration between R&D institutes and manufacturing firms. As shown in the
System 12 case, Shanghai Bell initiated technological co-operations with some local
universities and R&D institutes on quite a few occasions. Equally HJD-04 was itself a
successful product of technological collaboration between a military R&D institute
(CIT) and a state-owned switching producer (LTEF), and an industrial procurement
organisation (PTIC), the financial sponsor and the manager of this project. In
particular, the latter case clearly demonstrates the emergence of a new type of
collaboration that has brought in close links between technology creators (and
designers) and producers and users. It demonstrated the benefits of such co-operation
for product design: it enabled the design of technology to match the existing
production capabilities; and its technological modification and innovation to be carried
213
out on the basis of a better mutual understanding between designers, producers and
users.
Second, the introduction ofmarket forces has changed attitudes of organisations and
peoples toward technological activities. As the HJD-04 case shows, none of the three
key developers would have become involved in a project like HJD-04, without the
socio-economic transition from the centrally planned to a more market oriented
system. CIT as a military R&D institute would not have turned its attention to a civil
telephone switching development project, as its research project was decided by
higher military authorities. With the transition it was not only given greater freedom
to modify its activities to exploit financial opportunities, it was also under pressure to
achieve commercial development to safeguard its own economic security.
Opportunity and necessity were combined to force many People's Liberation Army
units to embark on commercial ventures. Similarly, as LTEF under the old system did
not need to worry about its production output, it could produce its cross-bar switches
for a long time without any changes. To a large extent, it was forced to explore
technological opportunities under the increasing financial pressure given the rapidly
falling demand for its existing cross-bar switches (section 6.3). The fact that PTIC as
a newly established industrial unit ofMPT became interested in this project was also
because of the new phenomenon ofmarket forces. Because technologies began to be
commercialised, there was no longer any free technology transfer even within the
sector (section 6.2.2).
Third, and perhaps the most important, is the creation of incentives in the system for
technological learning, therefore leading to the accumulation of technological
capabilities. As shown in both empirical case studies, firms like Shanghai Bell, LTEF
and other local component producers have been compelled by market forces to master
new technologies, to improve production management, to establish marketing skills
and to allocate resources by themselves.
Although it was in the first place set up by the Chinese government and afterwards
enjoyed privileges provided by the government, the new environment that Shanghai
Bell forced itself in stimulated the firm to learn to segregate its own business interests
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from that ofgovernments. On the one hand, it resorted to technical, financial and
political support from the central government, MPT and the Shanghai municipal
government, on the other hand, it rejected some interference from them which would
cut across its best interests. It co-operated with government to rapidly expand its
market share. Whereas MMEI wanted it to take the firm, which produced electronic
components (at high production costs) for the national defence sector, to be the
supplier of transistors and TTL circuits for System 12, however, Shanghai Bell
refused outright. Managers in Shanghai Bell might all have been accustomed to state
intervention in the old socialist tradition before they worked in Shanghai Bell, but they
learned quickly in a more market oriented context what the company had to pursue.
This was clearly shown by their interview responses (chapter 5, particularly
quotations in section 5.4 and 5.5). Their technological activities, such as technology
adaptation, domestication of component production, were selectively chosen, in order
to pursue Shanghai Bell's benefits. Their learning ofWestern managerial methods was
not a simple copying ofBTM. Rather it developed a hybrid style ofmanagement
between Western and Chinese methods through which it achieved high productivity.
In marketing and resource allocation, local managers articulated Shanghai Bell's
natural connections both domestic and overseas, and established specific measures
and policies in customer training, staff recruitment, technical collaboration, etc. to
maximise Shanghai Bell's profits (section 5.4 and 5.5). Without market forces,
Shanghai Bell might have become another "state-owned" firm and would have not
developed its capabilities in marketing, resource allocation and management, as it
received government protection in many aspects from the outset.
Similarly, under high pressure from the new and changing environment, LTEF has
been learning to build up its basic technological capabilities from scratch, although the
process was painstaking, as it could not shake off all of these social burdens inherited
from the past. However, it has been learning. Management learned to motivate staff to
work harder in the new environment by reforming the administrative system, by
setting up an internal labour market, etc.; to manage production and quality more
efficiently and effectively; to have greater autonomy in allocating human, financial and
material resources by its own; and to "marketise" its products by providing better
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quality products, services (and even adopt arguably corrupt measures) to win
customers. It was signals through the market mechanisms which motivated
understanding of customers' requirements of "quality", and set up criteria for
producers like LTEF to achieve. In addition, in such a more market oriented
environment, management and staff in LTEF were compelled to recognise the
ownership of technology and the potential power and profit attached to technology.
In addition to learning how to improve its basic capabilities, LTEF even decided to
master the innovating technological capability by setting up its own R&D institute
(section 6.3.2), although it might have a long way to go. Compared to Shanghai Bell,
this learning process taking place in state-owned firms like LTEF was far more
difficult. However, it was market forces underpinned by the emergence ofeconomic
necessities which made them want to learn (it could be said forced them to learn), and
this even involved a risk that state-owned firms might get bankrupted before having
accumulated basic capabilities needed to survive.
Alongside the contributions ofmarket mechanisms to national systems of innovation,
the state played an important role as a generator of incentives for technological
development, which we address below.
8.3 State versus Market
There has been a long-standing controversy about the roles of state intervention
versus market forces, as reviewed in chapter 2. This section explores these issues in
the specific case of public digital switching technologies in China's transition in which
market elements were introduced within what was at the outset a highly centrally
controlled system, and the transition to a more market oriented economy within the
framework of "Chinese socialism". It analyses the role which the state and the market
played in PDSS technology development during such a period of transition,
concerning their positive or negative consequences to PDSS technological
development, to the technological dynamism of the country, as well as to the society.
On this basis, it explores their complementary roles to each other.
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Section 8.3.1 discusses the negative consequences of the market forces presented in
the empirical cases, e.g. keeping technology secret from others, blocking the
technological information flow, damaging technological co-operation amongst various
players nation wide. Therefore, section 8.3.2 addresses the complementary role of the
state to the market on the basis of the empirical evidence in the two PDSS cases.
8.3.1 Market Forces - Two-Edged Sword
As well as the positive effects ofmarket forces on the innovation systems and the
economic system more generally that were noted in section 8.2, the case studies
showed that market forces can produce negative consequences not only for social and
economic development but also for the technological development of the society.
Profit is an essential element of the market mechanism. In the case ofHJD-04, the
incentives generated by market mechanisms induced technological secrecy and
protection amongst the three original developers and with the HJD-04 producers in
different sectors of the country. When HJD-04 technology development entered the
stage ofmarketing, and immediate expectations ofprofit come to the fore, friction
between the three developers took place, as each party had its own vested interests
and sought to pursue its own hopes to maximise income. Their behaviour in pursuing
profit from the technology greatly threatened the technological collaboration between
them. It blocked the flow of technological information needed between designers,
producers and users for further technology improvement and innovation. Conflicts
about which producers should be able to exploit the HJD-04 market also slowed the
pace ofHJD-04 production expansion, at the level of individual firms and nation¬
wide. This had strategic importance for the Chinese PDSS development as a whole.
HJD-04 was still embryonic and it needed to compete in the Chinese market with
foreign PDSSs, like System 12, which already had over half the market share in
China. IfHJD-04 could not expand its production capacity quickly enough, its small
market niche might not be able to sustain the technology improvement needed at
present and lay the base for future innovation.
Market forces drive individuals to pursue and maximise their own interests. Highly
competitive market might also induce firms to pursue short term profit, which could
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deviate away investment needed for longer term technological development. We have
seen in the empirical cases the clear difference between firms' interests and the
interest of sectors and the state in technological development. For example, firms like
Shanghai Bell had no interests in domestication of component production until
importing large quantity of components became inconvenient for its production. It
was also not keen to establish an R&D facility able to get involved in the core of the
System 12 technology, because this would not bring the company any immediate
benefit. It was the state which was interested in using System 12 as an advanced
technological resource in order to bring the country to a higher technological level.
Similarly, firms like LTEF had no interest in getting more switch producers involved
in HJD-04 production. PTIC was only concerned to take care of firms in its own
sector and tried to fend off all non-MPT producers. Concerning production expansion
and further technology development, it was in the state's interest to promote wider
technological co-operation across the country, e.g. between MPT and MMEI, in the
further development ofHJD-04, as MMEI was responsible for the electronics
industry. For example, this might be important for the future supply of components
for HJD-04 or its successors, if one day it is decided to shift toward domestic
manufacture, e.g. ofmicroprocessors.
We can see that market forces are two-egged sword which can produce both positive
and negative outcomes for social, economic and technological development. The key
question is the broader social and political frameworks which the market mechanism
is embedded. For example, the HJD-04 case demonstrated that the incentives could
lead to adoption of corrupt measures by firms (section 6.4.3). Given the newly
established yet incompletely developed legislative system, plus the lack of legal
tradition in China, and weaknesses in the internal administration and culture of firms,
companies tended to make deals in a "simple" way, by providing rewards to the
person who was in charge of the business. In these circumstances, economic
incentives could damage the social order rather than bear a positive result for
technology development.
Most common was the negative social consequences of the market competition, such
as mass unemployment, a widening gap between the rich and the poor, etc., which
218
could lead to social instability and unrest, and perhaps ultimately threat the survival of
the whole system. As we have seen in the Chinese case, the immense surplus of
workforce after the economic reforms became one of the major burdens of state-
owned firms, seeking to be competitive in a more market-oriented system. Under the
increasing pressure, the laying off" spare workforce by state-owned firms seemed to be
inevitable. As under the old Chinese socialist system, work units took full
responsibility for social welfare, loosing one's job would be equal to loosing
everything - being left with no social security, no health care, and no means of living.
The market mechanism itself clearly has no facilities to look after its victims. If the
market mechanism had been allowed to operate without limits in China, millions of
people would have been immediately redundant, and social stability would have been
at stake.
8.3.2 Complementary Role of the State to the Market
The empirical evidences presented above confirms the point noted in chapter 2 that
market mechanisms can fail and must be complemented by public controls. In
practice, there is no unregulated market in the world. Market mechanisms always
work within a broader social and political framework, e.g. the legislative system,
cultural system, etc. of a nation. State intervention is therefore necessary to offset the
inadequacies of the market mechanism and reduce some of the negative consequences
produced by it.
Apart from these general considerations, in the case ofChina, the introduction of the
market mechanism began within the framework of the Chinese socialist culture and a
centrally controlled system. As a result, the state's role was particularly crucial in
designing the whole process of the social and economic transition, in initiating and
directing the process, and waning away gradually the state's direct administrative
control over economic affairs, while concentrating on the roles necessary and
complementary to the market for national development as a whole. It had to find more
effective forms of state interventions.
The two cases show that government intervention brought about a range ofpositive
outcomes. First, the government policies set up the framework for Chinese PDSS
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technological development through technology transfer from abroad. The state
directly intervened in the selection of technology and negotiation of the deal ofPDSS
technology transfer to ensure the independent productive competencies of the country
in the PDSS and component technologies and to pursue the ultimate mastery of
foreign advanced technologies. In particular, telecommunication is a public good and
the backbone supporting the social and economic development of a country, and since
PDSS lies at the heart of the telecommunications network, it always requires
government attention to protect strategies for economic and public interests across
the country, the balance between different regions through systematic planning and
regulation. For example, using too many different PDSS systems could result
unnecessary large costs and complex ofmaintenance, because of their interfacing and
different maintenance skills.
Second, the state involvement in the dealing with foreign companies and governments
lifted the business deal to a level of state affairs which ensured the reliability of the
business deal, and overcame the weaknesses ofChinese individual companies with
little experiences in foreign trade. For instance, the enormous size ofChina's
telecommunications market was extremely tempting for all large PDSS producers in
the world. This placed the Chinese side in a powerful bargaining position and
eventually gained a fair deal and got the sanction lifted, which was posed by COCOM
against high technology transfer to China.
Third, the state intervention successfully gathered adequate financial, material and
human resources across the country in the support of the wholesale of System 12
technology transfer project. Like most developing countries, China's technological
competencies in general are weak. However, ifwe compare technological
competencies at the national level and the firm level, the former is much stronger than
the latter. This is also the case in terms of the firm's financial, material and human
resources. Only the state was able to overcome these weaknesses. The state
intervention noted above provided a powerful momentum for initiating modernisation
of the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, which was definitely necessary at
the outset of economic reforms and in dealing with a technology as complex as PDSS.
In the case of System 12, the state's role was so crucial that without it the whole
220
project would not have been possible or successful, in the circumstances that China
lacked PDSS technological capabilities and the national system lacked dynamism for
technological development.
Fourth, and more significant, the economic reforms led by the government created a
new national system of innovation, which is fundamental for the country's
technological development in the longer term. We have seen that during the course of
the System 12 project, there was a progressive shift in state policy towards a more
market oriented economic system through a gradual introduction ofmarket elements,
accompanied by loosening and decentralising state administrative control over
economic affairs, that transformed the entire system towards technological dynamism.
This new environment contributed greatly to the building up of the socio-technical
constituency of the Chinese HJD-04 technology, and to the late achievements of this
technology in production, marketing and further technological improvement, - even
though the case ofHJD-04 technology development did not directly involve
government intervention as the System 12 case did.
Finally, the state made considerable effort in facilitating and promoting technological
development at the national level. For example, it pursued the domestication of
System 12 component production; the rapid expansion ofSystem 12 production; the
integration of System 12 technical upgrading with the new regulations and demands
for the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure; the spin-off of foreign advanced
technologies from Shanghai Bell to local industries; etc. All these confirm that the
state role is needed, especially for the longer term development of the country.
However, not all of these efforts were successful, as state intervention proved to have
negative consequences too. The System 12 case showed that state intervention could
result in inefficiency ofallocating resources. The government policy ofpursuing
import substitution was not very successful at first in the case of the domestication of
System 12 component production, and the financial investment of the government and
effort dedicated into this project did not bear expected results. The main question may
well be the implementation of the state intervention, rather than the role of the state in
concerning the whole country, which we will discuss in next section .
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8.4 Policy Implications
The previous sections (8.2 and 8.3) have already made a number of observations
about the role of state intervention in PDSS technology development in China. It is
important, at this point to have a further discussion of two related questions. In the
light of the case studies, it needs first to note the changes in state intervention over
time during the social and economic transition, and second to identify the different
forms of intervention adopted and their different consequences, positive or negative.
In this way, this section seeks to spell out the implications of the Chinese empirical
cases, for the policies of the Chinese government for technology development and for
transforming the national system of innovation in relation to future PDSS
technological development.
This section starts by identifying the diverse forms of state intervention presented in
the two PDSS cases and explores how they changed over time during the period of
social and economic transition in China (8.4.1). It stresses that the state is not
homogeneous, and different ways of implementation can produce different outcomes.
It then discusses major government policies relating to PDSS technological
development in the past and to technological dynamism of the country and their
implications for future PDSS technological development (8.4.2).
8.4 1 Changing Forms of State Intervention
The form of state intervention has changed since the beginning of the transition. When
the System 12 project was initiated, state intervention was still so direct that the state
was the sole project designer, organiser, conductor and manager. Through an array of
policies - including the wholesale System 12 technology transfer; component import
licences (and the quota allocated for low tariff imports) and compulsory objectives for
domestication of component production; the measures to restrict the number of kinds
of foreign PDSSs in the Chinese telecommunications networks; and initiations for
technology spin-off to local industries - we can see that the System 12 project
embodied almost every element ofgovernment strategy for technology development
of the country, relating to its three-step technology development policy.
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With the deepening of the economic reforms, government control over firms like
Shanghai Bell and LTEF became more indirect. Except for the particular link with
MPT and the Shanghai municipal government, Shanghai Bell mainly benefited from
being a joint venture and the "source of foreign advanced technologies" in particular.
It enjoyed the general support from government policies: the low rate in taxation,
more autonomy in business management, direct trading with foreign companies, more
flexibility in currency exchanges, etc. In the domestication of System 12 component
production, apart from the fact that the government still kept the control of
component import tariffs, the direct intervention was largely reduced. It would seem
that, as firms became more independent from the state and tended to pursue their own
objectives and survive the market, direct government intervention became difficult and
less appropriate.
In the HJD-04 technology development, the government did not give any direct
support until the technology design had been proved successful. But this project was
indirectly stimulated and initiated by a series ofgovernment economic measures and
the general policies of the government for national technology development. HJD-04
represented a very different model than the conventional top-down approach,
exemplified by System 12, in which the government directly decided the objective of
technology development, laid out a large investment, and appointed technology
developers. Instead, the idea ofdeveloping a Chinese PDSS was brought by a
technologist. His personal attributes, which were crucial for HJD-04's success - his
creative personality, entrepreneurial gifts and required technology expertise - would
have mattered little, had it not also been that the Communist Party called for the shift
of the central focus ofmilitary R&D and the market gave out strong signals indicating
the enormous and increasing demand for PDSS technologies. Moreover, the
government dual development policy made foreign PDSSs available in the Chinese
market (including the System 12 technology transfer), which allowed PDSS
technological information flow through both formal and informal channels to diffuse
within the country. Similarly, the eventual construction of the HJD-04 sociotechnical
constituency can be more or less implicitly and explicitly linked to the government
policies to introduce market mechanisms and pursue dynamism in the whole national
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systems. The state budget and schemes for supporting new technology production
were not attributed according to prior centralised plans, rather they were granted to
projects like HJD-04 after the technology proved to be successful.
We have discussed in chapter 2 the negative consequences of the centrally controlled
system, that the system itselfwas so rigid that it could not handle effectively the
information flow between the R&D sector, industries and users and the complex
mechanism of interacting between them. Take the project of the domestication of
System 12 component production as an example. For each sub-project, many factors
had to be considered by the organiser, the Shanghai municipal government. These
included not only the problems of technology, the finance for each sub-project, but
also the attitudes of Shanghai Bell and local producers, and the changing trends of
technological development. Moreover, when the major players were not fully
committed to the domestication, much important information could simply be
withheld by them. These problems might in principle be overcome through more
careful planning and closer monitoring of the process ofprojects by the government.
However, it would simply have been too demanding for the government to deal with
every single project in this detailed way. The state ability to become directly involved
in such economic planning, particularly in a context of technological dynamism, is
constrained both by its lack of access to the requisite technological information and its
limited decision making capacity.
In addition, as already noted, state intervention is not homogenous. The state itself is
fragmented, and its different parts tend to have sectional perspectives depending on
their responsibilities, traditions, external constituencies and knowledge base. For
example, MPT was the main state body involved in conducting the System 12 project.
However, it was concerned with the telecommunications sector. It gave as much
support as it could to Shanghai Bell to make the project work. When conflicts arose
between PTIC and MMEI, MPT took the side ofPTIC, trying to keep the HJD-04
exchanges that were being produced byMMEI's firms out ofthe public
telecommunications network. On the other hand, MPT was not really involved in the
domestication of System 12 component production, although it is also in the interests
of the state. In contrast, MMEI and the Shanghai Municipal Government both actively
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pursued the domestication project. Differences emerged between them. MMEI
wanted Shanghai Bell to take its own firms as component suppliers, while the
Shanghai government preferred for Shanghai Bell to resort to local Shanghai
industries and bring them up to the required level of technological capabilities.
The above analysis may suggest three points in relation to technology development in
China. First, the government role in the technological development in particular a
complex technology like PDSS seems to be evolving from direct intervention towards
more indirect actions, seeking for example not to direct facilitating technological
change, but to facilitate change and promote technological activities in a direction that
would seek most ofbenefit for the entire country in the long term. This represented a
gradual transition from the previously top-down process.
Second, some direct intervention may still be needed, as the state is the body
responsible for taking a general longer term view - for example the requirements for
national technological development. Since developing countries like China are
constrained by a lack of resources especially in relation to technology, human
resources and finance, nation-wide co-operation through the government intervention
could be effective in creating and pulling together scarce resources. This is not to
suggest a particular model for state intervention. The form ofgovernment intervention
can be extremely diverse - ranging from direct control over individual projects, as the
state did in the case of System 12, to facilitating and promoting technological
changes, as the role the state played in creating economic incentives for technological
dynamics, which indirectly helped the emergence of the HJD-04 project. Our
considerations suggest that direct intervention may be most of risk ofgiving rise to
negative side-effects or inefficiencies given the complex social elements involving in
technological development processes. Thus direct state intervention needs to be
carefully planned and implemented.
This brings us to a third and final conclusion - that state intervention is not
homogenous, and that different ways of implementing state policies may well bear
different results.
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8.4.2 Policy Implications for China's Future PDSS Technology
Development
Government policies in two areas need to be reviewed here: one is the policies having
impact on PDSS technological development, the other is the policies which created
new national systems of innovation. The former encompasses dual technology
development policy, three step development strategy, import substitution policy in
accompany with import licensing and tariff control, etc. The latter consisted of a
series ofpolicies being introduced in the course of socio-economic transition over
time.
The government's dual technology development policy - of so-called "walking on two
legs" - combining foreign and national aspects in the technology development seemed
to have been extremely effective in PDSS technology development during China's
socio-economic transition. Within this policy, the specific three-step technology
development strategy identified by the Chinese government - involving respectively
bringing in foreign product; technology transfer, and then indigenous development -
has been successfully pursued in the PDSS technology field, and has yielded fruit. The
import of foreign finished PDSS helped, especially in the beginning ofeconomic
reforms to solve the urgent problems, in the face of the lack of indigenous technology
capability, to meet acute domestic demands for PDSS technology and contribute to
rapid renewal of the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure. This also provided
some information about advanced technologies and in particular allowed the society
to develop new requirements and criteria for PDSS technologies. At the same time,
government policies to deepen the economic reform, such as progressively
introducing market mechanisms, loosening state control over economic activities,
facilitated this process.
Wholesale technology transfer into China of telecommunications switching
technology, the second step, began early, around the same time as the first purchase
of foreign advanced PDSS exchanges, with clear the intention ofbuilding up Chinese
PDSS production capacities and to meet the foreseeable increasing domestic PDSS
demand. Local PDSS production capacities has contributed greatly to the
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modernisation of the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and curbed the
increasing import of finished PDSS exchanges. More importantly, the first two steps
effectively enabled a wide range ofpeople from designers, producers to users to get
involved in technological learning and to accumulate technological capabilities - as
indicated in chapter 7.
Indigenous technological development as the third step, including adapting foreign
advanced technologies, spinning offadvanced technologies to other local industries,
and even developing Chinese PDSS technology, has therefore notably benefited from
the previous technological activities. Without them, the Chinese HJD-04 technology
development might not have been able to selectively utilise the international
technology market and embark directly on designing a Chinese digital programme-
controlled switching technology without repeating protracted development stages
which preceded them in the industrialised world.
The coexistence ofChinese and foreign PDSS technology in the Chinese
telecommunications market not only helped to meet diverse requirements of domestic
customers for PDSS technologies, but also propelled both technologies towards
further technology improvement and innovation toward high quality products and
service as well as low prices.
Ironically, the HJD-04 development did not get much attention and support from the
government, especially in the initial stage of technology creation. MPT even tried to
stop the process, regarding this project as an unnecessary "duplication" and
competition to its own candidate for an indigenous PDSS. This attitude did not
change until the HJD-04 technology proved to be successful. At a later stage, the
dispute between MPT and MMEI did not help to unite HJD-04 production capacities
cross their respective industrial sectors. Rather it ruled out the cross sector
technological co-operation which could have enabled rapid expansion ofHJD-04
production.
HJD-04 technology was still embryonic. The state-owned companies that produce it
faced constant problems and pressures from the broad economic transition. Compared
to privileged joint ventures like Shanghai Bell, state-owned firms like LTEF arguably
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needed more government attention. For example, HJD-04 producers might need the
government to grant them direct access to the international electronics market and
autonomy to arrange adequate foreign currency for purchasing HJD-04 components.
As we have noted, state-owned firms like LTEF faced not only the problems of
resource shortage, but also the inherited social and economic burdens. In addition,
because the market mechanism does not automatically give priority to indigenous
technologies like HJD-04, intervention by central government is needed to encourage
indigenous technological development.
Contrasting MPT's attitudes toward HJD-04 and System 12, so far, it seemed that
MPT has been more concerned with the rapid expansion of local production of
foreign PDSSs like System 12 to modernise public telecommunications network and
meet urgent domestic demands than the Chinese HJD-04 PDSS technology
development which might bring about benefit in the longer term. Indeed, it is often
difficult forMPT to balance the short term and longer objectives of the PDSS
technological development to the country, given the growing domestic PDSS market.
The government's early attempt in restricting the number ofdifferent types of foreign
PDSSs did not sustain, because the later decision of the government under the
pressure from Western governments and US in particular to open even wider the
Chinese telecommunications market to the world (section 4.3). This does not mean
that the government earlier effort was wrong. Rather, it demonstrates the important
role of the central government in dealing with foreign trade to balance different
interests of the country.
In relation to government effort in import substitution, the frustrating experience does
not necessarily suggest that the policy was wrong as addressed above. It at least
helped local industries to understand the essential elements ofproduction linking to
the world standards and compelled individual firms to accumulate the basic
technological capabilities needed to survive in a more market-oriented environment.
The forms of state interventions and the ways of implementing the state policy need to
be carefully considered, as discussed early.
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8.5 Concluding Points
The two Chinese case studies showed that firms lacked even the most basic
technological capabilities, such as production quality control, marketing, resource
allocation and management. These problems are deeply rooted in the old institutional
framework ofChinese state socialism. Technological development is a complex social
process which involves a much wider range ofdifferent groups and organisations than
was presumed in traditional models of socialist planning. In chapter 7, it was already
noted that mass involvement in technological learning is crucial for improving
technological capabilities of a firm and a nation. Technological learning is not only
associated with those directly involved in the processes of technology creation and
design, but also producers and users. Indirectly, the circle of relevant actors may well
be much larger, involving perhaps financiers, educators, students, local and central
policy makers, etc. To enable the effective exchanges of technological information
between institutions and individuals in the society requires an supportive institutional
framework and incentives for technological changes. In this respect the old centrally
planned system in China certainly could not provide such a national system of
innovation.
China's social and economic transition has introduced market elements into the
system. State administrative control over economic affairs has been gradually replaced
by market forces. With respect of the Chinese PDSS cases, we have seen that the
transition brought about at least three major important changes:
a) new types of technological collaboration have emerged between R&D institutes
and manufacturing firms;
b) the attitudes ofpeople and organisations, including R&D institutes, manufacturing
firms and others, towards technology have changed, and these bodies become
more involved in technological activities; and
c) technological learning has been encouraged and has involved more people and a
wider range of organisations in society, which has helped the accumulation of
technological capabilities at both firm and national levels.
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As noted in chapter 7, firms have been motivated to seek technological opportunities
and to build up technological capabilities. In particular, there have been rapid
improvement in basic technological capabilities at firm level, e.g. production,
marketing, resource allocation and management.
As the transition started from a highly centrally controlled system, the newly
introduced market mechanism has actually been working alongside the existing yet
reducing state powers. This study has shown that government interventions relating to
PDSS technological development have, so far, brought about a range ofpositive
outcomes. Without these state actions, neither the System 12 nor the HJD-04 project
would have not been possible and successful. In relation to the national systems of
innovation, the s^ate played major role in transforming the old rigid system into one
with more technological dynamism. Apart from that, state intervention in PDSS
technological development provided a powerful impetus to the modernisation of the
Chinese telecommunications infrastructure. The Chinese PDSS cases show that the
state and market forces can both generate incentives for technological development.
Moreover, because China's transition is more or less top-down process directed by
the government, the state as its designer, conductor, monitor and executive, is
therefore particularly crucial.
The Chinese PDSS case study shows that market forces can produce negative
consequences not only for social development but also technological development.
This was very much so in China's transition, in which old structures and traditions
inherited from the exist alongside the newly established systems, e.g. the legislative
system, government regulations relevant to the market operation, etc., which are still
incomplete, or have not been fully established within the whole society. The newly
introduced market mechanisms are still far from mature.
Therefore, state intervention is necessary to compensate the inadequacy of the market
mechanism, to confront negative consequences and to balance the interests of
individuals, institutions and the nation as a whole. Moreover, the state needs to
continually adjust its role in accordance with the increasing role ofmarket forces
during the period of transition. Some functions carried out by the state can be
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effectively replaced by the market, whereas others are always needed and may need to
be strengthened.
Concerning the particular development ofPDSS technology in China, state
intervention is needed at least for several reasons. First, the state role is necessary for
setting up the longer term development strategies and frameworks, e.g. through
wholesale technology transfer from abroad to build up indigenous technological
competencies. In particular, PDSS technology lies at the heart of the
telecommunications network which is very crucial for the social and economic
development of a country. Second, as PDSS is such an advanced complex technology,
its development and technology transfer from abroad need large investments of
financial, material and human resources. Thus, government effort may well be needed
to gather strong resources nation-wide and effectively utilise them to ensure the
success of technological development. Third, China as a highly populated country
with a potentially huge PDSS market, it is an extremely attempting market for all
large PDSS producers in the world. The country as a whole has a very powerful
bargaining position to deal with foreign companies and governments. This was
particularly important at the beginning ofeconomic reforms when China had been
isolated from international business society for thirty years, individual companies
lacked capabilities and experience in foreign trade and certainly were not able to
handle a technology transfer project like System 12. Even if they could, foreign
companies like BTM and the Belgian government might not be sufficiently confident
to commit such a large investment in China without Chinese government involvement.
Certainly, state intervention can produce negative consequences. As the Chinese case
study shows technological development involves many elements - social, economic
and political as well as technical. Many of these elements may be counterposed. In
addition, there is enormous uncertainty emerging in the process. Thus state direct
involvement often results in some negative side-effects, because it is always difficult
for state to manage such complicated and often contradictory technological
development processes. One aspect is that the information needed to manage this
process may often be in the hand ofprivate actors and be withheld for their own
particular interests. Apart from that, this research has shown that major problems
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surround the form of intervention, that is, the manner in which state intervention is
carried out. State intervention is not homogenous, and different bodies of the state,
while developing and implementing state policy, might well conflate their local
interests with the interest of the whole state or indeed nation.
The Chinese case also shows that the forms of state intervention have changed over
time during the transition period. With respect to PDSS technology development,
extensive government direct control, instruction, management and financial and
material support in the beginning of the economic reforms has been reduced over the
period of time. State intervention has become more indirect, through establishing a
legislative system and issuing regulations, through restructuring institutional
frameworks, measures and by setting up supportive schemes. Many of these are
generalised in their approach, procedures and effects rather than being concerned with
specific matters.
On the basis of above points, we may suggest that: i) there is a need to explore
diverse forms of state intervention, which can range from direct controlling individual
project to facilitating and promoting regulations and measures; ii) direct state
intervention to achieve particular social and economic goals may possibly bring about
unintended negative side-effects, because of the difficulties inherent in managing a
complex technological, social, economic and political situation; iii) there is a need to
identify different forms of intervention and selecting appropriate way of implementing
policy and suitable state body to carry this out; iv) indirect measures - e.g. through
using markets to motivate technological dynamism as well as regulations and fiscal
measures - are also needed.
We may also conclude that in general, the broad framework ofgovernment policies
for technological development and restructuring national system of innovation,
relevant to the Chinese PDSS technological development, are correct and necessary.
The government's dual technology development policy - "walking on two legs" - and
the three-stage technological development strategy have greatly contributed to the
Chinese PDSS technological development. In the first stage, China imported foreign
finished PDSS technologies which solved the urgent domestic demands, helped the
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construction of the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and, moreover,
provided a window for the Chinese to learn about advanced PDSS technologies. This
helped the second stage - transferring complete PDSS technologies like System 12
into China. This step has successfully built up China's PDSS production capacities
and has also greatly contributed to the modernisation of the Chinese
telecommunications infrastructure, bringing about a leapfrog in switching technology
in China, as noted in chapter 7. The first two stages provided technological resources
for indigenous technological development and both direct and indirect means for
technological learning. In a very real sense, without these, the Chinese HJD-04
technological development might not have been possible. Moreover, the coexistence
of Chinese and foreign PDSS technologies as promoted by the government's dual
technological development policy helped to meet the requirements of domestic
customers and in particular compelled indigenous technology producers to improve
the quality ofproduction and services and further innovate, as already noted in
chapter 7.
However, the Chinese PDSS technology is still embryonic, and the problems facing
HJD-04 are enormous. To compete with foreign PDSS products, including those
locally produced like System 12, rapid expansion ofHJD-04 production capacity may
well be needed, as well as further technological innovation. With increasing
production, domestication of components production for HJD-04 may need to be
considered. This suggests the need for a nation wide technological co-operation, (e.g.
betweenMPT and MMEI), only the government can play the role in cordinating the
matter. The Chinese PDSS case shows that there is a gap to be filled by the state.
The Chinese case proved that import licensing and tariff control as well as the
domestication project directly organised by the government more or less helped to
propel local industries into the technological learning processes. However it is equally
clear that this policy made little headway in the early stages because of lacking
impetus from local firms. Only later, when there was a broad coincidence between the
self-interest of firms, did these policies prove fully effective. Clearly, the form of state
intervention, and the circumstance of domestic component production needs to take
into account.
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Obviously, the restructuring national system of innovation is crucial for technological
development, however it has still a long way to go for the Chinese government.
Although some kinds of state intervention are always required to be complementary
to the market mechanism, the form of intervention needs to evolve continuously to
match changing circumstance, e.g. the maturing ofmarket mechanisms. In the
meantime, an appropriate social framework needs to be set up to work together with
market forces in order to reduce the negative consequences on technological
development as well as on broader society.
234
Chapter 9:




The preceding two analytical chapters, 7 and 8, discussed issues thrown up by the two
empirical studies and related them to the main research questions posed in chapter 2.
This final chapter seeks to link the conclusions from the empirical research to the
theoretical framework and concerns of this study. It further examines how relevant
these findings are to the main policy issues and concerns ofdeveloping countries,
especially for developing countries which have been socialist states. It also considers
the extent to which these findings may be specific to China and/or the particular
technology, PDSS. Finally it reflects upon the study undertaken to spell out some
implications and opportunities for further research.
This chapter is arranged in seven sections. Section 9.2, "Development or
Dependency", addresses the fundamental theoretical issues and policy concerns which
emerged from the review of literature in this area which provides the starting point for
the rest of the chapter. It reviews what China's experiences in PDSS technology
development may contribute to these fundamental issues.
The next two sections focus on the area of technological development in developing
countries. Section 9.3, "Technology Transfer and Indigenous Technological
Capabilities", explores the possibilities for generalisation about the notions postulated
in Chapter 2 concerning technology transfer, indigenous technological capabilities and
technological learning as well as their close links. Section 9.4, "Local Shaping of
Technology", relates the empirical findings to the perspective of local shaping of
technology, to analyse the strategies available for developing countries to selectively
utilise foreign technological competencies in order to meet local needs.
Section 9.5, "National System of Innovation" and section 9.6, "State Intervention
versus Market Forces", address respectively how China's social and economic
transition has contributed to technological dynamism with regard to the concept of
national systems of innovation and the policy debate on the complementary role of the
state to the market. As a summary of the concluding points as well as an evaluation of
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this study, section 9.7 brings forward possible contributions of this study to
knowledge. The final section (9.8) proposes issues for future study.
9.2 Development or Dependency
This study has shown how, in PDSS technological development, China has
successfully utilised advanced foreign technological competencies through technology
transfer to fulfil its national objectives in both technology and economic development.
In less than fifteen years, China managed to expand its telecommunications network
capacity 21 million telephone lines. It also modernised its switching technologies and
leapfrogged older vintages of technology (e.g. analogue automatic switches), by
replacing other lower technology switches with digital programme-controlled
switching systems. At the same time, China as a whole has built up PDSS
technological capabilities not only in production, operation, maintenance, but also in
innovation and creation ofnew technological knowledge.
This study shows that, given the right conditions, it is feasible for developing
countries to catch up and overcome existing "gaps" between the developed and
developing countries. Certainly, developing countries can benefit from advanced
technologies developed in the West. Technology transfer is a means for developing
countries to reap benefits from these technology without the need to recapitulate the
technological development that led to their creation. Developing countries while
transferring advanced foreign technologies may also be able to avoid some of the
mistakes that the West and NICs may have made in the course ofearlier technological
development and/or technology transfer. However, technology transfer does not need
to resemble the Western model ofdevelopment in the structures and patterns
proposed by modernisationists. Nor is technology transfer a simple linear process of
transporting geographically a technology from one place to another - as criticised by
dependency theories. As pointed out in section 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, technology transfer is
a complex process ofunpacking, mastering and assimilating imported technologies.
Strictly speaking, in the process of technology transfer, the original technologies are
altered. The success of technology transfer is bound up with the behaviours ofboth
suppliers and recipients, which involves a significant degree ofuncertainties. Whether
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the results of technology transfer favour recipients - the developing countries -
depends greatly on how the processes are carried out. This raises important questions
about how technology transfer projects are strategically planned.
Based on the evidence of the Chinese PDSS case, this study indicates that there is a
need for effective strategies to use available domestic resources, as well as to identify
and exploit opportunities emerging in the dynamic global economy, given that
developing countries lack financial and technological resources. The latter point
places developing countries in a rather a weak bargaining position in the international
markets. In this respect, this study confirms that the structural approach (section
2.2.1) by dependency theorists is useful for developing countries to understand the
potential pitfalls in development. However, it provides them with little practical advice
about how to avoid these hazards and further to actively make use of the emerging
opportunities.
It is a challenge for DCs to escape economic and technological dependencies. Since
the problems which were pointed out by dependency theories still exist, this study
suggests that they might be reduced, by means of, for example, selective use of
foreign technological competencies and their combination with local competencies,
through the local shaping of imported technologies. The empirical cases presented in
this study provide clear examples of this. This has underpinned the conclusion in
section 7.5 that the key questions for developing countries seeking to reduce
dependencies concerns whether they can successfully build up technological
capabilities through technological learning during the course of technology transfer.
This study suggests that the problems of dependency should not be reified or
overstated. In a sense, dependency is always mutual between technology suppliers and
recipients. For instance, in the Chinese case, China needed to gain access to foreign
PDSS technologies, while foreign switching producers needed to gain access to the
Chinese market. The question thus concerns the balance between them, and the extent
to which China can maintain the key advantage or gain even stronger position. These
considerations underpinned a number of important choices in the technology transfer
of System 12 technology. IfChina could not produce the specialised components
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required - in particular custom LSI chips - for System 12, China would have to rely
on foreign producers. If their production was monopolised, then the situation would
have been less favourable for China. In this situation, China could have lost the
balance ofpower and might have suffered from unfair treatment, such as e.g. high
priced components, outdated technologies, etc. What actually transpired in this case
was the opposite. China has gained a stronger position through technology transfer.
More importantly, China has developed indigenous PDSS technologies like HJD-04
which have the potential, one day, to compete on equal terms with foreign products in
the market. In these circumstances, China's dependence on foreign technology
suppliers does not necessarily mean that China is in an unfavourable bargaining
position.
This bears upon the controversies in development studies about whether the NICs'
experiences are relevant to other developing countries. The Chinese case confirms
that, although their circumstances may be rather different, some of the lessons drawn
from the NICs' experiences are useful - for example, that NICs could not only acquire
the capacity to produce Western technologies, but could also develop innovation
competencies. The key question for developing countries thus becomes how to
achieve technological dynamism (discussed further in section 9.5). It also shows that
the state can play a complementary role to the market mechanisms in providing an
environment for technological development (discussed further in section 9.6).
However, there may be limits in the extent to which one can generalise from the
Chinese experiences in PDSS technology development for developing countries. First,
China is a large country. In terms of its size alone, it has a special position in the
world economy and politics. Its huge market makes it an extremely attractive element
for many businesses across the world. For the same reason, it makes sense for Chinese
to develop its own PDSS technology which can best suit the Chinese conditions and
to compete with foreign products in sharing the huge domestic market. For small
countries, it may not be economical to do so, since the development costs for PDSS
technology are huge, and a small domestic market might not be able to sustain a
domestic production capacity, let alone further innovation of the technology. Second,
PDSS technology has particular social, economical and political significance, and is
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thus frequently subject to state intervention. Other technologies may well be different
in terms of these requirements.
9.3 Technology Transfer and Indigenous Technological
Capabilities
To a large extent, we can conclude that China's technology transfer from abroad has
been effective in respect of the acquisition of technological capabilities. The wholesale
of System 12 technology transfer provided avenues for technological information
inflow and a wide range ofmeans for technological learning. This also indirectly
provided the basis for the Chinese HJD-04 technology to emerge, which was enabled
by combining the selective purchase of foreign components (cheaper, standardised
microprocessors and design tools) and locally available expertise in computer design,
and the knowledge of the Chinese telecommunications system. Technological learning
- by using, operating, producing, adapting, designing, creating, innovating, etc. with
involvement of a wide range ofpeople - greatly contributed to the accumulation of
indigenous technological capabilities. The study highlights the importance of informal
as well as formal links and knowledge flows for this.
Chapter 7, on the basis of the empirical cases, has discussed the close relationships
between technology transfer, accumulation and indigenous technological capabilities
and technological learning (7.5.). These findings verifies the presumption indicated in
section 2.4.2 that technology transfer is necessary for developing countries to build up
technological capabilities. The key for ultimately acquiring exogenous technological
competencies which are embodied in the imported technologies are to select, unpack,
adapt imported technology. Rather than counterpose technology transfer with the
acquisition of indigenous technological capabilities, a close and well chosen
relationship is needed between technology transfer and indigenous technological
capabilities, especially in technologies like telecommunications which is globalised,
complex, huge development costs, network technology. All these match my
understanding drawn upon the literature review of the relationship between
technology transfer, indigenous technological capabilities and technological learning
(section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.).
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In respect of the concept of technological capabilities, distinctions have been drawn
between the capabilities ofproduction, operation, maintenance, resource allocation,
marketing, management, etc. and the capabilities of indigenous innovation and
creation - technological capabilities at basic and advanced levels (section 2.4.2). My
initial presumption prioritised the (advanced) technological capabilities of innovation
and creation, the same as much research which has regarded them as more important
for developing countries to overcome dependency. After completing the discussion
and analysis of the empirical material from the two Chinese PDSS cases (section 7.5),
it seems to me that this presumption was perhaps misplaced. Instead, the cases
demonstrate the pressing task ofDCs in developing and strengthening basic
(operational) technological capabilities. There are two reasons for this. First, basic
(operational) technological capabilities create the basis for wider advances in
economic growth and provide the foundation for the development ofmore advanced
technological capabilities, for example through the effective use of foreign advanced
technological competencies. The fact is that, in most developing countries like China,
these capabilities in general are weak. And this is particularly true for former socialist
states in which individual firms lacked these basic capabilities which were poorly
developed as a result of the central planning system. Second, the development ofbasic
(operational) technological capabilities requires mass involvement in technological
learning, demanding also a supportive social and economic system, in contrast to the
development of advanced capabilities in technology creation which focuses attention
more narrowly, perhaps on the activities of a handful of (maybe extremely clever)
engineers and/or technologists.
The findings of this study confirms that it is useful to distinguish the technological
capabilities at the national level from those at firms' level (section 2.4.2). It shows
that in a developing country like China, technological capability at the national level
can be much stronger than that at the level of the firm, although its mobilisation
depends on effective technological collaboration between organisations. For example,
there are few Chinese individual firms have PDSS R&D capacity but, having co¬
operated with R&D institutes, they can develop and produce PDSSs like HJD-04.
This highlights one of the major issues of this study, the role of institutional linkages
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and government policies in supporting technological co-operation and in fully utilising
existing technological competencies across the country.
9.4 Local Shaping of Technology
This study challenges classical intermediate/appropriate technology theories, which
suggested that advanced Western technologies embodied presumptions from their
development context that made them inappropriate for developing countries - thereby
foregoing the benefits that these powerful and efficient technologies might offer
(section 2.4.3). It applies insights from the social shaping of technology approach to
explore how developing countries can beneficially acquire advanced foreign
technological competencies. It highlights the scope for developing countries to
selectively utilise foreign technologies, and adapt them to local circumstances - and
addresses the range ofgovernment policies and technology strategies that may be
pursued.
The social shaping of technology approach draws attention to theprocess of
innovation: to the choices inherent at every stage of technological change and the way
these are affected by their socio-economic context as well as narrowly technical
considerations; to the negotiability of technology and the way that artefacts once
developed are not fixed after they leave the R&D laboratory, but may evolve and be
further innovated as they enter commercial production and use. Applying this
perspective to technology transfer highlights the possibility of the selective acquisition
of technologies as well as choices about which elements of technology should be
unpacked, adapted to local conditions or developed and produced locally. Therefore,
there is in principle a range of strategies available for developing countries to adopt,
accordant with their domestic requirements and their existing technological
capabilities as well as external opportunities. The empirical cases demonstrate how
different strategies have been successfully applied in Chinese PDSS technology.
Chapter 7 has already analysed and compared in detail the two strategies presented by
the case of System 12 and HJD-04, and discussed advantages and shortcomings of
using them in different circumstances.
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The SST approach is very useful here in distinguishing different types of technologies
in terms ofphysical artefacts which may be developed in different ways and offer
different scope for local shaping. In particular following Fleck (1988) (section 2.4.3)
this study suggests that complex modern technologies are increasingly
"configurational" (they may be acquired as technology assemblages ofmore less
standardised component technologies configured together with customised elements)
rather than as internally homogenous, monolithic "systems technology". Such
configurational technologies can be reconfigured in their implementation and use. This
study shows that even large scale proprietary technologies such as System 12 PDSS
can be unpacked and further innovated. This suggests that the ideal type of "system
technologies", against which concepts of configurational technology have been
counterposed, may not in fact exist.
Finally, as concluded in section 7.5, the study suggests that the type of technology,
and the type of technology transaction, together determine the availability and
appropriability of exogenous technological competencies which are embodied in the
imported technologies, and provide different means for technological learning.
9.5 National System of Innovation
The concept ofnational systems of innovation may be helpful for a country, especially
a developing country, seeking to catch up with technologically advanced and dynamic
economies. It draws attention to the socio-economic institutional framework for
innovation and to the influence ofgovernment policies. It highlights the links between
agents involved in technological activities and incentives for technological innovation.
From this perspective, we can see that China's social and economic transition,
involving the introduction ofmarket elements into the system to replace some state
roles, has contributed to the technological dynamism ofChina's national innovation
system. This has gradually overcome problems that had beset the socialist central
planning system, and which arose in particular from the poor links between R&D
institutes, producers and their customers. The study showed how, in this transition,
the market forces and government policies combined to provide important incentives
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for these players to seek opportunities from new technologies, to get involved in
technological learning, and to engage in collaboration to these ends.
However, to some extent, the concept of national system conveys an image of a
process that is systematic, ordered and stable. The findings of this study point to the
fragmented and chaotic nature of the social and economic system. The changing social
and economic context in China's transition suggests that it is unhelpful to search for a
single best model for a particular nation's system for innovation, as national systems
need to evolve in order to be best suited to promote innovation in a changing
commercial and technological world. Just as important, there may be no single best
national system for a country as a whole, not just because of regional differences, but
also because the features of different national systems of innovation for different
industries and different technologies may well need to be different.
9.6 State Intervention versus Market Forces
One of the main area of debate among different schools of thought within
development studies reviewed in chapter 2 concerns whether state intervention played
a positive role in economic development in NICs (section 2.2.2). The empirical
findings from this study show that state intervention can indeed play positive role; it
can also fail. Chapter 8 analysed failures of some state interventions in the two PDSS
cases. Two key elements have significant impacts on the outcomes of state
intervention: the form of intervention and the state body which carries out the tasks
(section 8.5). This study in particular stresses the need to explore diverse forms of
state intervention which may need to be adopted to meet continually changing
domestic and international environments. Also, it points out that state intervention is
not homogenous, as the state itself is fragmented, and each body of state has its own
vested interests and commitments which shape the ways it intervenes.
In relation to the debate about whether state intervention is necessary (section 2.2.2
and 2.3.3), this study rejects firmly the schools ofthoughts which believe in laissez-
faire approaches. The empirical findings from this study prove that although many
state roles can be more effectively replaced by market forces (particularly to create
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technological dynamism in the system, in primarily generating incentives for
individuals and organisations), some others are always needed, for example, to
represent national interests. This study fully agrees with these studies on the NICs'
experiences which emphasise the government roles in provision ofappropriate
macroeconomic policies and infrastructure; in issuing restrictions on imports for
industrial promotion, etc.; in formulation of the long term national plans for
investment and industrial development whereby to guide the market; and in control of
the content and pace of industrialisation (section 2.2.2). In its roles in guiding capital
investment and technological development, the state is able to provide strategic
direction which could not be guaranteed by the market-oriented behaviour of
individual firms. An important aspect of this intervention is that it complements rather
than displaces competition and the market system.
Chapter 8 also analysed some of the negative consequences of introducing market
mechanism in China's economic transition and the different reactions of agents
involved in technological activities to market forces in different circumstances arose in
the two PDSS cases (section 8.3.1). This shows that market forces represent a two-
edged sword. The analysis further confirms that market mechanism always works
within a broader social and political framework, for example, markets are always
subject to some form of regulations (section 2.3.3). Markets in the real world are far-
removed from ideal descriptions of the free market. As noted above in section 9.2,
this study goes further to argue that state intervention is needed to compensate for
some of the failures of the market mechanism, in particular to take responsibility for
reducing some of the negative social consequences that may be produced by market
forces. Relating this to the debates about socialist economics, it suggests that the
"simple dichotomy" between socialist and capitalist systems has little use for
developing countries. In practice, governments always face a challenge to reduce
potential areas of"market failure", to balance public interests and economic
efficiency, and to combat, or at least ameliorate, negative social consequences which
could lead social instability and could well jeopardise the development process of a
country altogether.
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9.7 Summary - the Contributions of this Study
In summary, the claims of this study to contribute to knowledge rest upon its
empirical strengths and significance, and on its success in integrating perspectives
from three broad fields: development studies; the study of socialist economies and
technology studies. The latter, and in particular the social shaping of technology
perspective, has opened up for enquiry the content of artefacts and innovation
processes and has, in turn, drawn attention to the range ofways by which developing
countries may utilise advanced western technologies in acquiring technological
competencies.
This study has presented a very detailed account of the development ofPDSS in
China. This isper se a significant area, as PDSS is a complex, large-scale technology
with strategic economic and social importance. There have been some other studies of
the development of telecommunications in China and other DCs and other
technological developments in China. However these accounts have often been of a
generalised nature, and overly dependent on national statistics and central policies.
What makes this study special is its highly detailed empirical analysis. This
encompassed the roles ofthe key constituencies involved in technology development
and the broader context. The cases document the changing behaviours of the actors
involved, and link these to the broad social and economic context which was changing
rapidly as a result ofChina's economic transition. Their roles have been explicated
through a comparative study of two significant but contrasting cases which highlight
two different strategies for utilising advanced foreign technologies.
This study applies perspectives and approaches from three disciplines: development
studies, the study of socialist economies and technology studies. In this way it
contributes towards a better understanding of the problems (and opportunities) of
developing countries - and in particular former socialist states - in technological
development. The social shaping of technology perspective suggests a need to shift
from the generic accounts ofunderdevelopment that have prevailed in development
studies and instead to open up the processes of innovation for detailed examination.
This enables a focus on the strategies whereby developing countries might benefit
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from modern technologies developed elsewhere. Like the earlier experiences of the
NICs, this study suggests, on the basis of the empirical analysis of the Chinese PDSS
cases that developing countries are able to utilise foreign advanced technologies
successfully. It further points to the range ofdifferent strategies that may be available
for acquiring technological capabilities through technology transfer and technological
learning.
In particular, applying an SST perspective, which opens up the composition of
technology for analysis, reveals that an advanced technology like PDSS is not unitary,
despite perceptions that it comes as a finished system. Instead technologies
increasingly take the form of complex assemblages of component and custom
elements. While it is possible to acquire foreign advanced technologies as finished
final solutions, as in the case of System 12, components and tools for building such
technologies can also be bought in. Such an insight calls into questioning the
presumptions of intermediate technology which see Western technologies as building
in sets ofpresumptions and values from the societies in which they were developed
which will remain inappropriate for the capabilities and cultures of developing
countries. Instead it shows that developing countries can resort to technologies on a
selective basis and further that there is scope to unpack technologies and locally shape
and reshape them. In particular, it demonstrates that developing countries can also
master advanced technologies by combining internal and external technological
competencies. Indeed this is likely to become an increasingly common feature. Under
the world trend ofglobalisation, self sufficiency of a country in the area ofadvanced
technologies is becoming less important - even developed countries may not be
feasible to maintain the full range of capabilities in a technology (as is already the case
in relation to micro-electronics and computing, except for a handful ofthe most
developed countries). Developing countries and even small countries, may be able to
acquire partial competencies in advanced technological fields.
This study sees technology transfer as not a narrowly technical issue, but also as a
profoundly social, economic and political one, linked not only to the domestic system,
e.g. institutional structure and government policies, but also the world technology,
economy and politics. The study shifts the focus from the static model of dependency
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that has underpinned structuralist and dependency theories in development studies to
a dynamic one presenting developing countries with a number ofoptions. It flags the
balance that exists between suppliers and recipients (at firm and at national levels) and
sees technology development as a strategic issue for developing countries in choosing
how to deal with a changing world, as well as an issue ofhow recipients to strengthen
their position by building up technological capabilities while suppliers are seeking to
maximise and sustain their position in the global market.
This study finds value in the concept ofnational system for innovation in drawing
attention to the crucial role of the broad social and economic context of technological
development in a country. On the other hand, it suggests that the concept ofnational
systems of innovation may prove unhelpful if they land to a static and undynamic
search for a single fixed best model.
Drawing on diverse theoretical roots the study highlights some of the features
underpinning the lack of technological dynamism in China's former socialist system. It
broadly confirms findings from studies of other socialist economies that the major
obstacles for technological development in China have been the weak operational
technological capabilities of individual firms, and those weaknesses are associated
with the socialist central planning system - the lack of linkages (and lack of incentives
for such links) between R&D and manufacturing organisations and with their
customers.
The empirical cases of this study adds rich materials to the understanding of the close
relationship between technology transfer, technological learning and accumulation of
indigenous technological capabilities. These are integrated into the discussion of a
range of technology strategies available to developing countries and in particular the
scope to selectively utilise exogenous technological competencies to meet their
optimal interests.
Much research has more or less explicitly prioritised the development of indigenous
technology creation capabilities (i.e. the capacity to create novel technologies), seeing
them as more advanced, and necessary to truly overcome dependency. (This was also
a personal presumption at the outset of the study, as stated in chapter 2). However,
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one of the key findings is that the firm's acquisition ofbasic (operational) capabilities
is perhaps the most pressing task. They are ofmost immediate importance in allowing
a developing country to benefit from advanced technologies; they strengthen the local
economy, and also provide the basis for further technological development, including
technological innovation, in both the firms which have received technology transfer
and their local suppliers. The development ofbasic (operational) capabilities requires
not just capital equipment and engineering knowledge, but also broader changes in the
social and economic system. For example a key feature was recognition of the
importance ofquality and meeting customer requirements. Such developments called
for mass involvement in technological learning. Given that innovation is not a linear
process, limited to initial R&D, the boundaries between technology production and
creation capabilities may not be clear cut - given the need to adapt technologies to
local socio-economic and technical contexts. Moreover, these may provide the basis
through technological learning for developing advanced indigenous technological
capabilities, including, as the HJD-04 case shows, technology creation capabilities.
This study shows how the increasing influence ofmarket forces contributed to
technological dynamism in China. However it does not favour a laissez-faire
approach. Instead it supports the view that the role ofmarket and state are
complementary rather than being counterposed, and in particular provides evidence
that state intervention plays a number of important roles in technological development
- in supporting the development of technological capabilities as well as its role in
pursuing broader and longer term interests. These issues arise in a number of social
formations, as well as just the case ofChina, suggesting that the traditional dichotomy
between "socialist" and "capitalist" countries may no longer be helpful.
9.8 Future Research
Inevitably when any research project is completed, opportunities remain to extend the
scope of investigation. In particular it proved necessary in this work to select two
cases for detailed study - Systems 12 and HJD-04. There was also a Chinese
developed PDSS, the DS-series (discussed in chapter 3) - although this was a more
conventionally planned project than the HJD-04 case which perhaps offered fewer
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insights. It was also less successful in many respects than HJD-04. However a study
of the development processes with the DS-series, in comparison with HJD-04, would
help to understand the more traditional model of technology development in China,
and might draw attention, for example, to the importance ofthe market in stimulating
close links between technology designers, producers and users, and how this shaped
the parameters of technological development process as well as artefacts.
In addition, follow-up research will be valuable on the two case-studies undertaken,
for a number of reasons. First, at the time of completion of fieldwork, the commercial
prospects for HJD-04 were far from certain. Subsequently it has been widely adopted
- having exceeded ten million lines in 1997 (China Daily, 28.8.1997). System 12 also
seems well entrenched commercially. As the market competition intensifies and shifts
from favouring supplier to customers, with the gradual maturation of the market -
particularly with the entry of the new player, National United Communications
Corporation (UNICOM)1, into the telecommunications services market to challenge
MPT's monopoly (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) - questions arise about
how Chinese HJD-04 systems (or for that matter DS or Systems 12) has been able to
sustain and improve its position in the market. If they succeed as said in "A
Postscript", it will also be interesting to see whether they can enter the international
PDSS market.
Second, questions arise about how the technologies of System 12 and HJD-04 will
innovate to meet continually changing demands of the Chinese market, and global
changes in telecommunications technologies. In relation to System 12, these may well
bear upon the relationship between Shanghai Bell and its parent company, and
whether it will be allowed to expand the realms of its technology innovation capacity.
In relation to HJD-04, it remains to be seen whether or how the rather disorganised,
and extremely "lean" collaboration, that sustained the original development ofHJD-
04, has been changed to support its further innovation.
Finally, follow up research could throw more light on the unfolding ofChina's
innovation system, as economic reforms gather pace - addressing, for example the
1 It was established in 14 July 1994 byministries ofElectronics Industry, Power and Railway.
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increasingly competitive nature ofmarkets and the emergence of a legal and policy
framework to support these.
Another set ofquestions, and further research opportunities arise about the scope for
generalising these findings. First concerns their applicability to other countries. Here it
might be interesting to compare the Chinese experience with the historical experiences
of the NICs to flag the role of their particular national contexts and the broader global
setting (for example when following the end of the cold-war, globalisation has
become the dominant trend). The latter suggests that development strategies must be
set against the evolving global technology context. The question becomes how
nations can develop policies and strategies to exploit emerging opportunities in the
world technology markets and strengthen their bargaining position.
There are further opportunities for comparison with other developing countries and
other transitional DCs like Vietnam in particular. There are important differences
between China and other DCs. It will therefore be interesting to conduct international
comparative research into PDSS development in other DCs (for example, to compare
socialist and non socialist states, large and small countries, etc.). There is a continuing
need for further systematic research for developing countries into the range of
technology transfer strategies, categorising their respective advantages and
shortcomings. Another dimension would be to examine other technologies which
might have different technical and market features (for example PDSS is very much a
centralised, large scale technology, subject to considerable direct state intervention in
both its development and use; rather different characteristics might be found, for
example, in areas such as computing which has more dispersed markets).
Further research may also be needed in relation to some of the research hypotheses
and questions of this study which were not fully answered. For example, these
suggested that the socialist government could act to reduce some of the negative
social consequences that might arise from a more dynamic and market oriented
economy. The detailed empirical focus of this study did not allow this to be addressed
directly. For example, further work could address to the extent to which the Chinese
government has been able to provide telecommunications services to the entire nation
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in a way which can help to reduce the gaps between rich and poor and between more
and less developed parts ofChina, rather than to widen them; and the interplay
between market forces and the state play in these development.
Following on from this are questions about the role of the state. The study showed
that the state is not able to carry out the kinds ofeffective, rational intervention
envisaged under models of socialist planning, but is instead, strongly constrained by
the knowledge and information it possessed and in its powers. The structure and
operation of the state and broader political culture are relevant to discussion of state
intervention. In particular, issues deserving further investigation include the roles of
different sections of the state (which is divided into central and local levels and
different functional areas) and how they work together. Different government policies
can have considerable consequences for national innovation patterns, regarding
investment, financial incentives for innovation, the development and application of
technological competencies, as well as the stability of the society and the quality of
people's life. It will be useful to address, through comparative analysis, the
approaches ofgovernments in developing country, and in particular to examine how
they balance the interests of individuals and the nation; short term and long term
objectives; and economic efficiency and public interests, as these are crucial for the
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